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JPRS-TAC-87-011

6 FEBRUARY 1987

Worldwide Report

ARMS CONTROL

DTIC QUALITY INPECTED 2

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for public release;
Distribution Unlimited

19980512 194

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WORLDWIDE REPORT

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR'S SAKHAROV RETURN, REACTIONS, COMMENTS ON SDI

ANSA Interview

AU271447 Rome ANSA in English 1019 GMT 27 Dec 86

[Excerpts] Moscow, 27 Dec [dateline as received]--Recently released Soviet dissident Andrey Sakharov said that one of the reasons that he is returning to the Soviet Academy of Sciences is to work for nuclear safety to avoid incidents like April's Chernobyl nuclear reactor disaster, in an exclusive interview to ANSA.

In his ANSA interview, Sakharov repeated his opposition to the American "Strategic Defence Initiative" (SDI) also known as "Star Wars." The Soviet physicist recalled that in a 1983 "open letter", made before Washington decided to go ahead with the SDI program, he had underlined the danger of developing "Star Wars" program that could easily be turned from a defensive system to an offensive one.

In his "open letter" Sakharov had defined any "Star Wars" program as a "cosmic Maginot Line" and that it was wrong to think that who controls space also controls the earth.

For Sakharov, "the most important problem today is the distrust that keeps the United States and the Soviet Union from negotiating and reaching an agreement that would satisfy both sides. He added that when the U.S. realises that it cannot continue a SDI program, "the political climate will change and it will be easier to set new bases for reciprocal trust" that will facilitate a compromise solution to the issue of disarmament.

Historian on Sakharov Return

DW300815 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 29 Dec 86 pp 87-89

[Interview with Soviet historian Roy Medvedev by correspondent Andreas Lorenz in Moscow; date not given]

[Excerpts] SPIEGEL: Does party leader Gorbachev not hope for some foreign-policy advantages?

Medvedev: He certainly does. Sakharov is definitely against an anti-missile system. In the sixties already he rejected a Soviet missile defense system, because he feared that such a shield could tempt Moscow to launch the first strike. If a PRAVDA correspondent today asked him during a press conference at the foreign ministry: "Tell me, Comrade Sakharov, do you think that Reagan's SDI program is reasonable?", he would of course say: "No."

SPIEGEL: But he would probably also protest against the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan?

Medvedev: Everybody knows that Sakharov condemns the war in Afghanistan. That makes his criticism of Reagan even more important. The Americans will be facing problems in that context, because they have closely linked their policy with Sakharov's fate. Now, if he, Sakharov, states that SDI is dangerous, harmful, and useless, Reagan may get into difficulties.

Further AFP Interview

AU301128 Paris AFP in English 1118 GMT 30 Dec 86

[By Milan Daragovic]

[Text] Moscow, Dec 30 (AFP) -- The West should keep up pressure over human rights in the Soviet Union, dissident physicist Andrey Sakharov, who returned here a week ago after seven years internal exile, said in an interview with AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE.

The Nobel Peace Prize winner said he was "sceptical" about the usefulness of the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and described as "monstrous" the April 26 nuclear disaster at Chernobyl in the Ukraine.

Mr. Sakharov, often referred to as the "father" of the Soviet atomic bomb, said that he was "sceptical" about SDI. He said, "I don't like this programme. It is destructive and useless. It does nothing for the salvation of humanity."

He said that for the moment he saw no reason for alarm about SDI. "There is nothing to suggest that one can produce space-to-surface strike weapons more effective than existing surface-to surface missiles," he said.

He did not believe it would constitute an effective defense against nuclear missiles. It would always be beaten by offensive methods, but he said "work on SDI is already under way in numerous countries, particularly in the United States and probably also in the Soviet Union."

Mr. Sakharov said he thought SDI should not be allowed to become an obstacle to the resolution of other disarmament problems. "You should always separate problems and resolve them one by one. There is no danger in studying SDI separately."

He said the "rigid package" unveiled by the Soviet Union at the Reykjavik U.S.-Soviet summit was wrong. "It compromises chances of reaching agreement. We do not know what happened at Reykjavik but if it is true that SDI was the main obstacle, this question should be provisionally left to one side and a compromise sought on it later."

"The United States and the Soviet Union must reconcile their points of view, stop accusing one another and try to find solutions calmly and without haste," he said.

DER SPIEGEL Interview

DW070921 Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 5 Jan 87 pp 96-102

[Interview with Andrey Sakharov and Yelena Bonner by DER SPIEGEL correspondent Andreas Lorenz in Moscow; no date given]

[Excerpts] SPIEGEL: Are you not surprised that the authorities even allowed you to give an interview to U.S. reporters in a national television studio?

Sakharov: Yes, there are changes in our country. I hope that it is not only a political demonstration for temporary goals, but that it reflects real change.

SPIEGEL: Did you expect that?

Sakharov: In general I did not expect that I and my wife would be released. Inwardly we were prepared for a very long, perhaps even for eternal exile. But then things developed with enormous speed.

SPIEGEL: Possibly you served party propaganda. For instance, you are against the U.S. SDI program.

Sakharov: I think that my release actually helps Gorbachev. I hope that it is not just propaganda, but shows real tendencies, which are necessary at the present stage of our social development. Maybe my release is even a test of how changes under Gorbachev in the Soviet Union will come off. I do not consider that a bad thing.

Bonner: Let me add that what Sakharov said in Gorkiy and Moscow was completely honest. On some points his opinion corresponds with the U.S. position, and sometimes with the Soviet one. Let me tell you about one case. Just a moment ago I called the telegraph office to send a telegraph by telephone. When I gave my last name, the operator replied: "A well-known name." I answered: "It is I." The reaction was: "Oh, we are very glad, we have waited so long for your return. All the best wishes to your husband. We wish you health and strength."

Sakharov: You mentioned antimissile weapons. My opinion about that problem neither corresponds with the official Soviet position nor with that of the Reagan administration. In my article entitled "The Danger of Thermonuclear War," written before Reagan announced the SDI program, but published later in the West, I stated -- and it is known to the Soviet leadership -- that such a system, which uses laser and particle beam weapons, is not efficient.

In a military sense I think that one can develop lasers, particle beam weapons, and cosmic cannons with the highest speed missiles, but that all such things can be surmounted by a strong opponent. For every defense system there is a method to surmount it which would require less of an expenditure than developing those defense systems.

On that point I agree with the official Soviet position. In the military field, the economy decides everything. Napoleon said that.

SPIEGEL: Where do you not agree with the official position?

Sakharov: I do not agree with the package Gorbachev tied up in Reykjavik. That means that there will be no progress at the disarmament negotiations, if the United States does not renounce SDI. I do not consider that principle a constructive one. The Soviet argumentation is not convincing.

SPIEGEL: Gorbachev argues: Treaties make no sense. If the Americans develop SDI, because with such a shield a first strike would become feasible.

Sakharov: It is wrong to make the decision on one problem dependent on another. SDI is a matter for the far future.

Its development began at a time of great international mistrust. Actually full confidence will only be possible if we solve a huge complex of problems, for instance, problems of the opening-up of society, regional problems, and problems of disarmament.

In the near future the Soviet Union will not be confronted with the danger that the balance of strength would be altered because SDI is still in a very early stage of development and will be so for many years, maybe decades. The USSR will do the same in that period, and it will be no threat to America.

The real danger existing at present is the ballistic missiles, which, by the way, also reach into space. Thus space is already militarized and that is what we must talk about. If -- as was obviously discussed in Reykjavik -- the missiles are liquidated by both sides, SDI will become useless. It will represent no danger, because there will be no weapons for a first strike anymore.

On the other hand, I think if SDI is not linked with other problems it may be possible to reach compromises calmly, perhaps on research work on a limited scale without expenditures going into the billions.

SPIEGEL: With what will you occupy yourself scientifically in the future?

Sakharov: From the moment I left classified work, and even before, I was mainly interested in the physics of elementary particles and the early history of the origins of the universe. I read scientific literature dealing with that problem in particular. Moreover, I plan to participate in a discussion about problems of controlling thermonuclear reaction.

SPIEGEL: Will you assist in developing defense methods against SDI?

Sakharov: No, I talked about basic research. If you ask me about projects in applied sciences, I do not plan to occupy myself with problems of military consequence.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

MOSCOW REPORT, COMMENTARY ON U.S. DRAFT ABM RESOLUTION

Congress Tables ABM Resolution

LD080740 Moscow TASS in English 0729 GMT 8 Jan 87

[Text] Washington January 8 TASS -- A draft joint House and Senate resolution on complying with and tightening the regime of the 1972 Soviet-U.S. treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems (ABM) was tabled at the U.S. Congress.

The authors of the draft propose that the Pentagon be banned from testing and deploying an anti-missile defence system or its components of sea, air, space or mobile land basing if a similar system or its components are not tested or deployed by the Soviet Union.

The draft resolution is fresh evidence of lawmakers' opposition to President Reagan's "Star Wars" programme which, once realized, will demolish the ABM Treaty.

Comment on ABM Resolution

LD102021 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1730 GMT 10 Jan 87

[Text] As has already been reported, a joint draft resolution of the House of Representatives and the Senate on the observance and strengthening of the terms of the 1972 Soviet-U.S. Treaty on limiting antimissile defense systems has been introduced in the U.S. Congress. The authors of the draft propose a ban on the testing and deployment of such a defense or its components so long as the Soviet Union refrains from this. Over to our commentator Vladimir Pashko:

[Pashko] Essentially the draft resolution is yet another attempt to fend off the administration's encroachment on the only Soviet-U.S. treaty that remains in force, which is blocking the militarization of space. The ABM Treaty prohibits the sides from creating early-warning systems which cover the entire territory of the country. However, the so-called Strategic Defense Initiative put forward 3 and 1/2 years ago by President Reagan envisages the creation of just such a system; furthermore, with space-based elements. I should note that this is the fourth legislative proposal now in the U.S. Congress of the new convocation which blocks the government's military program. The three others were introduced in the House of Representatives and envisage retention of the ban on the testing of antisatellite weapons, a return to observance of the Soviet-U.S. treaty on strategic arms limitation -- SALT II -- and a reduction in the yield of nuclear blasts carried out by the United States.

Attention is being paid to the fact that the draft of the latest resolution is a joint elaboration by members of both Houses of Congress. This, too, provides evidence of the growth on Capitol Hill of opposition to the Star Wars program.

The day before the appearance of the draft ABM resolution U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense Perle held a press conference in Washington. He focused his main attention on a justification of SDI and the line of the administration in refusing to reach agreement [dogoverennost] with the Soviet Union. He quite simply accused those who are against this of a tendency to express their opinion without analysis. But to state this is to engage in a distortion of the facts. It is primarily scientists who are against SDI. It would be just as ridiculous to accuse the legislators who protest against the militarization of space of incompetence. It is precisely an analysis of the situation that leads Americans to recognize the fact that a further growth in armaments, and moreover their introduction into space, would bear a real threat to the United States itself; that it is high time to move away from such a course. The program for the creation of a non-nuclear world put forward a year ago by the Soviet Union creates favorable conditions for this.

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CSO: 5200/1238

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS: PENTAGON TO EXPLOIT SPACE STATION FOR SDI

LD210317 Moscow TASS in English 2217 GMT 20 Dec 86

[Text] Washington December 20 TASS -- The Pentagon has made a decision in accordance with which the project of the construction of a U.S. orbital scientific space station will from now on be subjugated to aims and goals of the "Star Wars" program. THE WASHINGTON POST reports this with a reference to informed representatives of the Department of Defense.

This decision means that the orbital station being developed now will actually not be used for peaceful exploration of outer space. This decision also indicates that the United States unilaterally broke its obligations to a number of allied countries earlier invited to take part in the project. The talks on cooperation in the sphere of the construction and uses of the station had been conducted among the United States, the European Space Agency, Japan and Canada.

On the insistence of the Department of Defense these consultations had been put off "indefinitely." The newspaper writes that the U.S. military circles do not want even the United States' closest allies to get an access to the latest technology developed in the framework of the "Strategic Defense Initiative."

New York December 20 TASS -- THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR learned that the Strategic Defense Initiative organization had turned over to the Energy Applications and Systems Corporation 90 thousand dollars to develop an anti-missile space gun. The design envisages the use of the energy of nuclear explosion to speed up the flight of shells in outer space. The gun is planned to be deployed on combat orbital stations being created under the "Star Wars" program.

The newspaper writes that the space services corporation simultaneously embarks on the development of a spy radar space system which, according to the designs of the Pentagon strategists, should enhance the United States potentials in collecting information on the location of the land-based Soviet ballistic nuclear missiles. It is hoped in Washington that such information would help implement the intentions of U. S. militarists to deal a first nuclear strike.

The adventuristic character of the "Star Wars" program causes the growing concern in international circles of scientists. "It is a widely held view in the scientific community that countermeasures will be easier to do than developing the defense," Kurt Gottfried, a Cornell University physicist, writes in THE NEW YORK TIMES.

London December 20 TASS — Reagan's "Strategic Defense Initiative" pursues offensive, not defensive, aims and leads to a considerable escalation of the arms race. Prominent British specialist in electronic equipment Richard Annals writes this in the book titled "Star Wars: A Question of Initiative".

The author stresses SDI is based on the idea that the United States will simultaneously ensure its security and get an opportunity to attack enemy by means of contemporary technology. The scientist is of the opinion that the implementation of the SDI program leads to the breach of the ABM Treaty, undermines the entire structure of international agreements in the sphere of arms control.

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CSO: 5200/1238

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS: PENTAGON STAGES MILITARY SPACE EXPERIMENT

LD021427 Moscow TASS in English 1402 GMT 2 Jan 87

[Text] Washington January 2 TASS—The United States last September staged a military space experiment codenamed "Delta 180," in which a Delta rocket orbited a laser radar for the first time, the AEROSPACE journal reported.

The rocket also left two of its pickup-laden stages, designed to detect and track missiles, in a low orbit. At the end of the experiment the target-acquisition radar, developed by McDonnel Douglas, directed the third stage to the second one 120 miles away for a head-on collision, imitating a missile intercept by means of a space-based kinetic-kill weapon.

The journal said many of the new devices involved in the experiment had been taken out of the laboratory and into space for the first time.

"Delta 180" was one of a series of experiments conducted by the Pentagon in outer space. The "Strategic Defense Initiative" organization has already signed more than 2,000 contracts with corporations and research centers for SDI-related efforts, according to the AEROSPACE.

The journal said that from the standpoint of technology, the SDI project was proceeding ahead of schedule.

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CSO: 5200/1238

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

PRAVDA: SDI PART OF U.S. ECONOMIC WARFARE AGAINST USSR

PM291859 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Dec 86 First Edition p 3

[Article by Doctor of Historical Sciences S. Mokshin under the rubric "27th CPSU Congress: Strategy of Acceleration": "Scientific Exchanges--A Direct Path to Mutual Understanding"]

[Excerpts] Since the early eighties the imperialist states, and primarily the United States, have striven to use the "technology weapon" against the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries. Conservative ideologists persistently depict the Soviet Union as a "colossus with feet of clay" which cannot be considered an economic rival of the United States.

The two-volume report "Politics in the Sphere of Science, USA, USSR," published by the U.S. National Scientific Foundation for members of Congress, is indicative in this respect. Summarizing the contents of Volume 2, dealing with the development of science and technology in the Soviet Union, U. Lepkovskiy, observer of the journal of CHEMICALS AND ENGINEERING, noted that its authors strive to avoid "the standard American custom of underestimating the possibilities inherent in Soviet technological potential." Indeed while the previous report (1977) kept virtually silent about the successes of Soviet science and technology, credit is now given willy-nilly to the fact that the Soviet Union was "the first country in the world to elaborate a specific national policy in the sphere of science," proving that it is possible "to plan and guide its development." But having made such an important admission the authors, as if frightened, immediately attempted to disclaim it by means of fabrications to the effect that, even though the USSR may have risen to the status of the second-mightiest power in the world, its "technological base is chronically lagging behind technological standards in the West." If this is so, what is the point in talking about scientific collaboration and engaging in exchanges of scientific discoveries and assets?

In actual fact, the fabrications by the ideologists of imperialism as regards the Soviet Union's "technological lag" behind the West serve only the objectives of transnational monopolies and the U.S. military-industrial complex in waging "economic warfare" against the USSR. This has materialized specifically in the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative" (SDI), which is in fact the "Star Wars" program.

In its continuous pressure on socialism, imperialism uses the "technological level" as a means of pressuring our country's foreign and domestic policy. The center of gravity of embargoes and other types of boycott of scientific exchange is increasingly shifting from bans on equipment deliveries to bans on the transfer of technical knowledge --

which offers convincing proof of the U.S. desire to establish "technological hegemony." The ultimate goal of such a policy is to isolate the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries from the world market in modern technology, slow down their economic development, and disrupt the military-strategic parity.

Meanwhile, it is well known that the United States has no monopoly on scientific and technical achievements. Even its own political, public, and scientific figures declare that "the country's indisputable leadership in the technology sphere was lost a long time ago, therefore the widespread bans on the export of commodities and technology are simply useless" and "fraught with a whole range of serious problems for the United States itself."

This is pointed out by, for example, University of Pennsylvania Professor Thomas (Korpan) in the book "A Challenge to American Values." But, he notes, leaders in Washington have failed to correctly evaluate the developments and continue to believe in America's "technological superiority." This opinion is also shared by the American Committee on East-West Accord. Addressing one of its meetings, G. Kennan, former U.S. ambassador to the USSR, who has held senior positions in the State Department, advocated scientific and technical cooperation between the United States and the USSR. Criticizing all sorts of speculations as to whether the Soviet Union could be trusted when concluding agreements in the sphere of scientific exchanges, he said in particular: "I am amazed whenever I hear such thoughts, because we have 6 decades of experience giving a clear answer, and this answer is yes, one can conclude agreements with the Soviet side, and they will honor them!" D. Kendall, chairman of the "Pepsico" Corporation Board of Directors, declared at one board meeting that the expansion of USSR-U.S. cooperation in the sphere of trade and scientific exchanges "accords with U.S. vital interests" and that the United States "has gained nothing" from its sanctions against the Soviet Union: "The expansion of trade is the obvious way to build bridges of mutual understanding."

At the meeting of members of the American-Soviet Trade and Economic Council held in the United States, representatives of business circles confirmed their desire to organize cooperation with their Soviet partners.

The CPSU resolutely rejects the policy of boycotts and embargoes in the sphere of scientific exchange. "The story that the USSR's defense potential is almost completely based on purchases of Western technology and cannot develop without it is absolute nonsense," M.S. Gorbachev has noted. "The authors of this story simply forget with which country they are dealing, they forget -- or want to make others forget -- that the Soviet Union is a country with great science and advanced technology....Of course, like any other country, we rely -- in civilian and in military production -- both on our own and on the world's achievements in science and technology, on the world's production experience. That is life; it is inevitable...."

The Soviet Union has created a mighty scientific potential and has achieved outstanding results in a number of leading branches of science. Soviet scientists were the first to elaborate the theoretical elements of missile technology, and have made a decisive contribution to the discovery of transuranium elements, the elaboration of the theory of chain reactions, the discovery of lasers, modern aerodynamics, and so on. In many respects, the Soviet Union occupies leading positions in the world. If forced, as has already happened on several occasions, it will give an effective and fast response to the program for securing "technological superiority" via the implementation of the Reagan doctrine of the so-called "Strategic Defense Initiative."

Scientific exchange between countries with different social systems can be fully ensured provided the political obstacles to equal and large-scale ties on the basis of mutual advantage are eliminated. This will be of good service to the humanitarian objectives of strengthening confidence, mutual understanding, and spiritual enrichment among peoples, the consolidation of peace and good-neighborliness, and human progress.

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CSO: 5200/1122

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR ARMY PAPER VIEWS U.S. ASAT PROGRAM

PM141419 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Jan 87 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Pentagon's Space Ambitions"]

[Text] New York, 10 Jan -- The U.S. Department of the Air Force has asked Congress for permission to hold three test firings of antisatellite missiles against a real target in space at the end of this year. These tests, THE NEW YORK TIMES reports, are to open the final phase in the Pentagon's creation [sozdaniye] of a modern ASAT system which is intended to provide the United States with optimum conditions for inflicting a first nuclear strike.

The main components of the ASAT system, on whose creation [sozdaniye] the Pentagon is currently focusing, are special missiles designed to destroy communications and early warning satellites, and F-15 fighters. In the very near future Washington plans to set up two squadrons of these planes equipped with antisatellite weapons and deploy them on the east and west coasts of the United States.

Tests of the new system are currently in full swing. Thus, last year the U.S. military department twice held experimental launches of antisatellite missiles, aiming them at the light of a distant star. IN 1985 there were firings against a real target in space -- an obsolete satellite. The Reagan administration's program in this sphere is no less crowded in the near future. In fiscal 1988 and 1989 alone, THE NEW YORK TIMES attests, the Pentagon intends to spend over 1.1 billion dollars on the creation [sozdaniye] of an ASAT system.

Many scientists and military experts view these Washington plans as extremely destabilizing. They are noting that a U.S. ability to destroy early warning satellites would inevitably tempt Washington to launch a surprise first nuclear strike and lead to an intensification of international tension.

On the basis of these very ideas, Congress forbade the Reagan administration to test an ASAT system against a real target in space in the current fiscal 1987. However, the Pentagon believes it will be able to obtain permission to carry out the tests when the fiscal year ends on 30 September.

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CSO: 5200/1238

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR'S FALIN SEES SDI AS REVOLUTIONARY AS A-BOMB

LD031620 Hamburg DPA in German 1331 GMT 3 Jan 87

[Text] Hamburg, 3 Jan (DPA) -- The Soviet politician Valentin Falin, member of the CPSU Central Committee, believes that relations between his country and the Federal Republic are "at present not in the best of shape". He hopes "that the shadows which are -- not at our initiative -- overhanging these relations will disappear sooner or later," Falin said today in an interview on West German radio (WDR/Cologne). This depends not only on the Soviet Union, but on the policies and the actions of the Federal Government.

Asked to comment on the fact that the present ruling parties will in all probability remain in power after the Bundestag elections, Falin said: "Elections are the internal affairs of the countries concerned, including the Federal Republic...We maintain relations with the governments formed in a particular process. And we would like to think that these governments adequately reflect the long-term interests of the country and the nation and that these governments will not neglect the interests of good relations with countries such as the Soviet Union and its allies."

Asked about the Soviet Union's many disarmament initiatives last year, the chairman of the Soviet news agency APN referred to a "new way of thinking". The Soviet Union is trying to approach existing problems using a new yardstick, a new philosophy, and new ideas "so that we can all get out of the artificially created dead-ends." Peaceful coexistence and good-neighborly relations must be achieved. "There is no alternative to the political solution of all problems concerning security since security itself is no longer a military task, a military problem. It is a political problem and should be solved above all through political means," Falin said. Not a single problem can be solved through arms today; rather, the use of force among states merely creates new and even more dangerous problems.

Referring to the chances of disarmament after Reykjavik, Falin stressed the Soviet Union's readiness to consider even the completely new proposals from the American side in order to reach balanced disarmament steps. "We proceed on the basis that everything can be achieved if we see 'everything' as meaning nuclear disarmament." Falin compared the SDI, strongly criticized by the USSR, with the kind of military-technological revolution that took place 40 years ago with the building of the atomic bomb. The dangers of the new revolution would be no smaller, from the point of view of the ever shorter deadlines for decision-taking alone. Today, the deadlines for such decisions are 4-6 minutes and 30 seconds at most in the case of SDI technologies.

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CSO: 5200/1122

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS ANALYST REITERATES REYKJAVIK STANCE ON SDI

LD091916 Moscow TASS in English 1828 GMT 9 Jan 87

[Text] Moscow January 9 TASS -- Follows commentary by Vladimir Bogachev, TASS military news analyst:

It is not fortuitous that the demand for non-militarisation of outer space holds the pivotal place in the Soviet programme for the total elimination of nuclear weapons worldwide already in the current century. The resolution of the problem of reduction and then of a total destruction of nuclear arsenals is most closely connected with the prevention of the deployment of strike weapons in near-earth space. It is senseless to reduce arms on a comparatively small space of the earth surface, while giving a green light to even more dangerous weapon systems in the truly infinite outer space.

The Soviet Union's stand on outer space problems spelled out in the statement by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, of January 15, 1986, is determined not by time-serving tactical considerations, but by the main line in the USSR's activities in the international arena, the commitments of the sides under the Soviet-American Treaty of 1972 on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence Systems.

The Soviet Union's policy of putting an end to the weapons race on earth and preventing its spreading into outer space also underlies the "package of accords" proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev at the Soviet-American summit meeting in Reykjavik.

The consistency of the Soviet Union's policy in resolving the problems of war and peace does not exclude but, on the contrary, presupposes the Soviet Union's preparedness for a search for mutually-acceptable decisions and compromises that would dispel fear in each of the sides, eliminate the existing threats to security in the world and, certainly, would not create new ones. At Reykjavik the Soviet Union did not insist, in particular, on an end to all the research being done under the SDI programme. Moreover, such a research and tests would be allowed within the framework of laboratories, while the testing of space elements of anti-ballistic missile defence in outer space would be banned. Within the next few years the sides could reach further mutually-acceptable decisions in that field.

Yet, in the course of the summit meeting in Iceland, the American side put up a barrier in the way of implementation of all the agreements reached on nuclear weapons, while refusing to limit work on SDI and insisting on the cancelling of the ABM Treaty after a ten year period, in whose course the USA would be preparing a space weapons system for deployment. On top of all over things, the U.S. stand on SDI at Reykjavik is in conflict with the ABM treaty.

The American side at Reykjavik actually proposed the USSR that it scrap the Soviet weapons for the deterrence of the aggressor, while the USA would secure for itself the possibility to create a threat from outer space to the USSR. It goes without saying, that the Soviet side could not accept such proposals.

Washington's stubborn reluctance to give up the plans to militarise outer space. The refusal of the U.S. Administration to use the possibilities which opened at Reykjavik for the sake of its insane Star Wars programme is evidence that the American side continues, as before, banking on ensuring military superiority, that it would like to call in question the axiom of the international relations that victory in a nuclear war cannot be won.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR'S AVDUYEVSKIY ON SCIENTISTS' PARTICIPATION IN SDI

OW110008 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0725 GMT 9 Jan 87

[Academician V.S. Avduyevskiy on aspects of SDI in feature "SDI--Who Needs That Bluff," carried in the "Science and Life" program]

[Text] Ronald Reagan in his speech in 1983 announced the SDI program, or Star Wars as it is called. This program provides for saturating outer space with weapons which will be deployed almost over the entire world. That will be an armada of hundreds of space vehicles carrying a completely new type of combat weapon. The impetus for the announcement of this program was the creation -- or rather the discovery by Teller, the inventor of the hydrogen bomb -- of some new effects. He proposed to use nuclear-energy-pumped lasers. These x-ray lasers, according to their inventors, can hit targets over distances of several thousand kilometers. They expect to hit ballistic missiles at such distances. In other words, they proclaim the following slogan -- it is possible to achieve disarmament, it is possible to save mankind from nuclear disaster by saturating space with arms, by creating new technological weapons.

What is the role of science and scientists here? Many scientists find it suitable to adopt that defensive interpretation of SDI. Why? Because, as a rule, military orders are steady. The laboratories are provided with good equipment, and the military orders are well-financed. This way there is no conflict of conscience, as people claim that they are working for defense. The scientific research they carry out is well-financed. But they fail to understand just one simple thing. When the results of their scientific research leave their hands and fall into the hands of the military and no longer belong to them, they begin to perform a completely different role. The case in point is the Manhattan Project, where scientists developed an atomic bomb for use in the struggle against nazism, for liberating all the countries in the world from the threat of enslavement and destruction. Now this weapon has fallen into the hands of the U.S. military, who are threatening the whole world with it. The great discoveries of the 20th century, such as the creation of electronics, computers, etc, were achieved during the development of peaceful programs. Many interesting results were obtained during peaceful space programs when there was cooperation between the USSR and the United States.

Americans do not have a clear concept of the SDI program. Pictures in advertisements play a very great role in the United States. Films and television, the press and all the magazines show how simple the SDI program is, how the Star Wars program is being implemented. The pictures show that a button is pushed somewhere to activate the x-ray lasers, and the rising missiles or warheads are hit, or else the missiles explode as soon as they leave the firing range. These pictures are intended for people who simply have no idea about technology, especially space technology. People are simply treated as fools. Yet it cannot be said that this applies to all Americans. There are specialists and scientists in communities in the United States and in western countries, in Europe and Japan who understand the pernicious effect of that theory. They understand that it is impossible to solve either international or social problems by creating new technology, new weapons.

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR PAPER CONNECTS CIA DIRECTOR TO SDI

PM231155 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 17 Dec 86 First Edition p 4

[Unattributed article: "Untouchable Crook. Political Profile of CIA Director W. Casey"--first two paragraphs are SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA introduction]

[Excerpts] Who rules America? Who are the people who decide its destiny? They are well known. It is sufficient to open the "Who's Who" directory... Government officials. Pentagon generals. Financial heavyweights. And yet, the answer would be incomplete. The CIA has to be added to "the powers that be."

This is the idea pursued by international journalists Yu. Kornilov and G. Shishkin in the book "Who Rules America" (Kto Pravit Amerikoy], due to be published by the Political Literature Publishing House. W. Casey heads the CIA. We offer his political profile to our readers.

Way back in the summer of 1979 the U.S. bourgeois press--and not just a single paper but 25 of them at once--carried an extensive militarist appeal calling for support for the government program for the creation [sozdaniye] of an ABM defense system. Who was it that issued such a bellicose appeal to the public? It was established that 14 of the 344 persons who signed the appeal (and, of course, paid for its publication) were directors, associates, or lawyers of firms already executing ABM contracts worth a total of more than 1 billion dollars; more than 20 persons were involved with companies which would have become subcontractors in the performance of these contracts if Congress had approved the relevant appropriations; and 20 represented firms among the top 100 weapons manufacturers. The initiator of the appeal's composition and publication was some "Citizen's Committee for Peace Through Security," founded by none other than the rich lawyer and Republican Party functionary W. Casey.

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TASS: WEINBERGER PROMOTES DEPLOYMENT OF SPACE WEAPONS

LD121327 Moscow TASS in English 1313 GMT 12 Jan 87

[Text] Washington January 12 TASS -- By TASS correspondent Igor Ignatyev:

U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger has said the Reagan administration is prepared to start deploying space weapons system by system as they become operational.

Speaking in an interview with ABC television, the Pentagon chief said:

"As soon as we are ready to deploy something that we might call phase one of the Strategic Defense Initiative that would be an integral part of the whole system, I would be delighted to deploy it as soon as we can."

With this aim, he demanded that his department's request for nearly six billion dollars for SDI in its supplementary appropriations bill for the current fiscal year and the military budget for fiscal 1988 be met in full.

In his annual report to Congress, the defense secretary described "Star Wars" as "most important among our projects", which the administration would "never give up".

The report said, inter alia, that the United States would launch the full-scale production of anti-satellite weapons even if Congress did not lift its ban on their testing against real targets in outer space.

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CSO: 5200/1238

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

TASS: WEINBERGER PRAISES JAPANESE SDI CONTRIBUTION

LD070933 Moscow TASS in English 0814 GMT 7 Jan 87

[Text] Tokyo January 7 TASS -- U.S. Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger urged in his interview with the newspaper YOMIURI Japan [as received] that she take an active part in the new militaristic NATO programme being drawn up at the Pentagon for the creation of qualitatively new types of conventional weapons.

The Pentagon chief praised Tokyo for its preparedness to contribute to the implementation of the Star Wars programmes and said that Japan, which has an impressive technology base, could make a considerable contribution to a build-up of the West's military might.

The new programme for a rearmament of NATO, whose implementation is to be started by the Pentagon in February, provides for the creation and deployment of pilotless planes, anti-tank robots, missiles and other types of weapons with the use of the latest achievements of electronics and robotics, YOMIURI stressed.

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CSO: 5200/1238

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR MILITARY ANALYST: U.S. ARGUMENTS FOR SDI 'ABSURD'

LD061735 Moscow TASS in English 1709 GMT 6 Jan 87

[Text] Moscow January 6 TASS -- Military News Analyst Vladimir Bogachev writes:

At a time when American scientists, including those working under Pentagon contracts, are citing ever more convincing evidence of the technical untenability of Reagan's "Star Wars" program, of its dangerous destabilising nature, official representatives of the United States Administration are resorting to even more fantastic and absurd arguments in defence of their "Strategic Defense Initiative".

Only recently President Ronald Reagan stated that those Americans who protest against the plans of militarising outer space are actually ... voting for tax increases. When speaking in unemployment-stricken Colorado the President promised that SDI will raise living standards in America and in the whole world.

Yesterday Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger surprised journalists by stating that the quicker work to implement SDI is carried out the sooner will it be able to utilise its benefits.

President Reagan's statements on SDI, of course if they are to be taken at face value, can create the impression that by deploying American strike weapon systems in near-terrestrial space Washington supposedly is scrupulously fulfilling its pledge to prevent a militarisation of outer space made at the summit meeting in Geneva.

By its scope the campaign to deceive the American tax payers about the true designation of the "Star Wars" program, its efficiency and cost has left far behind both the notorious "Watergate" and the present big scandal over American arms deliveries to Iran.

The benefits of SDI, mentioned by Casper Weinberger, are already now being used by the sharks of the American military-industrial complex which are making huge sums on preparations for war in outer space. For the rest of mankind the American "Star Wars" program spells the danger of a global catastrophe.

Already now the peoples of the world are feeling the consequences of Washington's reckless plans of militarising outer space. It is the present American Administration's adherence to the "Star Wars" plans that frustrated the accords reached in Reykjavik on the reduction of strategic arms, the total elimination of medium-range missiles in Europe and a radical reduction of their number on a global scale.

It is the needs of SDI that determine Washington's negative attitude to the Soviet proposals on a general and complex ban on nuclear weapon tests.

The "Star Wars" are placing in jeopardy the entire process of arms limitation and reduction.

Mankind has the right to expect that common sense will at long last prevail in Washington. For in the long run this program is just as dangerous to those who are promoting it.

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CSO: 5200/1122

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR: AMERICAN PEOPLE'S 'COMMON SENSE' OPPOSES SDI

PM021256 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 31 Dec 86 Second Edition p 3

[Reserve Major General L. Korzun "Publicist's Remarks": "Time to Choose"]

[Excerpt] The past year most convincingly confirmed the importance of Lenin's conclusion that /"THE PROBLEM OF WAR AND PEACE IS THE MOST ACUTE PROBLEM FACING MANKIND."/ [printed in boldface]

More and more people are becoming aware how dangerous the gigantic forces brought into being by man's brain are, how fragile our planet is, and how defenseless life on it will be in the face of a universal nuclear catastrophe. Moreover, this catastrophe could occur even in a war without the use of nuclear weapons, if powerful high-accuracy conventional weapons were used to destroy nuclear reactors at nuclear power stations and other installations that are dangerous sources of radioactive and chemical contamination--which, let us note, does not recognize state borders and could strike not only the victim of aggression but also the aggressor himself.

But nuclear and chemical weapons are, of course, particularly dangerous. Even 2 years ago, in early 1985, the arsenals of mass destruction weapons built up in the world would have been sufficient to destroy 58 billion persons--12 times more than the number inhabiting the earth's globe at that time. During the 2 years since then these arsenals have increased substantially thanks primarily to efforts by the United States and its NATO allies.

How can one fail to recall at this point V.I. Lenin's prophetic vision. According to N.K. Krupskaya, he said even back in 1918 that "modern technology is now contributing more and more to the destructive nature of war. But a time will come when war will have become so destructive that it will become altogether impossible."

It would seem to be time to understand that this point in time has now arrived. There still are, however, insane people--particularly in the United States, and some of them hold top positions in the administration--who hope to use the creation [sozdaniye] of new and even more deadly types of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons, including those being developed [razrabatyvayemye] under the notorious "star wars" plans, to break the military-strategic parity and, having gained military superiority, to attempt to win victory in a war.

True enough, voices speaking of commitment to the cause of peace can be heard from time to time from the White House. President Reagan even admitted at the November 1985 Geneva meeting that "nuclear war must never be fought and there can be no victors in it" and that the United States "will not strive to attain military superiority." Unfortunately, his other statements and, in particular, his practical deeds are separated from these words by a distance even greater than the distance separating the earth from the sky. It is evident that the present White House incumbent and his associates are totally incapable of abandoning the postulate formulated by such a would-be theoretician as U.S. Secretary of Defense C. Weinberger: "Truth is a utilitarian concept, and it is useful only for the attainment of Soviet goals."

Be that as it may, in our foreign and domestic policy we are indeed guided by Lenin's instruction on how fatal it is to fear the truth, and we recall his warning: The bourgeoisie "has skillfully extended the deception of the mass of the people to foreign policy 'action...'"

The head of the Washington administration and his team are obsessed, as ever, with the idea of policy "from positions of strength" and the desire for a "crusade" against the Soviet Union and communism as a whole in order to change the law-governed march of history. It is difficult not to agree with BUSINESS WEEK commentator (Dzh. Pirson): "Reagan would like to be the first president to achieve what Secretary of State John Foster Dulles proclaimed but failed to achieve in the fifties--to 'roll back communism on a worldwide scale.'"

How can one fail to recall the words of the unforgettable Kozma Prutkov [pseudonym of group of 19th century parodists], who said: "Wisdom, like turtle soup, is not within everyone's grasp." Particularly since the correctness of the reflections by this sharp-tongued literary hero is confirmed by a leading bourgeois newspaper such as THE NEW YORK TIMES which, incidentally, cannot even be suspected of being sympathetic toward the Soviet Union. It wrote as regards the Washington administration's space adventures, chimerical but nonetheless dangerous as they are for the fate of mankind: "The administration's position, dictated by the pursuit of the illusion of military superiority, is provocative and damages America itself."

Well, even the bourgeois press heavyweights have at times--very rarely, it is true--moments of vision. A contribution was evidently made by the fact that, according to public opinion poll results, the overwhelming majority of Americans do not share their president's dangerous illusions as regards SDI. The entire world community also disagrees with them. A total of 154 delegations voted for the resolution "On the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space" at the 41st UN General Assembly Session, and only the U.S. delegation abstained.

But by all accounts the present Washington administration has already made its choice. The pace and scale of work on the "star wars" programs are increasing, more and more new nuclear explosions thunder at the Nevada test site, the limits on nuclear arms set by the SALT II Treaty are provocatively exceeded, all types of arms are being built up, unbridled anti-Soviet and anticomunist

hysteria goes on incessantly, and actions against many independent states in different parts of the world become increasingly dangerous. All this is evidence that the U.S. ruling circles are unable and unwilling to abandon the old imperialist way of thinking which has long outlived its time and fundamentally fails to meet the conditions of the nuclear and space age. This is being understood on an increasingly broad scale even in America itself. Here is a typical conclusion, drawn by Congressman E. Markey: "The choice facing Congress and the American people is clear: What do we want—'star wars' or arms control? It is not the Russians who force us to make this choice. This choice is dictated by common sense, the fragile arms control structure which has been gained through enormous efforts, and the desire for stability and peace which cannot be stifled by clever propaganda campaigns."

On the threshold of the new year of 1987, one would like to believe that the American people's natural common sense will prevail and they will manage to make the only correct choice--the choice to the benefit of peace.

As for our choice, it is unambiguous and perfectly clear. It was made by the Great October Socialist Revolution, whose 70th anniversary we will be celebrating in 1987. After all, it was no accident that Lenin's Decree on Peace was the first decree by the young Soviet state.

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CSO: 5200/1238

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

PRAVDA REVIEWS U.S. SOLDIER'S BOOK ON SDI

PM291421 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Dec 86 First Edition p 5

[V. Linnik book review: "American Specialist Against the SDI Program: A 'Case' Which Must Not Be Lost"]

[Text] This book (Footnote 1) (R. Bowman: "Star Wars: A Military Expert Opposes the Strategic Defense Initiative" ["Zvezdnyye Voyny: Voyennyy Ekspert Protiv Strategicheskoy Oboronnoy Initsiativy"], Los Angeles, 1986, 180 pp.) stands out from the numerous thick and slim publications on this question by virtue of the fact that its author has studied SDI not through others' descriptions but as someone directly engaged in it as a responsible executive in a number of the Pentagon's scientific and research programs to militarize outer space. This is not the first publication by USAF Lieutenant Colonel Robert Bowman, retired: His previous work, despite or, perhaps, thanks to its unorthodoxy, has been read in the United States and has served, in particular, as a direct source for certain Soviet publications on the "star wars" theme, including some published by the Committee of Soviet Scientists in Defense of Peace and Against the Threat of Nuclear War.

R. Bowman cannot be accused of short-term calculations or of any intent on his part to make his conclusions fit the most popular political slogan of the day. No, the book's value lies in the fact that the military-technical and political-strategic arguments against SDI grow from within, as it were, from a consistent, logical interpretation of the U.S. military-industrial complex' dangerous venture here. The author mounts his "case against SDI" with a researcher's meticulous professionalism, and the political conclusions are to be drawn by that court of final appeal, the reader. Bowman executes his task convincingly, with the accuracy and terseness characteristic of military men.

The American president's "vision," which he imparted to the world in his now well-known speech of 23 March 1983, proclaiming the "Strategic Defense Initiative" to be the "key to a world free of nuclear weapons," was nothing new, let alone "revolutionary," as the "star wars" enthusiasts love to describe it. Rather, that speech and the disputes generated by it, which continue to this day in the United States, were the revival of something old that had been more or less forgotten. Namely, the discussion in the late sixties about an ABM defense, which ended, as we know, with the signing of the 1972 ABM treaty of unlimited duration, which seemed to put an end once and for all to discussion about the possibility of creating a reliable ABM defense.

The proponents of the concept of U.S. military superiority are seriously of the mind that American technology will make it possible to create a reliable echelon system for intercepting missiles in the initial (boost) phase, which lasts approximately 130-300 seconds (that is, from immediately after launch until separation of the warheads and dummy targets, which could total tens of thousands of units). Even the purely technical complexities of creating such a system are scarcely capable of being overcome, Bowman writes, since in terms of complexity and cost each of the 10 or so programs forming part of "star wars" will exceed the "Manhattan Project" (the creation of the first atomic bomb) and the moon-landing program. The accuracy of the system's laser components, the author observes, must be such as to be capable of hitting a dime coin traveling at 24,000 kph from a distance of 24 km.

The delivery of fuel for the space-based battle stations, magnetic and laser cannons, and so forth will alone require, according to experts' computations, 1,400 space-shuttle flights--which, given the present norm of 50 launchers per year, will take 200 years. The creation of a number of vital elements of the system (targeting accuracy, the sensitivity of the sensors, the speed of computer calculations) presupposes the ability to carry out these operations one million times faster and better than today, Bowman observes. But all this apparently, is of little concern to the "star wars" warriors, who are trying to sell as realistic the crop not even of next year but of the next millenium. After all, the golden rain of contracts is flowing into their hands right now!

Analyzing SDI's sphere comes to the conclusion that Reagan's officially proclaimed goal of creating a 100-percent reliable ABM defense is a chimera. In addition to the extreme complexity of technical execution, this is bound up with the natural presupposition that the other side will not sit around idle and will quite easily (given SDI's high vulnerability) find a means of neutralizing the "space shield" that has been erected.

However, as the author rightly asserts, the "space shield" as an augmentation of the U.S. strategic triad's first nuclear strike (ICBM's, the strategic air force, and SLBM's) is an extremely dangerous and real entity, because a first disarming strike simplifies by a factor of several magnitudes the task of defending against the other side's counterstrike. Once you remember that Pentagon Chief C. Weinberger has repeatedly spoken about the need to maintain the U.S. strategic triad /AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF SDI/ [capitalized passage between slantlines printed in boldface], the full sinister import of the unctuous talk about the purely defensive character of the "Strategic Defense Initiative" becomes obvious. It is not surprising therefore that rightists in the United States were seriously alarmed by the results at Reykjavik, where the USSR and U.S. leaders came close to reaching an accord on reducing and then eliminating both sides' nuclear arsenals.

Even if the defense value of SDI is very slight, Bowman says, developing his viewpoint, this in no way rules out its offensive potential. After all, even if you concede from the theoretical standpoint that the task of intercepting missiles at the boost stage is feasible, it is even easier to mount an attack

from outer space on the other side's sill-based stationary missiles, command points, communications centers, and so forth. And such options are not only not excluded from but indeed form a direct part of the calculations of those who are pushing through the SDI program in the United States today. And finally, the author sums up, any system designed to discharge the ABM defense function, even if it demonstrates its complete lack of suitability for that task, will quite likely prove to be a highly effective antisatellite means.

It is clear that any one of these characteristics adduced by the author, let alone all taken together, turns SDI into an instrument for sapping strategic stability, a mine placed beneath all existing or potential arms limitation agreements, and the starting signal for an arms race with unpredictable consequences.

Bowman's conclusions are noteworthy not because they coincide with our standpoint on SDI. The author, as an American and a true patriot, is principally worried by the fact that SDI will mark a serious undermining of America's own security. And that will indeed be the inevitable consequence of the extremely unpredictable strategic situation that will arise in the world as a result of the transfer of the arms race into outer space.

Failure to see the dangers for America itself and for all mankind inherent in SDI is unforgivable and criminal. Therein lies the chief poignancy of Bowman's book.

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SDI AND SPACE ARMS

MOSCOW PAPER ANSWERS U.S. PHYSICIST'S ANTI-SDI LETTER

Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 51, 28 Dec 86-4 Jan 87 p 5

[Text] The following letter, written originally in Russian, came to Moscow from Berkeley, California, from an American graduate student (in physics) Glen D. Cowan. We also publish remarks made by Novosti Press Agency political analyst Spartak Beglov who is mentioned in the letter.

The American Physicist's Position

Like many Americans, I followed with great interest the meeting in Reykjavik between General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev and US President R. Reagan. I read in *Pravda* the text of M. S. Gorbachev's press conference after the meeting, and watched his address on Soviet television on video cassette. I regret that no agreement was reached on disarmament, but at the same time I share his assessment that the meeting was of great importance, that it was "a new stage in a complicated and difficult dialogue in search of solutions".

Unfortunately, many Americans today support the president's SDI programme believing that it is only a defensive measure, that as such, it poses no threat to the Soviet Union. After the Reykjavik meeting I hoped very much that the Soviet side would clarify to the Americans why the USSR was against SDI, and for this reason I found it very interesting to read in the *San Francisco Chronicle* an article by Soviet political analyst Spartak Beglov "Why the Soviets Think Star Wars Is a Trap". But I should say that the article disappointed me. Let me tell you why it did.

I'm against the SDI programme for the following reasons: (1) An antiballistic missile system (if it were technically feasible) would tip the strategic balance, it would give the American side greater chances for making a first strike with impunity. SDI advocates often argue that the Soviet Union, too, will have the same defence system, that we would give you "requisite technical information" in order to build it, so there would be a quite stable, balanced situation. I think this is absurd. I do not believe the American president would like to hand over all that to the Soviet Union after

a long period of extremely secret research. Even if two such systems could be built, I do not believe that it would raise any higher the present level of stability. Wouldn't a defence system capable of destroying thousands of missiles easily destroy the enemy's defence system?

(2) The SDI programme will affect (as it is obviously already affecting) the disarmament talks. SDI will create a situation that will increase mutual mistrust. Secondly, if the US starts to create an ABM system, the USSR will be obliged to take necessary measures to keep strategic parity, or what would be the most simple solution - to improve and add to the existing Soviet nuclear arsenal.

(3) To create an effective ABM system (to say nothing of two such systems) is technically difficult, or rather impossible. SDI advocates stress that this programme's goal is not to build such a system but simply find out through scientific research whether it is feasible. At first glance this approach may seem quite logical. If chances of creating two effective ABM systems were realistic economically, I might have favoured SDI. (And, perhaps, not. The best solution would be to scrap all nuclear weapons.) And if the goal of SDI is simply to find out if the system is technically feasible, then why is it dangerous? The danger lies in the fact that the intense SDI research which includes tests in outer space would result in new types of weapons, especially antisatellite weapons. It would launch a new stage in the arms race, would provide a new arena for military conflicts. This would require huge monetary and human resources.

I'm sure that Soviet leaders share this anxiety about the SDI programme. And, as I was reading

Spartak Beglov's article, I expected to come across something like some of the points I've made here. And what was in it? There was a partial reference to the third point I've made on the creation of new types of weapons. But the rest of it are references to the American desire to create "offensive space weapons in line with American long-range plans for world supremacy". Even if we suppose that the Reagan administration does have some plans for world supremacy, this point is not likely to convince any Americans of the undesirability of SDI. And there is not a word about the other arguments I have listed, while it is precisely they, I think, that could influence American public opinion, especially if advanced by an important Soviet personage. It is for this reason that I address you in this letter. I think it would be very useful if a Soviet government official, better General Secretary Gorbachev himself, could give the US media his own reasons against SDI.

I've got yet another idea about SDI. The Reagan administration often stresses that the

Soviet Union also has an ABM programme, that a radar installation is going up near Krasnoyarsk for this purpose, that you've already tested antisatellite weapon in outer space. I know that an ABM system around Moscow has been permitted under the already signed ABM Treaty. Whether the radar system in Krasnoyarsk has been permitted, too, I do not know. I'm also not in a position to say to what extent this antisatellite weapon threatens stability. It would be very useful all the same if the USSR would state its readiness to abandon all that if the USA would agree to corresponding measures. I think such a step is in our common interests, and that this would very positively influence American public opinion.

I'm positive that our countries will eventually be able to reach agreement on disarmament and stop the insane arms race. I'm encouraged by the Soviet nuclear test ban initiatives, the USSR's constructive approach to negotiations, your desire for a constructive dialogue aimed at ending the nuclear threat. I wish you complete success in this.

...and the Soviet Analyst's View

I'd like to start by saying that as the author of the material referred to by Glen Cowan, I'm far from indifferent to the reader's attitude. All the more because my critic, apparently, is a sincere, searching and knowledgeable person. He is well informed about the SDI programme. What he apparently does not know about are the "secret springs" that give rise to some publications. He may not know the circumstances that led to the publication of my article in the **San Francisco Chronicle**.

Only hours after the Reykjavik meeting ended, my report from there went off to different places. In it I detailed contents of the main nuclear disarmament offers made by the Soviet side and said that the SDI programme proved a handicap to an agreement. This short, telegraphed material only allowed for the briefest possible summary of Soviet criticism of SDI. The **San Francisco Chronicle** supplied my report with the headline "Why the Soviets Think Star Wars Is a Trap", thus turning my brief Reykjavik meeting report into a news analysis which it, of course, is not. If the newspaper asked me to write a special article on the Soviet view of SDI (I've already written many quite detailed articles on the topic), it would without doubt have contained the arguments mentioned by Glen Cowan.

But let's put author's vanity aside. It can only be welcomed that the publication in the **San Francisco Chronicle** moved one of its readers to voice concern which seems to be affecting growing numbers of Americans over the administration's persistence to carry out the SDI programme.

I would like to add these arguments to the obvious but very weighty arguments emphasized by Glen Cowan.

The SDI programme is capable (and is intended by its very nature) to accelerate the

arms race so much that its technological impulse and its internal dynamics may leave no time for politicians to prevent a catastrophe. My Reykjavik report drew a parallel between the SDI plan and the birth of nuclear weapons. At first the Manhattan Project enticed the creators of these weapons with a prospect of an American power monopoly which would ensure opportunities for the US to dictate its will to other nations. Then, as a result of the arms race being caused by the American side, it became clear that humanity is threatened with a weapon which could get out of control and then blot out civilization. The same story – but on a much more dangerous and less controlled spiral – threatens to repeat itself if the SDI programme is realized.

More. SDI is a glutton which threatens not only to consume more and more billions from American taxpayers, but also the vital resources of the Third World and of the West European countries. Indeed, the experience of recent years shows that the current monstrously large American military budget is in fact almost totally covered by the money the USA is getting from abroad through the wangling of interest rates and the exploiting of discrepancies between prices for exported manufactured goods and for cheapening food, raw materials and fuel from the Third World.

At the same time I find questionable Glen Cowan's view that Americans can in no way be influenced by the argument regarding an obvious link between the Star Wars programme and the plans for global domination nurtured by the current ruling circles in the USA.

Let's turn to stern lessons of history. It is easy to see if one considers the major military catastrophes of the century that there is a direct link between struggle for world supremacy and the race for a "miraculous" or "ultimate"

weapon. Thus the contest between the "armour" of the Entente and the "Big Berthas" (the giant field guns manufactured by Krupp in Germany) was a militarist prelude for World War I. Hitler continued to believe in some novel "miraculous" weapon till his dying day. In this light, the adventurist stake on achieving a position of "world leader" by making a military spurt into space is equally dangerous for the Americans and the other nations.

Referring to the US administration's allegation about the Soviet Union having its own ABM programme, Glen Cowan suggests that everything should be abandoned if the USA agrees to corresponding measures. But the Soviet Union is strictly abiding by the ABM Treaty's provisions. The radar at Krasnoyarsk is intended exclusively for the tracking of space objects and the monitoring of outer space. This cannot be said about the US radar with a phased array, whose construction is nearing completion in Thule, Greenland, in direct violation of Article VI of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.

The same is also true about similar American and British installations on the Aleutian Islands. Years ago, the USSR proposed to the USA that a ban should be imposed on the creation and deployment of antisatellite systems. The Soviet unilateral moratorium on tests of such weapons has been in force since 1983. Washington has unfortunately ignored this initiative as defiantly as it did the Soviet unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions.

"The best solution would be to scrap all nuclear weapons," wrote Glen Cowan. That's it. This is precisely what was discussed in Reykjavik. All brilliant projects are simple. The only major difficulty in solving this issue is that each government on whom humanity's survival depends should be able to realize this as an imperative of the nuclear age and thus work consistently in a suitable manner.

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CSO: 5200/1217

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

PRAVDA TIES FRG NUCLEAR POLICY TO SDI

PM061533 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 3 Jan 87 First Edition p 5

[B. Gorokhov article: "Who Needs Plutonium From Wackersdorf?"]

[Text] There is continuing debate in the FRG over the government's nuclear policy. It was prompted by the news that a nuclear-fuel-processing enterprise is being constructed in the Bavarian hamlet of Wackersdorf. This, in principle, is a necessary thing, if the creation of this enterprise is indeed occasioned by the real needs of developing nuclear power.

But why, in that case, are passions becoming inflamed over the construction? Why are prominent FRG figures making concerned statements about this? The point is that nuclear fuel regeneration is, as it were, a gray area between the peaceful and military use of nuclear power. According to data from scientists of the Laser Technology Institute under the German Fraunhofer Society, the plutonium that will be obtained in Wackersdorf could be used to manufacture nuclear explosives, and in sufficient quantities to equip 500 units of nuclear weapons every year -- neither more nor less. The United States has already tested a device with just such a nuclear filling. According to W. Roth, deputy chairman of the Social Democratic Party of Germany's Bundestag faction, there are no economic arguments in favor of creating an enterprise to obtain plutonium in the FRG apart from reasons of a military nature.

It is precisely this that arouses fears, for none other than F.-J. Strauss, prime minister of Bavaria and chairman of the Christian Social Union, believes that "for sovereignty it is necessary to possess nuclear weapons." And he is not alone in his opinion. Suffice it to say that as long ago as the mid-seventies, a number of Christian Democratic Union and Christian Social Union ministers now in the present Bonn cabinet and then in the Bundestag actively opposed ratifying the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty because, they said, it blocked the way to the creation of a European nuclear force incorporating the FRG.

The Federal Government, which insists on constructing the enterprise in Wackersdorf, now repudiates with both hands those who ask a natural question: "Is Bonn not longing to have access to a nuclear button?" Official spokesmen declare that Wackersdorf's product is simply "unsuitable" for the production of nuclear weapons.

The FRG press draws attention to the fact that a greater quantity of plutonium than in any state that does not have nuclear weapons is already being kept under state protection in the (Alkem) power company's storehouses in the Hesse city of Hanau. In the opinion of West German parliamentarians, under certain conditions these stocks enable the Federal Government to "cover the greatest part of the road to nuclear armament without openly admitting that it is pursuing military goals."

So, as we see, it is certainly not a question of Bonn's ignorance of the fundamentals of nuclear physics. Let us assume, however, that the FRG Government really does not intend today to acquire "homemade" nuclear weapons. In that case what will happen to the West German plutonium? Perhaps it will go to Nevada or Mururoa, where, contrary to world public demands, nuclear explosions are continuing to thunder? For the FRG Government has virtually espoused the U.S., British, and French policy of continuing nuclear tests and dissociated itself from the prospect opened up in Reykjavik of the total elimination of nuclear weapons. How can one not recall here also Bonn's desire to gain access to the new kinds of arms being created [sozdavat], in particular, with the use of nuclear technology within the framework of the notorious SDI?

Nor can one help drawing a parallel with the facts, which have become public knowledge, of the FRG military-industrial complex' close cooperation with the racists of the Republic of South Africa. Where is the guarantee that, following the technical documentation for the construction of modern submarines with which a West German state concern provided the Pretoria regime, the Republic of South Africa will not obtain plutonium for the production of nuclear weapons in the same way?!

The world public must receive a clear answer to all these questions.

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CSO: 5200/1122

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

USSR PAPER SEES MILITARY INTEREST IN 'EUREKA' PROJECT

PM281520 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 18 Dec 86 p 3

[Report by unnamed TASS special correspondent: "'Eureka' Program Conference"]

[Text] Stockholm, 17 December--The fourth European intergovernmental conference on the "Eureka" program opened in the Swedish capital today. It is attended by foreign and scientific research ministers from 19 countries, as well as a representative of the EC Commission.

The agenda comprises questions connected with completing the process of organizing the management side of the program, examining new research projects, and direct contacts with representatives of business circles. The ministers will also discuss the budget of the international secretariat--the organization's executive body--and analyze the progress made in implementing scientific projects that were embarked upon earlier.

The aim of "Eureka" is to make Western Europe far more competitive in view of the fact that it is increasingly lagging behind the United States and Japan in the sphere of modern technology. The program participants are displaying most interest in scientific developments in the sphere of information science and communications, electronics, robot technology, lasers, and biotechnology.

Despite the partners' original claim that "Eureka" is a civilian project, the desire of the military circles to tailor the program to their own interests is becoming increasingly obvious. The French representative to "Eureka," Claude Arnaud, recently stressed in the magazine NATO REVIEW that the program bears some similarity to the U.S. SDI.

FRG Research and Technology Minister Heinz Riesenhuber was even more candid when he stated the other day in Bonn that the results of research in the context of "Eureka" are suitable for use in the military sphere.

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CSO: 1825/059

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

PRC COMMENTARY ON 'EUREKA' PROGRAM'S PROGRESS

PEOPLE'S DAILY Version

HK231053 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese 19 Dec 86 p 7

[Commentary by reporter Gu Yaoming (7357 5069 6900): "The 'Eureka' Program Enters a More Practical Stage"]

[Text] "We have completed the stage of creation. At present, we are entering a concrete stage of practical work that calls for exerting quite substantial efforts." This is an assessment by Swedish Industry Minister Peterson of the "Eureka" program at the fourth ministerial conference. Nineteen West European countries and 39 ministers of the EC Council and members of the commission gathered in Stockholm on 16 and 17 December to discuss the development projects in the "Eureka" program and the difficulties facing it, and bringing the "Eureka" program a big step forward in a more practical direction.

On the basis of the three prior ministerial conferences, the conference achieved new positive results:

1. The conferees adopted 37 new development projects, progressing in breadth and depth. These new projects have mainly to do with information, telecommunications, robots, laser technology, new materials, biotechnology, environmental protection, transportation technology, and marine technology. Large projects among them include a joint French-Italian investment in research and manufacture of high-energy [Ao neng 7559 5174] micro integrated circuit memory chips.
2. The conferees discussed "open market" measures, contending that to make projects in the "Eureka" program a success, trade barriers on high-technology products set up by various European countries must be broken to create a very dynamic internal European market, thus strengthening the competitiveness of European high-technology industries. The conferees called on various member states to realistically take proper measures and to give a report at the next ministerial conference.
3. The conferees discussed the problem of funds needed for "Eureka" projects. This is an actual problem bearing on the survival of the "Eureka" program that calls for an urgent solution. The conferees called on the governments of various member states, the EC, and enterprises to provide more funds and stressed the need to encourage more private banks to invest money in high-technology projects. The conferees agreed to the proposal put forward by the FRG for the arrangement of a "Eureka" financial roundtable conference to attract more private capital. The conferees also showed an interest in establishing a European high-technology fund and an insurance committee.

4. The current conference was attended by many representatives from industrial and banking circles. During the period of the conference, some research organs, enterprises, and banks held direct consultations on cooperation and investment. It was a very lively atmosphere. The meeting stressed the need to strengthen cooperation with enterprises and banks and to relieve them of worries about the "Eureka" program. The conference put high value on increased contributions from medium-sized and small enterprises to the "Eureka" program. It was held that this is of particularly great strategic significance in strengthening European competitiveness in high-technology fields.

5. The conferees called on the organizations under the EEC and the European Free Trade Association to speed up work on unifying specifications, types, and standards in order to remove another obstacle to the "Eureka" program.

The above progress achieved by the "Eureka" program in its development in a more practical direction is not without its causes.

In recent years, West European states have followed with increasing firmness the road to unity in an effort to reinforce their own strength through unity. The "idea of Europe" on the part of various member states has been continuously strengthened. Controversy over the "Star Wars" program and strategic nuclear weapons and other problems at the Iceland meeting of U.S. and Soviet leaders in October this year has enabled West European countries with lingering scruples about scientific and technical cooperation to further realize that if the backward features of science and technology are not changed as quickly as possible, economic development will inevitably suffer. What is more serious, they would be ultimately dictated to in matters of politics and defense. For the sake of Western European independence and security, the quickest possible implementation of the "Eureka" program has become a matter of urgency. Therefore, the Iceland meeting of U.S. and Soviet leaders has also objectively speeded up the progress of the "Eureka" program.

Various East European states have realized more clearly than before that there is no way out for a country to go it alone in high technology contest that decides its future destiny. Western Europe is also facing a choice between "unity meaning prosperity and division meaning decline" in its scientific and technological development. In a speech at the opening ceremony of the recent conference, Swedish Prime Minister Carlsson said: Europe has resources and also talent and financial resources. But only by using them in a concentrated way can there be effective competition with the United States, Japan, and other technically strong countries in the high technology field.

In the past half year, various member states have paid attention to strengthening publicity among enterprises, enabling them to have fewer scruples about the "Eureka" program. Originally, many enterprises worried that the "Eureka" program in the past year or more has enabled enterprises to see the possibility of implementing this program and also to realize that this helps greatly in increasing enterprise productivity and competitiveness, improving employment opportunities, and so forth. This holds especially great attraction for medium-sized and small enterprises not so

well provided with scientific research funds. At present, many enterprises other than those of Europe also hope to participate in some of the projects involved. British Secretary of Research [as published] (Geoffery Patty) said in a press interview: "This meeting clearly shows that enterprise scruples about the 'Eureka' program at the outset have been greatly removed."

The current conference has once again shown that the "Eureka" program is compatible with the interests and needs of the European states and has received European states' widespread attention. With this program put in concrete terms, there will be continuous progress, given the participation of more and more states. It can be predicted that it will have a great influence on the future of Europe and the outlook for world politics.

Of course, "Eureka" is a highly ambitious program. A great number of states, enterprises, and research organs enter into cooperation turning research results into industrial production capacity, with products turned out in competition with U.S. and Japanese products. The difficulties that need to be overcome are numerous. A lot of setbacks will be encountered in the process of implementation. But people can have reasons to believe that Western Europe's scientific and technical cooperation will make continuous progress in overcoming difficulties.

BELIJING REVIEW Version

Beijing BEIJING REVIEW in English Vol 30 No 1, 5 Jan 87 p 13

[By Gu Yaoming]

[Text]

Discussions at the Stockholm Ministerial meeting have pushed European co-operation in one high-tech development stage further.

We have finished the work of setting up. Now we have begun the practical work period, which will require much more effort. So said Swedish Industry Minister Thage Peterson at the fourth ministerial meeting of the Eureka programme. When 39 ministers and members from 19 European nations and the European Commission met in Stockholm on December 16, 1986. Established in 1985, it aims at revitalizing the West European technology by promoting co-operative high-tech projects and developing competitive new consumer goods. Among the results of this meeting were:

(1) Adoption of 37 new projects including information, telecommunications, robots, laser technology and new materials.

(2) Discussion of how to open markets. The meeting considered it necessary to remove trade barriers on high-tech products among European countries in order to create a vigorous international European market and thus increase the competitiveness of the European high-tech industry. The meeting asked all the member nations to develop measures for achieving this and to deliver reports at the next meeting.

(3) Discussion of sources of financing for Eureka projects. This is considered the most critical problem affecting the programme. The meeting called on the member states, the European Commission and private businesses to invest more in the programme's high-tech projects and agreed to Federal Germany's suggestion about setting up a financial roundtable conference to attract more private capital.

(4) A demand that the European Economic Community and the organizations under the European Free Trade Association speed up efforts to unify standards and types of products.

In recent years, the West European countries have been steadily following the path of unity and self-reliance, strengthening themselves through unity. "European consciousness" among the member states has been growing steadily. The disputes between the heads of the United States and the Soviet Union on the "Star Wars" programme and strategic nuclear weapons at last October's summit in Iceland have helped convince those European countries which were still hesitant about co-operation in science and technology. They have realized that if development does not happen in these fields, their economies will be affected and they may be manipulated by others in politics and defences.

The West European countries have learnt that there is no way a single country can survive by itself in the international high-tech competition, which will decide their future. They are now faced with the choice between co-operation and divisiveness. The former will lead to progress and the latter to decline. In his opening speech, Swedish Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson said that the European countries have the

necessary natural resources, as well as qualified scientists and technicians and financial resources. But only by pooling all these can Europe compete with the US and Japan in high technology.

In the last six months of 1986, the member states have been publicizing the Eureka programme among the businesses in their nations. At the beginning some businesses were worried that the Eureka programme would be only a project on paper, but its progress during the year has made them see the programme's implications for profits, for increasing productive forces and competitiveness, and for increasing employment rates. The Eureka programme has an especially strong appeal to medium and small enterprises, and now even some enterprises outside Europe hope to join in some of its projects.

The emergence of the Eureka programme shows that it accords with the interests of the European countries. It can be predicted that the Eureka programme will exert an important influence on both the future of Europe and the world's political prospects.

SDI AND SPACE ARMS

BRIEFS

CANADA R&D ON SPACE-BASED RADAR--The Canadian Defense Department has received permission to spend \$47 million on research and testing of space-based radar. The project would be aimed at helping defend against Soviet cruise missiles in the north and may be developed with the U.S. Defense Department. The radar would augment and possibly replace the land-based early warning system currently being put into place in the north under the Canada-U.S. North American Air Defense Agreement. A background paper describes the system as consisting of a small constellation of satellites placed in orbit. A Defense Department official emphasises that the project should not be considered part of the controversial U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, known as Star Wars. Brigadier General Terrence Liston says the primary difference is that the proposed radar system would be directed towards earth, watching for cruise missiles and cruise-carrying aircraft, rather than scanning space for ballistic missiles. The Canadian Government refused to take part in the U.S. Star Wars project but it has allowed Canadian industries to participate. [Text] [Montreal International Service in English 2000 GMT 23 Dec 86] /9365

USAF ASAT WORK--New York, 23 Dec (TASS)--The U.S. Air Force intends to continue work on developing systems of strike space weapons. The weekly AVIATION WEEK AND SPACE TECHNOLOGY reports that the U.S. plans to preserve the program for developing and manufacturing anti-satellite weapons (ASAT). Besides it is planned to press congress for funds to conduct new tests under conditions simulating combat operations. The ASAT program at the present stage is estimated at 3.8 billion dollars. The weekly points out that the U.S. Congress facing strong protests across the country against the Reagan Administration's plans to militarize space, has been banning for two years straight appropriations for testing ASAT systems. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 2154 GMT 23 Dec 86 LD] /9738

SDI UNDERMINES SPACE EXPLORATION--Washington, 28 Dec (TASS)--The Reagan Administration's "Strategic Defense Initiative" undermines space exploration for peaceful purposes and international cooperation in this field. The Washington-based institute for security and cooperation in outer space warns in a special bulletin it is preparing. It says that attempts to make space a possible battlefield threaten not only to demolish the foundation of cooperation but also cause grave damage to international security. The bulletin says that the SDI effort must therefore be dropped. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1126 GMT 28 Dec 86 LD] /9738

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CSO: 5200/1122

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

USSR: REYKJAVIK RESULTS STILL AFFECT DISARMAMENT DEBATES

Soviets Clarify INF Position

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU in German 25 Nov 86 p 1

[Article by Pierre Simonitsch: "The West Can Choose Between Two Proposals"]

[Text] The West can choose between two Soviet proposals on the reduction of medium-range missiles, which are both on the negotiating table. This was stated in Moscow by Victor Karpov, chief Soviet delegate in the disarmament negotiations with the United States, in a talk with visiting UN correspondents from Geneva. Thus Soviet diplomacy clarifies for the first time its attitude on the issue of medium-range missiles, which has been creating confusion since the Reykjavik summit meeting. In a separate talk with the group of journalists from Geneva, the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry, Gennadi Gerassimov, announced a new Moscow initiative this year for ending the Afghanistan conflict. With regard to relations with the FRG, the Soviets have not yet put aside the comparison between Gorbachev and Goebbels made by chancellor Kohl. "That remark has damaged our relations, it is still painful to us," declared Gerassimov with a pouting face.

The long overdue explanation of the equivocal attitude of the Soviet Union regarding medium-range nuclear weapons was given by the top disarmament expert, Karpov. According to his statement, the proposal by Soviet party chief Mikhail Gorbachev of 15 January continues to be valid. It contains a separate agreement on the reduction of medium-range missiles, not tying it to other problems. However, in such an agreement, French and British nuclear weapons would have to be taken into account. It would not concern medium-range missiles stationed in the Asian part of the Soviet Union, pointing east. "If the West prefers this solution, we continue to be willing to negotiate," declared Karpov.

The other Soviet proposal had been submitted at the Reykjavik summit meeting. It provides for the elimination of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe as well as "drastic reduction" of SS-20 missiles deployed on Soviet Asian territory, without taking into account French, British and Chinese nuclear forces. But in return, the Soviet Union demands a "package deal," namely, simultaneous reduction of intercontinental nuclear weapons and U.S.

restraint in their "Star Wars" project (SDI). "If the United States is willing to compromise with regard to SDI, then the road is open for an agreement on the entire complex of nuclear weapons," Karpov said.

According to its chief negotiator, on 17 November, shortly before the adjournment of the Geneva disarmament talks, the Soviet Union explained its position in writing, "in more precise words and greater detail than in the discussions at Reykjavik." It also included additional elements and answered some questions raised by the United States. The U.S. side--according to Karpov--had not gone the same constructive route. Submitting their papers on 22, 23, and 28 October in Geneva, the United States in reality had retracted agreements which had been reached between Reagan and Gorbachev in the Icelandic capital.

The 4-day meeting, arranged for early December in Geneva, according to Karpov serves the purpose of "getting the U.S. reaction to our latest proposals and discussing the possibilities of agreements on all three major issues--space weapons, strategic and medium-range rockets."

Karpov stated that, with regard to SDI, the Soviet Union has proposed special negotiations to define what is permitted and what is prohibited under the 1972 ABM treaty on limiting missile defense systems. No "positive answer" has as yet been received from Washington.

The Foreign Ministry spokesman, Gerassimov, suggested to the group of journalists as a "personal idea"--which quite possibly could become official policy--a meeting in Vienna of the supreme commanders of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. There, the two generals Rogers and Kulikov should discuss a reduction of conventional weapons. "We don't want to observe NATO only through field glasses," Gerassimov said.

The close confidant of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze did not hide his feeling that he does "not like" the present East-West negotiations about troop reductions in Central Europe (MBFR). "Nothing has been done there in the last 13 years," he stated; "we are willing to agree to any other forum for talks on troop reductions." According to Gerassimov, consultations of the Warsaw Pact are presently taking place in Sofia on this question. Subsequently, the East Bloc would approach NATO and propose a meeting of working groups of the two alliances. The talks are to deal with military confrontation in the conventional area.

With forceful assurances of its willingness to also reduce the conventional armed forces in East and West, the Soviet Union evidently is trying to anticipate upcoming NATO initiatives. The Western defense alliance, at its meeting of ministers in December, will decide on the possibility of opening up a further negotiating front with the Warsaw Pact. A high-ranking study group is working on the plans at present. But Moscow is in an even greater hurry. "We don't want to wait around until December," says Gerassimov. The surprising flurry of activity with regard to conventional weapons has somewhat pushed into the background the matter of nuclear medium-range missiles, whose deployment had kept the public agitated for years.

Gerassimov does not rule out that, in the course of negotiations, the Soviet Union will give up the package deal created in Reykjavik, linking the elimination of medium-range missiles to U.S. concessions on SDI. But he thinks that in that case, West European governments would make the removal of Pershing II missiles and cruise missiles, deployed since 1983, dependent on unilateral reduction of Eastern conventional armed forces. "If we take our negotiating package apart, the other side will tie up a new package immediately," prophesies Gerassimov. In his opinion, the United States' major allies have totally forgotten the original statement of the NATO two-track decision on "catch-up armament" and the proposed "zero solution" for medium-range weapons.

In the negotiations carried out within the framework of the United Nations, the Foreign Ministry spokesman foresees an agreement on a worldwide ban of chemical weapons in the course of next year. After the resumption of these negotiations in Geneva in January, the Soviet Union will submit a proposal for the solution of the controversial control question on the basis of a working paper introduced by Great Britain.

When questioned about the prospects for a political solution of the Afghanistan conflict, Gerassimov announced "news even before the end of the year." He did not wish to give details. He only indicated that the withdrawal of Soviet troops could be accelerated if the opposite side were to restrict support for the resistance movements. "The withdrawal of a few Soviet regiments from Afghanistan was a political gesture to show that we want a political solution," Gerassimov said; "it is not our intention to stay there forever."

Separate INF Agreement Seen Essential

Munich SUEDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG in German 5 Dec 86 p 4

[Editorial by Kurt Kister: "Zero Solution--the First Step"]

[Text] The Reykjavik summit has revived a dispute in the FRG which many had thought was over and done with after the deployment of Pershings and cruise missiles. President Reagan and party chief Gorbachev agreed in Iceland, before they parted ways because of SDI, that in the case of medium-range nuclear missiles, the worldwide elimination of these systems was not only desirable for both sides, but also had to be carried out in a short period of time. What had been pushed around for so long in the years of negotiations in Geneva that practically no one expected any results, has suddenly regained topicality and explosiveness. The dispute in the FRG concerns whether "we must not strive for the zero solution for medium-range missiles" (Franz Josef Strauss), or whether it "is in the German and European interests" (Hans-Dietrich Genscher). This requires a look at the most recent history.

On 18 November 1981, President Reagan announced the zero solution for intermediate-range nuclear missiles, the so-called INF systems, as a binding goal of Western arms control policy. Not least of all, this decision was made under pressure of the Schmidt government in Bonn. The chancellor had to prove to his own party, which was more and more turning away from him, but also to

the peace movement, that Washington did not want to deploy new missiles at any cost. Acceptance of the zero solution as a negotiating goal meant a political victory for the Schmidt contingent among those favoring catch-up armament. It saw medium-range missiles as a tool to make INF an object of negotiations for the first time, since INF had always been excluded from arms control talks. At the same time, one wanted to get the better of the immense SS-20 potential of the Soviet Union. The other part of those favoring catch-up armament, on the other hand, considered the new missiles an absolutely necessary complement of the NATO arsenal, largely independent of the number of Soviet SS-20s; gathered around Strauss and Alfred Dregger then as now, they absolutely ruled out the zero solution. This wing believed that the West had to have nuclear weapons which, in case of a Soviet attack, could safely and quickly reach Soviet territory, also.

The present dispute over the zero solution repeats precisely this old controversy. It is still a matter of a fundamental evaluation of the role of nuclear weapons in Europe: are they above all a means of political deterrence, whose "rational" military use is hardly thinkable or, in case of war, are they also to balance the presumed conventional inferiority? The right wing of the CDU/CSU, in its opposition to the zero solution, upholds this latter evaluation. It is of the opinion that total elimination endangers the security policy coupling to the United States; that it would leave Europe without a counterbalance to Soviet short-range missiles of the types SS 21, 22, and 23, and would aggravate the inferiority in the conventional area.

Here, however, the counter arguments have greater weight. The coupling of the old continent to the United States is ensured by the presence of 326,000 U.S. soldiers. With this stationing, the United States has entered a community of fate with Europe whose significance is not changed by additional nuclear missiles. It is true that NATO can counter the roughly 1,400 Soviet short-range nuclear weapons with only 172 comparable systems. But whoever makes computations of balance in the nuclear area, as with conventional troops, has not grasped defense policy in the nuclear age: what is decisive is the entire range of rockets and missiles, and the United States, Great Britain and France have a rich arsenal of those. Lastly, the attempt to make up for conventional imbalances through nuclear firepower leads straight back to the 1950's. In case of an attack, NATO has deliberately cast aside the strategy of considering soldiers and tanks as a conventional trip wire for the automatically ensuing nuclear strike. It is for the very reason that the nuclear threshold was so low (and still is) that the alliance has spent so much money for non-nuclear defense during the past 15 years.

To reach an accord on medium-range missiles dependent on the simultaneous reduction of short-range weapons and conventional troops would mean torpedoing the arms control process, so unexpectedly restarted. Reductions can--but then also must-- be carried out gradually. One must make use of Soviet willingness--after all, there are still enough problems, for instance in questions of control and the tie-in of SDI demanded by Moscow. The West should adamantly insist on negotiations in the area of tactical nuclear weapons as well as armed land and air forces. If Gorbachev is serious about all his offers of recent

months, he could, for example, now give a signal through a more constructive attitude at the Vienna MBFR talks--also in favor of the zero solution.

Conflicting Views Within NATO

Bonn DIE WELT in German 15 Dec 86 p 2

[Article by Cay Graf Brockdorff: "Outward Agreement Within NATO--But Andreotti Warns"]

[Text] Italy, which is sometimes suspected--especially in the person of its Foreign Minister Giulio Andreotti--of giving in to the Soviets more than necessary, actually always demonstrates a realistic attitude when it involves the basic facts of threat. At the fall meeting of NATO foreign ministers, Andreotti as honorary president gave the opening speech.

He said: "A thorough analysis of the effects of nuclear weapons is decisive for Europe's security. If the zero solution for intermediate-range weapons should come to pass, the Soviet Union must not be permitted to retain its superiority in shorter-range weapons systems. If an equal balance in short-range systems cannot be attained, it must at least become visible in outline, parallel to every agreement on reduction or removal of intermediate-range systems, so that the danger of destabilization can be averted."

Andreotti's remark, which in content resembles the situation assessment of the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Bernard Rogers, reveals the two schools of thought within the alliance. Both want disarmament progress, but one is cautious and, with the threat analysis, places the security of the alliance visibly above arms control. The other, led by Bonn Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, does not want to burden the success, seemingly within reach, by "saddling" it with new demands.

It can be assumed that France, for whom the events of Reykjavik have been a considerable headache, has advised caution just like Italy. But the line of the "refusers" won, not wanting to go the way of the "saddling" hurdle, which to them seemed an obstacle to a breakthrough. All foreign ministers, including Andreotti and Washington's George Shultz, in the end agreed to the communique aiming directly at the zero solution.

The Atlantic alliance is in the throes of disarmament fever. Admonishments for caution are almost felt to be onerous; strategic reasons for the necessity of catch-up armament are in danger of being forgotten. There are people who always discover cliches in such situations. Here, too, they have found a handy formula: "Deterrence does not really depend on a weapons system." But the strategic reality in Europe cannot be exhaustively described by such turns of a phrase.

Rogers, also, supports the zero solution. But he warns: isolated reduction of intermediate-range weapons throws the alliance back to the year 1977. The general reveals the core of the problem: "The Soviets are working toward the point from which they can intimidate and blackmail us without ever firing a

single shot. As someone said: to harvest the fruits of victory without the torments of war. We can stop this development only by taking the necessary steps to deter not only an attack, but also political intimidation. For that, [political] will and resolve are needed."

Shortly before the end of 1986, the alliance presents a closed front to the outside as always, but it is certain that doubts about the right course have not disappeared among all of its members. One or the other consoles himself with the--not unrealistic--thought that the security of Europe, optimized by catch-up armament, will not give way to an uncertain deterrence signal overnight.

Prior to any missile reduction comes the demand for effective controls, considered fundamental by all. Richard Perle, chairman of the high-ranking group for nuclear questions within NATO, has already outlined what they must be: "If necessary, we must even go into Soviet factories." It is worth noting that Perle, one of the hawks of the Washington administration, was never an advocate of catch-up armament.

The secretive way in which the Soviet Union--whose general staff has a major directorate for strategic deception--has circumvented the Salt II treaty, has made the United States very thoughtful. Before a zero solution there would be long negotiations, very, very long ones, probably.

Even now one must warn against looking for compromises at the expense of security. But the most courage is needed by European politicians to depict these contexts in an understandable form.

Zero Solution Seen Impossible

Frankfurt FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG in German 19 Dec 86 p 1

[Editorial by Karl Feldmeyer: "Forked Tongues in the Alliance"]

[Text] The autumn meetings of NATO foreign ministers and defense ministers this year were more than just routine meetings. They reflect the profound change in the alliance between the beginning and end of this year, a turning-point which occurred not in the area of military facts but, rather, in the consciousness of the alliance. It is because of the Reykjavik summit meeting that expert circles today speak freely of a qualitatively new situation in the alliance.

Two events are decisive: the understanding between Reagan and Gorbachev regarding withdrawal of all intermediate-range weapons from Europe, and the U.S. offer to eliminate all nuclear missiles, possibly all nuclear weapons, within 10 years. Both positions are beyond what Washington had previously agreed on with the alliance partners.

The disappointment that disarmament decisions failed at Reykjavik because of SDI, the impression that a great opportunity had been missed, was only the first reaction of the West European public. The ensuing considerations were of

a different kind; the NATO meetings after Reykjavik contributed much to this. Between the solidarity affirmation of the alliance partners immediately after the Reykjavik summit meeting and the terse statement by the NATO Council in mid-December, that meetings like the one in Reykjavik are "important milestones," lie only 9 weeks in terms of time; in terms of content, entire worlds. Of all that was considered by Reagan and Gorbachev in Reykjavik, there is political support only for the 50-percent reduction of strategic offensive weapons by both powers. That speaks for itself--especially if one studies the long list of what Reagan had proposed and considered in Reykjavik. The NATO Council voiced no approval for Reagan's boldest proposal, that of eliminating all strategic offensive weapons, nor for the stance which the President took vis-a-vis SDI. Removal of all intermediate-range missiles from Europe--catchword zero solution--also did not gain the approval of the NATO Council. Only the circle directly concerned--the United States and the six deployment countries--favored it.

But the change of opinion in NATO, brought on by Reykjavik, can be proven not only by the evasive language of the communique. There are also newer quotes, such as the statement by Italian Foreign Minister Andreotti: "Reykjavik has made it clear just how endangered Europe would be--a vulnerable peninsula at the edge of the Asian continent--if its defense depended solely on conventional forces." And the same goes for the remark by the NATO secretary general, Lord Carrington, that among other things, Reykjavik had had the effect on those who for years had been demanding progress in arms limitations that "they are now afraid that prospects are opening up for real movement."

The cause of this disquiet is not so much one or the other detail, but rather the discovery that the U.S. President in his disarmament policy wants to go far beyond European objectives. The goal of his Reykjavik proposals is the rapid reduction of nuclear risks for the United States. However, the proposals which he either made or accepted touch on the security of the NATO partners. They, who up to now had found fault with Reagan's arms build-up, now fear that disarmament politician Reagan, with his visions, had shaken the foundations of NATO strategy and European security. This is confirmed by all the communiqus issued by defense and foreign ministers since Reykjavik. They tirelessly repeat the security policy principles of the alliance. It reminds one of whistling in the dark when they keep repeating the necessity of coupling Europe's security with that of the United States, and giving priority to maintaining the alliance's deterrence and defense capability. But deterrence requires that no gap be opened up among the necessary nuclear weapons--and all of them know that, too. If one takes seriously the affirmation of NATO principles in the communiqus, this means simply that a zero solution must not be carried out under the given circumstances. The politicians who decide and affirm all this so far have not dared to pronounce this openly.

Such a contradictory attitude is risky, since it promotes distrust and makes it impossible to pronounce and invalidate the fears stemming from Reykjavik, among which is that of a U.S.-Soviet balance of interests at the expense of European security. On the other hand, Reagan cannot be pleased when his allies pretend to support his position in Reykjavik while, simultaneously, they attempt to stonewall his initiative by affirming present alliance strategy. An alliance

of democracies cannot tolerate for very long an institutionalized speaking with forked tongue. Without credibility, which requires clear-cut statements, the alliance is doomed to disintegrate. Consequences must be drawn from this insight.

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CSO: 5200/2473

U.S.-USSR NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS TALKS

PRC OFFICIALS'S OUTLOOK ON ARMS RACE SITUATION

HK070853 Hong Kong LIAOWANG OVERSEAS EDITION in Chinese No 1, 5 Jan 87 pp 3-4

[Article by Huan Xiang (1360 6763), general director of the State Council International Problems Research Center: "Outlook for the International Situation in 1987"]

[Excerpts] In my view, the two superpowers will both concentrate on solving their domestic issues in 1987, and it will be hard for them to take a substantial step forward on major international issues, but there is still a possibility of adopting some minor and tactical detente measures.

On the issue of the arms race, since the summit in Iceland, the two sides have continued to accuse each other of "backing out from the original position." In fact, both sides made some retrogression. The present issue is how to stop retrogression and seriously seek a way to restart and advance the talks. Obviously, this is still very difficult. The arms control talks are related to too many things. They are not only related to the "Star Wars plan" of the United States, but are also entangled with the issues of human rights, "hot spots", conventional weapons, and chemical weapons. Moreover, the talks on controlling nuclear weapons alone were very complicated as they included many technical details and needed careful and meticulous consideration. So, how could we hope that the talks would achieve quick results? In particular, the two sides now still have to cope with many knotty problems at home.

However, in order to maintain the vulnerable detente tendency which has cost them so much painstaking effort over the past year and more, the two superpowers may continue to take a minor step forward, which will also be favorable to the handling of their domestic issues. For example, they may reach some agreement on the issue of controlling intermediate-range missiles, which may not affect the overall situation, but may improve the atmosphere and win popularity. So, it is still possible such a step will be taken. It seems that the United States will have to take more initiative if it wants the situation to develop in this direction.

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CSO: 5200/4049

SALT/START ISSUES

USSR HITS U.S. MX, MIDGETMAN DECISIONS

MX Decision Violates SALT

LD210433 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1730 GMT 20 Dec 86

[Text] The White House press office has issued a report on President Reagan's decision to start large-scale development of the mobile Midgetman intercontinental ballistic missile and the development of specially-equipped railroad cars for 50 MX missiles. At the microphone we have Viktor Levin:

[Levin] A few days ago when the United States put into commission the 131st strategic bomber and in this way cast aside the Soviet-U.S. treaty on the limitation of strategic weapons, SALT II, Washington affirmed that allegedly the United States intends to continue to display maximum restraint. This assurance and desire for restraint also figured in statements by White House representatives and in the official statement of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

It must be frankly said that nobody took these assurances seriously. It was clear to all people of common sense that Washington has been trying to create a propagandistic smokescreen around the improper behavior, no more, no less. Not only among ruling circles in Western Europe but among U.S. legislators, sharp words were heard of the need to adhere to the limitation established by the SALT II Treaty. Thus, 57 senators of the U.S. Congress, representing not only the Democratic Party but also the Republicans, openly accosted President Reagan with an appeal to adhere to the quantitative limits fixed by the SALT II Treaty.

Today, when President Reagan's decision became known to start the large-scale development of the Midgetman missile and flat railroad cars for transporting the MX missiles, it can be said that Washington has once again refused to heed the voice of reason. Both these decisions mean no less than a new breach of the provisions of the SALT II Treaty. According to this agreement, the sides have the right to commission one new type of intercontinental ballistic missile each. Having adopted the MX missiles, the U.S. has made use of its right. Now they want to have a second new type of missile. This contradicts the accords. The intention to site MX missiles on mobile flat cars also exceeds the limits of SALT II. This form of basing missiles is prohibited

and leaves the treaty wide open to abuse. I repeat, what we have here is a blatant breach of the provisions of the SALT II Treaty and these acts completely expose the pharisaic assertion of the U.S. Administration about displaying maximum restraint.

However, this is not all that is indicated by the President's decision. It reveals once again that the U.S. Administration simply does not wish to take into account either common sense or the obligations that it has undertaken, much less the opinions of its allies and its own congressmen. As we can see, there are new failures and awful scandals for the current administration that are evoked by its short-sighted actions. But the longer the intoxication that all is permitted lasts, the more difficult and awful the hangover.

PRAVDA on Midgetman

PM271428 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 24 Dec 86 First Edition p 5

[Vitaliy Gan "Commentator's Column": "Goal of Ambitions"]

[Text] Washington--The U.S. Administration is continuing to accelerate the buildup of American strategic forces on the old, hackneyed pretext of the "Soviet military threat." President Reagan has decided on the full-scale development of mobile, single-charge Midgetmen ICBM's, which are to be brought into an "operational state" by 1992. It is planned to build around 500 of these missiles at a total cost of at least 35 billion dollars.

At the same time the president has approved a Pentagon recommendation regarding the basing mode of a second batch (50 units) of MX first-strike ICBM's carrying 10 warheads of enhanced accuracy. As has been reported, faced with very powerful pressure from the military-industrial complex and its political lobbyist--the Pentagon--Congress has already appropriated funds for the building of the first 50 ballistic missiles, which will come to almost 15 billion dollars.

While giving the go-ahead to MX production, the legislators did, however, consider the siting of the missiles in silos unreliable and requested that the administration submit proposals on a different basing mode.

The White House document made public is capable of confusing anyone by the vagueness of its formulations and abundance of technical detail. However, one of its sentences puts everything in place. "The overall number of systems produced and the scale of missile deployment will depend on the magnitude of the Soviet threat and on the progress at talks on an arms control agreement," the statement points out. It is difficult to fail to notice that this sentence has merged two of the administration's fallacious premises that have served throughout these years as a justification for thwarting talks with the Soviet Union on real measures to break the arms race. Plugging them at the moment is a clumsy attempt to impress upon the public of the United States and other countries the fact that there has been a definitive departure from the Soviet-American accords achieved in Reykjavik. It is no wonder that CBS in its

commentary maliciously observed that "just 2 months back, at the meeting in Reykjavik, President Reagan proposed doing away with all ballistic missiles. His proposal today, however, is designed to ensure their survival."

The violation of the SALT II Treaty, the refusal to join the Soviet nuclear test moratorium, the undermining of the ABM treaty, and the buildup of qualitatively new kinds of strategic armaments are all links in a single Washington chain with which they would like to harness the whole world to the chariot of U.S. universal ambitions. But will the world allow such a situation, that is the question.

Deployment of 10 New MX Missiles

OW251215 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0400 GMT 25 Dec 86

[From the Novosti newscast; Yuriy Rostov commentary]

[Text] Ten ballistic MX missiles have been deployed and placed in a state of battle readiness at the Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming. Our commentary.

[Rostov] Hello, comrades. And so, 10 more ICBM missiles have been added to the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Is this a lot or a little? It is a lot because each of these 10 missiles carries 10 nuclear warheads, because these missiles are the first of 50 to be deployed in the near future, to be followed, according to Washington's plans, with 50 more MX missiles and 500 ICBM mobile Midgetman missiles.

The total elimination of nuclear weapons. This aim, as far back as the beginning of the eighties, has been proclaimed on many occasions by the Republican administration. At the same time, from the moment it entered the White House, the same administration has launched a militarist program unprecedented in scale. The effects of these programs are being felt now. They have led the United States to refute the SALT II agreement, scuttle the anti-missile agreement, and scuttle the whole package of agreements on limiting the nuclear arms race--those agreements that were reached in the seventies.

The beginning of widespread deployment by the Reagan Administration of new, super-contemporary ballistic missiles is but one more step exposing the hypocrisy of Washington. In other words, Washington favors talks; in deeds, it sabotages all efforts to find a way out of the dangerous situation in the international arena.

This year has been declared by the United Nations the Year of Peace. This year, millions of people began thinking in a new way. They are demanding specific steps to curb the arms race. And these steps are being taken. The Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions is an example of such actions, as is also the Soviet program for nuclear disarmament by the year 2000, which contains well thought out and realistic measures for the liquidation of weapons of mass destruction.

Millions of people are now demanding that the United States renounce its militaristic programs and that the United States respond to the call by the Soviet Union to begin constructive dialogue, the preconditions of which were established in Reykjavik.

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CSO: 5200/1219

SALT/START ISSUES

USSR: U.S. GOALS FOR SALT BREAKOUT SCORED

PM311607 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Dec 86 Second Edition p 3

[Article by Major General of the Reserve F. Gontar, candidate of military sciences, under the rubric "The Facts Expose": "In Pursuit of Superiority"]

[Text] By sanctioning the entry of the 131st B-52 heavy bomber fitted with long-range cruise missiles into service as part of the strategic offensive forces, the Reagan administration committed a gross violation of the SALT I and SALT II Soviet-U.S. legal-treaty documents and de facto refused to honor them. It was immediately following Reykjavik that the United States broke completely with the SALT II treaty, which enshrined the strategic parity and served as a starting point in the quest for ways to reduce and liquidate nuclear weapons. Washington thus demonstrated that, despite its peacemaking assurances, the U.S. Administration continues to rely on crude force and the nuclear fist, and that its expectations of victory in a nuclear war remain the foundation of U.S. military doctrine. Evidence of this is also contained in a statement by Pentagon chief C. Weinberger, who said bluntly that all measures by the United States are aimed at attaining superiority over the USSR in a nuclear war and the completion of such a war on conditions advantageous for the United States.

In their pursuit of the specter of military superiority, the U.S. ruling circles are building up their efforts for the complete implementation of the so-called "comprehensive strategic program for America's rearmament." In line with this program, Washington is implementing at an accelerated pace the modernization of all components of the strategic "triad." It must be mentioned that by way of justifying his militarist preparations and the repudiation of the SALT II treaty, R. Reagan continues to insist that, during the decade before he took over as President (1981), the United States had been "inactive" and had taken a stance of "restraint." But these claims are, to put it mildly, a deliberate untruth and meant for uninformed people. In actual fact, it was precisely in that period of so-called "restraint" that the United States became the first to embark on the mass MIRVing of its ICBM's. As a result of this "inactivity," the number of combatant charges on U.S. strategic missiles increased several-fold.

The White House would also rather keep silent about the fact that, as a result of the modernization carried out on Minuteman-3 ICBM's (each with three individually targeted warheads) over the last few years, their nuclear yield and accuracy of fire have almost doubled.

Flight tests of the new high-accuracy MX ICBM (each one with 10 warheads of 600 kilotons each) are at the final stage. The Pentagon has started the combat deployment of these missiles without waiting for the outcome of the tests. Full-scale development [razrabortka] of the new Midgetman (mobile) ICBM is simultaneously in progress, and up to 1,000 units are planned for deployment.

In its desire to give the naval forces a capability of delivering a first "disabling" strike, the Pentagon continues the large-scale fitting of surface ships and nuclear-powered submarines with Tomahawk long-range cruise missiles. The building of "Ohio" class SSBN's, each one with 24 launch installations, is proceeding at an accelerated pace. Eight such submarines are under construction at present, and up to 20 are planned to be built in the nineties. It is well known that, starting in 1989, these submarines will be armed with highly accurate Trident-2 first-strike missiles.

Measures are also being implemented to improve the combat potential of the strategic "triad's" aviation component. As R. Reagan declared, the further buildup of the number of strategic bombers fitted with long-range nuclear cruise missiles will continue regardless of any limitations. Having broken the SALT II treaty, the Washington administration continues to refit the B-52 bombers with long-range air-launched cruise missiles. Each aircraft can carry up to 20 such missiles. A total of more than 190 B-52 bombers are planned to be refitted with these missiles. Series production of the new B1-B heavy bombers has started. The U.S. Air Force plans to have 100 such aircraft in service by 1989, each one of them capable of carrying up to 30 cruise missiles. Development [razrabortka] of the ATB "invisible" heavy bomber is proceeding at accelerated pace. Flight tests of this aircraft are planned to begin already in 1987 so that, by the mid-nineties, 130 bombers of this type could be in service.

The B1-B and ATB aircraft will be the foundation of the U.S. strategic aviation in the future. In its desire to enhance the combat potential of these aircraft, the United States is completing the development [razrabortka] of a new nuclear cruise missile for them, a so-called "second generation" missile codenamed ACM. In terms of its tactical and technical specifications, it is substantially superior to the ALCM currently in service. The use of lightweight high-strength alloys in building the missile and a new high-energy fuel have resulted in almost doubling the ACM's flight range up to 4,500 km. Series production has started, and ACM's are expected to come into service in 1987-1988. A total of some 1,500 new missiles are planned to be manufactured in just a few years.

In addition to the cruise missiles, the Pentagon is planning the creation [sozdaniye] of 1,900 new SRAM II air-to-surface supersonic ballistic missiles for strategic bombers, which will replace the SRAM missiles currently in service.

The SALT II treaty was a serious obstacle for the implementation of all these extensive militarist programs in the sphere of building up strategic offensive weapons. This is why Washington decided to get rid of it. The overstepping of the limits set by the SALT II treaty will lead to an unrestrained arms race, which was evidently what the U.S. military-industrial complex bosses calculated on. But U.S. security will not increase as a result of this. By building up the mountains of weapons, and primarily nuclear weapons, the U.S. rulers are seriously jeopardizing the whole world, including their own country.

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CSO: 5200/1219

SALT/START ISSUES

USSR GENERAL DENIES SALT VIOLATION

Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 51, 28 Dec 86-4 Jan 87 p 7

[Article by Lieutenant General Viktor Pavlov]

[Text]

The United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) has circulated a press release on alleged Soviet violations of the SALT-2 Treaty.

The time chosen for this and even the "facts" selected to suit this purpose are obviously aimed to somehow take the crest off the criticism addressed to Washington in connection with its decision to abandon the SALT-2 Treaty.

First and foremost, the agency decided to somehow respond to the Soviet Government's Statement of December 5 in which the USSR, taking into account the immense universal importance of the issue, announced that it is "refraining, for the time being, from abandoning the limitations under SALT-1 and SALT-2 Treaties".

The Soviet government's step, naturally, is in sharp contrast with the manner in which the White House has dealt with these accords – moreover, this contrast is patently not in favour of the USA. Therefore the ACDA set itself the task to minimize anew the role and significance of the agreements rejected by the American side in the field of strategic offensive arms, to distort the USSR's policy in this area, and to cast aspersions on the Soviet side's adherence to strict observance of the commitments it assumed.

The press release says, for example, that the "Soviet Statement comes as no surprise since the SALT agreements – even if fully complied with – did not prevent a very substantial further expansion of Soviet capabilities". However, the ACDA should know better than anyone else that in actual fact the USA still has considerably more nuclear warheads on strategic carriers than the USSR has. We also know the official statements by the representatives of the Pentagon and the US administration to the effect that the nuclear warheads ration is the most important indicator of the balance of the sides' strategic forces.

If one were to touch on the realities which stemmed from the agreements in the field of strategic arms limitation, the agency should have mentioned, even if in passing, that during the time that the 1972 Interim Agreement and the SALT-2 Treaty have been in effect the Soviet Union has cut down some 540 strategic carriers with a view to observing the agreed-upon extreme levels of strategic offensive arms.

The ineffectiveness of limitations, to which the agency refers, is one of the most popular motives in the USA, which was composed by the administration to justify its abandonment of the SALT-2 Treaty. But this pseudoargument is intended solely to an audience which is incompetent in questions of armaments. As to the

White House itself, it clearly sticks to the directly opposite view. It is only the effectiveness of limitations that can explain the entire present-day conduct of the American side in relation to the agreements in the field of strategic arms limitation. After all, if the limitations were not serious and did not put a brake on the American military programmes, the administration would hardly venture to draw upon itself practically universal condemnation by its refusal to comply.

Even more unseemly is Washington's attempt to regalvanize the far-fetched "facts of violation" by the Soviet Union of its commitments under the SALT-2 Treaty. Three such "facts" have been mentioned.

The first is the SS-25 deployment, as the Pentagon nicknamed the Soviet intercontinental ballistic missile RS-12M, which is a modernized variant of the RS-12 missile. The USSR is accused of this being a second new type of ICBM whose deployment is allegedly at variance with the SALT-2 Treaty, which allows the development of only one new type of such missiles. The charge is built on the assumption that the "throw-weight" of the RS-12M missile exceeds the above norm the same weight of the RS-12 missile, which is why the RS-12M intercontinental ballistic missile cannot be considered a permitted modernization of the RS-12 missile and should be considered a prohibited second new type.

What is the matter here? In the SALT-2 Treaty (agreed statement to Paragraph 7 of Article IV) it is clearly recorded that the throw-weight of an ICBM is the aggregate weight of its warhead (or warheads), the devices for the division, separation and guidance of the warheads and defence penetration means, including the structures for their separation. The American side groundlessly includes into the throw-weight of one missile (RS-12M) the weight of the equipment used only in testing, and in the case of another (RS-12) it just as groundlessly excludes from the throw-weight the weights of the defence penetration means and the corresponding device for the warhead guidance. After that it compares the throw-weights of both missiles and arrives at the conclusion that in the case of the RS-12M missile it is "roughly twice that of the RS-12". But actually why twice? By treating the provisions of the Treaty in this arbitrary manner, it is possible to assert that it exceeds even five times. The American side apparently decided not to accept any explanations, clearly testifying that the RS-12M missile is a modernized variant of the RS-12 missile and has everything in order in respect to the permitted limit of changing the throw-weight. It is clear why this was done.

Indicative in this respect is also the question of "encryption of test missile telemetry". The SALT-2 Treaty (general understanding to Paragraph 3 of Article XV) envisages that "each Party is free to use various means of transmitting telemetric information, including its encryption", with the exception of cases when it impedes verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty.

The information which is needed for verification of compliance with the provisions of the SALT-2 Treaty is not decoded in the USSR. As a matter of fact, it is not transmitted in direct shape from aboard the missile — after

all, the side carrying out the tests knows in advance, for instance, the launch-weight or the throw-weight of the missile, the number of stages, the kind of fuel and the number of warheads. Consequently, the question can only be of indirect indicators which would allow the other side to judge of these parameters. Their selection, naturally, depends on the methods of calculations accepted by the sides.

Inasmuch as the American side declared that the information which is not decoded in the Soviet Union is, allegedly, not enough for it for verification purposes, the Soviet side met it halfway and suggested that it should name the parameters which, in the American side's opinion, should not be decoded, and then their list should be agreed upon. If the problem really existed and if there were a real desire to solve it, this straight way would have been the shortest. The question would have been closed. However, this has not occurred. Under various far-fetched excuses Washington deviated from solving the question which it itself posed, and continued to use it (for lack of actual pretexts) for political speculations.

That the press release amounts to a desperate attempt to counterpose at least something to the clear-cut and precise Soviet assessment of the USA's negative actions in the field of arms limitation is also evidenced by the assertion about the Soviet side's allegedly "exceeding limits on strategic nuclear delivery vehicles". This is an obvious rehash on its own departure beyond the limits of the SALT-2 Treaty in connection with the re-equipment of a 131st heavy bomber to carry cruise missiles. What kind of overstepping can the ACDA speak about if the USSR has not only not exceeded the limits of the Interim Agreement and the SALT-2 Treaty but, as the Soviet government has declared, "refrains for the time being from abandoning the limitations" under these agreements?

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CSO: 5200/1216

SALT/START ISSUES

BRIEFS

TASS: 132D B-52 ARRIVES--Washington, 7 Jan (TASS)--The 132nd U.S. strategic bomber B-52 fitted out with cruise missiles arrived at the Sawyer Air Base (Michigan State) on 22 December, a spokesman for the Pentagon said on Tuesday here. In his words, another such aircraft will possibly be stationed there later this month. Thus, the Reagan Administration is pointedly continuing its dangerous policy of undermining the SALT II Treaty and uncontrolled buildup of the nuclear arsenals. The UPI agency recalled that it was late in November last year that official Washington "began intentionally violating" the treaty signed in 1979, when the 131st B-52 bomber was fitted out with cruise missiles. The AP agency points out in its turn that this decision has aroused criticism among a number of U.S. congressmen. ["USA Fitting Out B-52 With Cruise Missiles"--TASS headline] [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 0818 GMT 7 Jan 87 LD] /9738

TASS: MX MISSILES DEPLOYED--New York, 3 Jan (TASS)--The U.S. Strategic Air Command on 2 January officially received and took control over the first batch of ten intercontinental MX ballistic missiles, which were deployed at the U.S. Warren Air Base in Wyoming. A total of 50 MX missiles, each capable of carrying 10 powerful nuclear warheads, are to be installed in special silos at military bases in Wyoming, Nebraska and Colorado, by decision of the Reagan Administration and in line with the U.S. nuclear potential modernization program, by the year 1988. Late last year the Reagan Administration already announced that it intended to request congressional approval for the deployment of 50 MX missiles on special railway platforms to make them mobile. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1054 GMT 3 Jan 87 LD] /9738

CSO: 5200/1219

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

USSR FOREIGN MINISTRY AIDE DISCUSSES EUROPEAN INF, ARMS CURBS

PM281755 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 23 Dec 86 Morning Edition p 5

[*"IZVESTIYA interview"* with K.F. Mikhaylov, deputy chief of a USSR Foreign Ministry Administration, by S. Guk: "Once More 'Gray Areas,' Once More 'Arms Upgrading?'" --no place or date of interview specified; first four paragraphs are IZVESTIYA introduction]

[Text] Even though Reykjavik failed to produce any specific agreements on nuclear disarmament because of the U.S. stance on SDI, the meeting was, nonetheless, not fruitless. It demonstrated that to reach accord on the phased nuclear defusing of the planet is not such an unrealistic cause. Just one thing is needed: a desire to disarm.

But here is a paradox: The West European U.S. allies, who praised to the skies Reagan's "zero option" on medium-range missiles in Europe, suddenly shied away after Reykjavik. Now those very same politicians are speaking about the threat contained in the implementation of their own "zero option": The USSR would retain its short-range missiles and NATO would have nothing to counter them. They are announcing the emergence of "gray areas" (which is how NATO's lag in medium-range missiles was described by the West in the past), and demanding new "arms upgrading." At the same time they continue to make use of the long-refuted thesis about the Warsaw Pact's "overwhelming superiority" over NATO in conventional arms, and here again demand "arms upgrading."

The Western story about West Europe's "arms upgrading" by means of U.S. medium-range missiles being "the only" way to "force" the USSR to talk is transformed before our very eyes into a chain reaction of further "arms upgrading" by NATO.

IZVESTIYA correspondent S. Guk asked K.F. Mikhaylov, deputy chief of a USSR Foreign Ministry Administration, to comment on the situation.

[Guk] Konstantin Fedorovich, could it be that the West's fears are somehow justified? If U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles were to disappear from Europe, what would be left for NATO and the Warsaw Pact in the sphere of nuclear forces?

[Mikhaylov] Postwar history contains examples when the U.S. Administration, in order to justify a new round of the arms race, made use of claims about a "bomber gap," a "U.S. missile gap," and so on. Later on, Washington itself would admit that it had "slightly exaggerated" the enemy figures, and meanwhile the arms race would continue to roll on like an avalanche.

Now that the question of eliminating medium-range missiles in Europe is on the agenda, these--to put it mildly--reservations are being used by those U.S. NATO allies who until recently advocated the so-called "zero option." Some are doing this on the basis of their own nuclear ambitions and "costs" stemming from the prospect of losing the status of nuclear powers. They cling convulsively to the dangerous concept of nuclear deterrence, which engenders only hostility and mistrust. Others are maneuvering in the expectation of gaining additional concessions from the Soviet Union.

Objectively speaking, the elimination of Soviet and U.S. medium-range missiles in Europe (in the spirit of the Reykjavik accords) will not diminish the West Europeans' security. First, because the French and British nuclear potentials and the U.S. forward-based means in Europe would, for the time being, remain outside the scope of reductions. Second, there is no Soviet superiority at all over NATO in terms of short-range nuclear means (with a range of less than 1,000 km). For some reason, people in the West speak only about Soviet missiles in this category and somehow "forget" the presence of the Pershing-la, Lance, and Pluton missiles and the palisade of nuclear artillery in NATO. Third, the Soviet Union proposes that, when accord is reached on the elimination of U.S. and Soviet medium-range missiles in Europe, missiles with a range of less than 1,000 km be frozen as of, say, 1 January 1987, and talks on them start immediately.

Fourth, in their Budapest initiative the Warsaw Pact countries, in parallel with substantial reductions in ground forces, proposed the reduction of operational-tactical nuclear weapons with a range of less than 1,000 km.

Fifth and last, the Soviet program for the elimination of nuclear weapons by the end of this century also determines specific deadlines for the elimination of all remaining nuclear weapons, including the potentials of the other nuclear powers--Britain, France, and China.

These proposals are based on the principle of no detriment to the security of either side at any specific moment in the implementation of possible accords on the elimination of nuclear weapons. This is why the fears now being expressed by representatives of some Western countries are groundless.

Of course, this question is not simple, and it cannot be solved at a single sitting over a cup of tea. It is, however, fully possible and necessary to find a compromise acceptable to both sides. Otherwise, this is the way matters will develop: Yesterday "arms upgrading" in medium-range missiles, today--in short-range missiles, tomorrow--another "modernization," and so on ad infinitum. But it is high time to stop stuffing our continent full of weapons of mass destruction, and the time has come to start extracting the "nuclear splinters" from it.

[Guk] The West uses another "argument." It is not new, but it has been dusted off again: the "triple superiority" of Warsaw Pact countries in the sphere of conventional arms. This is why, people in NATO headquarters in Brussels declare, it is necessary to either redress the balance or retain in West Europe a certain quantity of U.S. medium-range missiles to counter Soviet superiority. So, briefly, if you please: Who is superior to whom in the sphere of conventional arms?

[Mikhaylov] Anyone unwilling to eliminate nuclear weapons will always strive to somehow justify his actions. The claims that the Warsaw Pact allegedly has an almost overwhelming superiority in conventional arms are disbelieved even by many Western experts who take the real facts as their basis.

There does exist an approximate equilibrium although this, of course, does not mean arithmetical equality. Each side's armed forces have their own structure and their own types and quantities of weapons. A purely formal and simplistic approach leads only to distortion of the real picture. And this picture is as follows: The NATO bloc is superior to the Warsaw Pact Organization in total personnel numbers, in the quantity of combat-ready divisions, and in antitank means. It has an approximately equal quantity of artillery and armored and tank equipment. The North Atlantic bloc enjoys superiority in strike tactical aviation, which the Warsaw Pact compensates to a certain extent by a somewhat larger quantity of air defense fighter-interceptors. NATO also has appreciable superiority in naval armaments. But why do we nonetheless speak about an approximate balance of forces? Because, despite the certain inequality in individual components, such a balance does exist on the whole. Incidentally, the London International Institute for Strategic Studies has drawn a similar conclusion: "The military balance in conventional arms remains such as to render a general military aggression extremely risky for either side."

Naturally, when specific talks begin, their participants will put the figures on the table. And this will make it possible once again to become convinced of the existence of approximate military equilibrium between the Warsaw Pact Organization and NATO.

And mainly, as M.S. Gorbachev declared, "Let's look at everything with fresh eyes: Let the West effect the appropriate reduction in those categories of weapons of which it has more, and we will, without any hesitation, eliminate any 'surplus' in categories where we have more."

This simple and simultaneously weighty formula to be applied to the proposed reductions offers an exhaustive response to the claim about the "danger of retaining an imbalance" in individual weapon categories.

[Guk] The Vienna talks on troops and conventional arms reductions in Central Europe have been going on since 1973, but hitherto the sides have been totally unable to come to an agreement. What is the reason behind the "dead end" prevailing in Vienna?

[Mikhaylov] It goes beyond the complexity of the actual topic of the talks. Vienna is a graphic example of how it is possible, by resorting to far-fetched pretexts, to obstruct the process of armed forces and arms reductions.

The situation at the Vienna talks remains unsatisfactory. Evidence of this is also provided by the results of the 40th round of the talks, which ended in early December. Positions began to come closer to one another toward the end of last year and early this year, but this failed to materialize into an accord. Hitherto there has been no agreement on either the object or the extent of reductions, nor on the question of verification [kontrol].

The NATO countries' proposal to exclude arms from reductions and limitations (contrary to the mandate of the talks), their attempts to impose excessively exaggerated and unequal verification [kontrol] measures on the Warsaw Pact states, and other demands leading in effect to a fruitless "numerical discussion" which has for years on end kept the talks at a standstill, provide evidence of the lack of any desire by the Western participants to seek reasonable compromises in Vienna.

And yet, the necessary prerequisites do exist to overcome the standstill at the talks and to achieve positive results there. This requires efforts to be concentrated on even a partial solution like, for example, a small initial reduction of Soviet and U.S. forces coupled with a pledge not to raise the level of Warsaw Pact and NATO armed forces in Central Europe.

What is needed is an initial push to shift the talks from the deadlock and to cross a kind of bridge to subsequent reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals. This is the objective of the Warsaw Pact states' Budapest initiative. They offer substantial reductions in Europe of all components of ground forces and tactical strike aviation belonging to European states and also of the corresponding U.S. and Canadian forces and facilities stationed in Europe. Nuclear weapons for operational-tactical purposes with a range of up to 1,000 km would also be subject to liquidation.

The importance of this step becomes even more apparent if one were to imagine that the numerical strength of the armed forces of the military-political alliances opposing one another in Europe would be reduced by a total of 1 million men by the early nineties.

It would seem to be high time for those who are now ringing the bells and shouting about imbalance in conventional arms to the Warsaw Pact's advantage to embrace this idea and support it by all possible means. But for 6 months now the North Atlantic bloc has failed to produce an adequate response to our proposals (just as it failed to respond in the decisions made by the NATO Council's December session). NATO is also keeping silent about the proposals on contacts between representatives of the two alliances to discuss problems of armed forces and conventional arms reductions.

The ringing of the NATO "bells" is nothing but propaganda camouflage for all kinds of champions of "arms upgrading" striving to distract attention from the ray of hope for movement toward a nuclear-free and lasting peace which emerged in Reykjavik.

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CSO: 5200/1234

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TASS: FRG'S RAU CALLS FOR U.S., SOVIET MISSILE REMOVAL

LD092223 Moscow TASS in English 1751 GMT 9 Jan 87

[Text] Bonn January 9 TASS -- Johannes Rau, who is a leading candidate from the SPD [Social Democratic Party] to the office of FRG chancellor, has declared for the concrete measures to ensure the withdrawal of American and Soviet medium range missiles from Europe, for specific moves in the field of disarmament.

Addressing an election meeting of the Social Democrats in the city of Essen in Ruhr, Rau pointed to the need for the start of the second phase in the policy of detente. Without strengthening peace, the prominent West German political figure stressed among other things, it is impossible to resolve the most important home political problems of the FRG such as a reduction of the rate of mass unemployment and environmental protection.

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CSO: 5200/1234

INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES

TURKISH COLUMNIST ON MISSILE DEPLOYMENT CONTROVERSY

Istanbul HURRIYET in Turkish 22 Oct 86 p 19

["In Politics" column by Coskun Kirca: "Medium-range U.S. Missiles and Turkey"]

[Text] Two different issues are confused when discussing the presence of nuclear weapons in Turkey. The issue of deploying intermediate-range U.S. missiles in our country to counter the Soviets' intermediate-range SS-20 missiles and the issue of whether our armed forces should possess nuclear weapons are two separate matters which must be differentiated.

Intermediate-range U.S. missiles in Turkey were withdrawn in 1962 at the end of the Cuban crisis. This withdrawal was implemented in exchange for a Soviet pledge not to deploy similar missiles in Cuba. However, at that time, intermediate-range missiles played the same role that the two superpowers' ICBMs play today. In other words, those missiles were reciprocally targeted against the two superpowers rather than their mutual allies. Even so, however, the Turkish government of the time saw the withdrawal of the said missiles as a sign that the United States was losing its interest in Turkey's defense. Because at that time the general understanding was: Since any Soviet aggression against Turkey would jeopardize the U.S. strike capability in Turkey against the USSR, Washington would not leave Turkey defenseless. It was thought then that this situation constituted an adequate deterrent against any possible Soviet aggression against Turkey. Thus, when the U.S. missiles were withdrawn from Turkey in 1962, the Turkish government became concerned that this understanding had been changed. When the two superpowers built intercontinental nuclear strike forces targeted against each other on their own territories, these concerns invalidated.

It was a long time after that that the USSR deployed intermediate-range SS-20 missiles targeted against Western Europe. These missiles have been targeted against West European countries in central Europe rather than against Turkey. However, it is known that the SS-20 missiles have the capability to hit Turkish provinces in the Thrace and the Marmara region from their current deployment bases. This is how the situation stands today. However, the 1962 agreement between the superpowers and the fact that these missiles are primarily aimed against Western powers in central Europe have prevented the discussion of the deployment of intermediate-range U.S. missiles in Turkey.

In the current situation, the deployment of U.S. missiles in our country cannot be discussed because there is a possibility that the two superpowers may sign an accord envisaging the transfer of the Soviet SS-20 missiles counterbalancing U.S. intermediate-range missiles from Europe to Asia, the dismantling of a substantial number of these missiles and the removal of U.S. intermediate-range missiles from Western Europe.

If such an accord is signed, the threat posed by the Soviet SS-20 missiles in Europe against some Turkish provinces will be eliminated. However, whether the missiles transferred from Europe to Asia would threaten Turkish territory from their new bases is an issue that must be evaluated when the time comes. It is obvious that the Soviet SS-20 missiles must be deployed in Asia in such a way that they do not pose any threat to Turkish territory. Turkey must ask the United States to insist on this point during its negotiations with the USSR.

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CSO: 5200/2468

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

MOSCOW HITS U.S. STANCE AT CW TALKS

LD121343 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1130 GMT 12 Jan 87

[Text] Multilateral negotiations on banning chemical weapons resume in the Palais Des Nations in Geneva today. Our correspondent Vladimir Dmitriyev reports from Geneva:

[Dmitriyev] Let me remind you that these are being held within the context of the disarmament conference, in which 40 states are participating. In the course of the previous round, which ended in mid-December, a perceptible degree of progress was achieved at the negotiations on the key issue: coordination of a draft international convention on a general and total ban on chemical weapons. The progress made is being linked in considerable measure with the constructive proposals made by the Soviet delegation; these go toward developing our wide-scale program of disarmament which was proclaimed a year ago in Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's statement.

The new Soviet initiatives on banning the production of chemical weapons in commercial civilian industry are highly evaluated here in Geneva, in particular, as well as the initiatives relating to the acute problem of conducting on-site inspection. These initiatives are subordinated to the main aim, that of using the convention to secure conditions for banning chemical weapons, which would exclude any possibility of their resurgence. The Soviet Union, manifesting flexibility and a creative approach and with the aim of accelerating negotiations, adopted as a basis the British proposals; these have already been supplemented by useful amendments and become more significant and, to a considerable degree, accessible for a compromise solution.

The majority of delegates are of the opinion that 1987 would be the year for adoption of a convention, if, of course, all sides manifest good will. The chief obstacle is the position of the United States, which in pursuit of its narrow selfish aims, is holding up compilation of this important document.

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CSO: 5200/1236

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

MOSCOW: PENTAGON SAID PURSUING BW RESEARCH IN LAHORE

LD141310 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress in English 1400 GMT 13 Dec 86

[Text] The U.S. Defense Department this year allocated \$42 million on research and development for various types of bacteriological weaponry. The corporation Mark Collett is to carry out research and development into a deadly virus of the rare and quick-acting Rift Valley fever. The Pentagon's secret bacteriological center in Fort Detrick is particularly notorious, whose laboratories are responsible for the leakage of the virus causing the incurable disease AIDS, with this giving rise to a sharp outbreak of the disease among the Americans, and it was observed, among residents in other countries who live close to the Pentagon bases there.

The U.S. centers who specialize in developing bacteriological weaponry are spread though the world. One of these is sited in the Pakistani city of Lahore where, under a veil of combatting malaria, American experts on assignments from the CIA and the Pentagon conduct research on developing new types of bacteriological weaponry, including those causing grave mental disorders. Local residents meanwhile are being used as guinea pigs by researchers at the Lahore center, with over 500 residents of Lahore who suffer from yellow fever, jaundice and mental disorders falling victim to criminal experiments.

The Indian weekly BLITZ reports since 1980 Lahore has become the center for breeding particularly dangerous species of mosquitoes to be used against the population in Afghanistan. Attempts at using these to cause an outbreak of encephalitis among Afghan and Pakistani nomadic tribes have been made public. The outbreak of a hitherto unknown epidemic was registered over a year ago in the Indian State Rajasthan. The Indian bacteriologists arrived at the conclusion that virus-infected mosquitoes were the specific carriers of the infection. Experts believe these insects had been prepared at the bacteriological center in Lahore.

The Pentagon continues research on developing new types of bacteriological weaponry despite the fact that the existing stockpiles are ample enough to kill humanity dozens of times over. U.S. military cynically describes the bacteriological weaponry as the weaponry of the future and believes it to be among the most cost-paying since, in their estimate, its production cost in quantities sufficient to kill one individual is 30-40 times less than that of same amount of other weapons.

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CSO: 5200/1236

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

TASS: SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS RECONVENES

LD112203 Moscow TASS in English 2132 GMT 11 Jan 87

[Text] Geneva January 11 TASS -- The special committee on chemical weapons resumes its work in Geneva tomorrow. The committee is a working body of the conference on disarmament.

The talks which are aiming at elaborating as soon as possible a convention on full ban on this type of weapons of mass destruction and on elimination of the weapons, made considerable headway in 1986.

This was promoted by the detailed proposals submitted by the Soviet delegation in development of the January 15, last year, statement by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The USSR's new proposals open the way for signing such a convention as early as this year.

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CSO: 5200/1236

CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS

USSR ACADEMICIAN OUTLINES 'DANGERS' OF GENETIC ENGINEERING

AU080947 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO in Bulgarian 5 Jan 87 p 5

[Interview given by Academician Nikolay Dubinin, director of the General Genetics Institute under the USSR Academy of Sciences, to Yuriy Baranov of NOVOSTI "specially for RABOTNICHESKO DELO": "Genetic Engineering Today. For or Against Life?"—first two paragraphs are newspaper's introduction]

[Text] Genetic engineering today is a science whose development is increasingly determining the future of various fields in our life, particularly in medicine, agriculture, and environmental protection. The possibilities of the controllable gene are immense, as long as they are used for the good of mankind.

We offer our readers the standpoint of Academician Nikolay Dubinin, holder of the Lenin Prize, recently awarded the Order of Lenin on the occasion of his 80th birthday, director of the General Genetics Institute under the USSR Academy of Sciences, and one of the leading world scientists in the field of molecular genetics and genetic engineering.

[Baranov] The successes of genetic engineering achieved in recent years are widely known. However, the great discoveries of scientists in the West are used for military purposes and form part of the plans for creating biological weapons. Are the researchers aware of the dangers of these irresponsible schemes and of the threat hanging over mankind?

[Dubinin] Genetic engineering is opening up vast possibilities for the inhabitants of the earth. However, these possibilities may be used both to benefit and to harm life. For these reasons the responsibility of scientists in the different fields of genetics is increasing sharply.

Last year a Soviet-American scientific symposium was held in Moscow on the problems of combating the risk of biological wars. Scientists whose opinions carry weight everywhere in the world took part in the symposium. The U.S. delegation included Joshua Lederberg, chancellor of the University of California and holder of a Nobel Prize, who expressed the view of a large number of scientists in the United States. Our positions coincided, namely, that everything possible must be done to put a stop to the dangerous research on creating biological weapons. It has long since been proved that if a bacteriological war breaks out, it will be just as terrible and devastating and have consequences just as unforeseeable as a nuclear war.

[Baranov] What does the danger of biological war consist of in practice, and what disasters is it "preparing" for mankind?

[Dubinin] The main point is that various bacteriological weapons can be designed to cause mass epidemics. Scientists have long since managed to cope with the agents causing anthrax, plague, and cholera through vaccines and other methods. But genetic engineering is able to "perfect" these agents in such a manner that the human organism is powerless against them. For example, it is sufficient to implant a disease-causing gene into the ordinary influenza virus in order to cause a most serious illness with a lethal outcome. In this manner influenza alone is able to depopulate whole countries or even continents over the course of a few days.

The creation and stockpiling of bacteriological weapons threatens us with the most terrible "silent" death. It has nothing in common with the good of man, for whom it is unnatural to annihilate his fellow human beings.

[Baranov] If the efforts of scientists in the world are directed toward peaceful aims, what can we expect from genetic engineering during the next few years?

[Dubinin] Progress depends to a large extent on the successes of genetics. During the next 10-20 years genetic engineering could solve a number of questions which are disturbing mankind at the moment. A most acute problem is the fight against cancer diseases. In recent years scientists have discovered the agents causing cancers, the so-called oncogenes, whose effect depends on many factors. They lie dormant in the human organism, but when they "wake up" and begin to act, a malignant tumor appears. There are countries in which 20 percent of fatalities are due to this disease. Unique experiments and the first laboratory tests after the discovery of the oncogenes give cause for hope that people will be protected against cancer diseases when we manage to keep the oncogenes in the organism in a permanent state of "sleep."

[Baranov] What other fields can expect help from genetic engineering?

[Dubinin] Genetic engineering is actively being applied in agriculture. In plant growing, nitrogen fixation -- the accumulation of nitrogen in the soil -- is of immense importance. In nature this process takes place with the aid of bacteria which collect nitrogen from the air. Nonetheless, chemical agents are necessary in order to increase fertility. By implanting genes into bacteria, genetic engineering can make wheat, rye, and corn capable of obtaining their own nitrogen in order to enrich the soil.

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CSO: 5200/1236

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

MBFR HOLDS 40TH ROUND OF TALKS ON TROOPS, ARMS

Press Conference

AU041824 Paris AFP in English 1816 GMT 4 Dec 86

[Laurence Lecallier report]

[Excerpt] Vienna, Dec 4 (AFP) -- Warsaw Pact negotiators Thursday urged that a simplified accord be signed with NATO to get the East-West Mutual Balanced Force Reduction (MBFR) talks here out of their 13-year deadlock.

Talks on troop and weapons levels in central Europe are now in the final session of their 40th round and analysts said the new proposal was aimed at getting even a symbolic accord, so East-West talks can move on to conventional force reductions in all of Europe as the Warsaw Pact wants.

But North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) spokesman Jan van de Mortel said NATO wanted to come to a "significant accord" at the MBFR talks and was not prepared to sign a "symbolic agreement aimed at ending these negotiations."

"We could examine an accord in its most simple form, to withdraw at least 11,500 Soviet troops and 6,500 American soldiers from central Europe," said Soviet delegation head Valerian Mikhaylov during a news conference.

"The idea is to come to a very simple accord which will not engage us in talks for several years," said Mr. Mikhaylov.

"This measure could be completed by political engagements by the two sides not to increase their weapons and forces in central Europe while waiting for talks on the reduction of conventional arms in all of Europe," he added. [passage omitted]

Mikhaylov at Plenary Session

LD041233 Moscow TASS in English 1153 GMT 4 Dec 86

[Text] Vienna December 4 TASS -- By Tass correspondent Anatoliy Tyupayev:

The scheduled round of talks on the mutual reduction of the armed forces and armaments in central Europe has ended. The head of the Soviet delegation, Valerian Mikhaylov, addressed the plenary session today.

Dwelling on the causes of the unfavourable situation at the talks, he pointed at the continuing attempts by the United States and its NATO allies to distort the subject and objective of the talks at the expense of the security interests of the socialist countries.

The draft agreement proposed by the Western participants was rendered without meaning from the viewpoint of real disarmament. It in no way resolved the tasks of reducing and limiting arms, lowering the level of military confrontation or at least suspending the arms race in Europe.

At the same time it was accompanied by arbitrary and unjustified measures of control and verification the adoption of which would place the USSR and other Warsaw Treaty countries in the conditions of unequal security compared with the NATO countries.

The Western-proposed version of the agreement did not contribute to reaching a mutually acceptable accord and it did not seem to be intended for that.

The Warsaw Treaty countries, said the Soviet representative, were and remain opponents of the use of talks for creating a semblance of dialogue and the less so as a screen to cover up military programmes.

"We resolutely oppose the use of the 'Vienna impasse' as an obstacle in the way of an all-European reduction of conventional arms and armed forces."

"We still believe that the socialist countries' February 20, 1986 draft agreement meets the aims of achieving a positive result in Vienna. It is sufficiently balanced, takes into account to an equal extent the security interests of the sides and is feasible.

It can become a suitable basis for a mutually acceptable agreement.

If, however, it proves impossible to overcome the difference between the sides with regard to such an agreement, it would be possible to look for another way out of the present situation.

One could think, for instance, of the simplest form of agreement and on a certain reduction of the troops of the USSR and the U.S. in central Europe, say, by 11,500 and 6,500 men respectively given reciprocal observation over the reduction.

Such a step could be supplemented by mutual political commitments of the sides to the effect that in advance of the talks on the reduction of conventional arms on the all-European scale they will not build up their troops and arms in central Europe," said the Soviet representative.

"This would be useful in itself and in respect to the establishment of a more favourable atmosphere for all-European talks."

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CSO: 5200/1232

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR'S GENERAL TATARNIKOV QUOTED ON MBFR

LD231630 Moscow TASS in English 1607 GMT 23 Dec 86

[Excerpts] Moscow, 23 Dec (TASS)--"The proposal by Czechoslovakia's Foreign Minister Chnoupek to convene an economic forum as one of the steps to be taken after the Vienna meeting displayed the imaginative approach of socialist countries to questions of economic cooperation", it was stated by Igor Ornatskiy, deputy head of the Department for Foreign Economic Relations of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Speaking at a press conference here today on the results of the first stage of the Vienna meeting of participatory states of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, he said that the subject-matter of the proposed forum encompasses the most pressing matters of trade and industrial cooperation while at the same time not repeating the questions being discussed at the Vienna meeting.

Poland, Hungary and the GDR have become coauthors of this proposal.

So this proposal creates a good basis for further work in solving problems related to the second basket of the Helsinki Final Act. Along with the Bulgarian proposal to convene an ecological forum and the Romanian proposal to hold a meeting on scientific-technical cooperation, this opens up prospects for really advancing the cause of economic cooperation.

Major General Viktor Tatarnikov, a representative of the USSR General Staff, noted the untenability of the contentions by Western propaganda about the existence of a disbalance in conventional armed forces in Europe. He said that both Secretary of State of the United States Shultz and the head of the White House Staff Regan had stated after Reykjavik that the alignment of the armed forces of the two blocs in Europe did not give rise to concern.

According to American statistics the armed forces of NATO number 5.6 million men and those of the Warsaw Treaty -- 4.9 million. On the whole, General Tatarnikov declared, there is a balance of conventional armaments in Europe.

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CSO: 5200/1124

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR'S ISRAELYAN ON CD ACHIEVEMENTS, SETBACKS

Moscow NEW TIMES in English No 52, 30 Dec 86 pp 18-19

[Text] The Council Hall is one of the best known rooms in the Geneva Palace of Nations. Its walls are decorated with impressive frescos by the Spanish painter Jose Maria Sert: damning everything, the vanquished are burying their dead. But neither are the victors happy. A huge sarcophagus against the sinister background of ruins--this is the price of their victory. Two cannon muzzles, like the gaping mouths of giant dragons, symbolize the Moloch of war, demanding more and more sacrifices.

For more than a quarter of a century this hall has been the scene of fierce diplomatic battles on the most pressing problem of mankind--it is here that the disarmament conference holds its sessions. Countless speeches have been made here over the years and mountains of documents drafted. Sert's frescos have already aged and become covered with a network of cracks, but still there are no tangible results.

True, the conference hall has known better times. The drafting of a number of crucial multilateral agreements in the field of disarmament was concluded here, for instance, the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, which has now been signed by more than 130 countries. Drawn up some twenty years ago, this treaty has justified itself and serves as an obstacle to the proliferation of these barbarous weapons. Or take the convention on the prohibition of bacteriological weapons. Indeed, this was the first real measure in the history of mankind to abolish this type of weapon of mass annihilation.

The convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques was adopted about ten years ago. The conference came up with its latest "product" in April 1981--the convention on the banning or limiting of the use of certain conventional weapons which could be regarded as excessively injurious or having indiscriminate effects.

But since then this forum, like all others on questions of arms limitation, has been marking time. Meanwhile, the arms race has not only created mountains of nuclear and other weapons but is threatening to spread to outer space, ineluctably increasing the danger of a universal nuclear catastrophe.

Does this mean that the past ten years have produced nothing new? Not at all.

Signs of Change

First of all, the conference has become more representative. Since 1979, all five nuclear powers have been taking part in its work, and the representation of socialist, non-aligned, neutral and Western countries has been broadened. Today the Geneva forum reflects the alignment of political forces in the world arena more accurately and can be regarded as a prototype of a future world conference on disarmament. It has the mandate to conduct talks with the aim of drafting agreements in the field of arms limitation, and includes virtually all the militarily important countries. In other words, the conference is a unique body which can and must make a substantial contribution to the consolidation of international peace and security. Its agenda has grown considerably in recent years: from the prohibition of nuclear tests to preventing an arms race in outer space, from the prevention of nuclear war to the prohibition of radiological weapons.

The public often fails to associate the conference's work with talks on anything other than banning chemical weapons. Indeed, tangible progress has certainly been achieved in this direction. But it is also true that the vast majority of states taking part in the conference are paying the greatest attention to and showing growing interest in the problems of limiting the nuclear arms race.

This year the conference was in session for seven months and as in the past an atmosphere of complex and diverse diplomatic confrontation prevailed.

Whatever concrete issues were discussed, in the end everything came down to the conclusion that real progress in solving them can be achieved only by resolutely abandoning the old stereotypes in the field of security and disarmament, which have become firmly established in the minds of politicians and diplomats, as well as in the practice of the conference itself.

The series of major Soviet proposals and measures initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev's January 15 statement injected new life into the routine course of the conference. This was expressed not only in the speeches made by most delegations but also in their concrete proposals concerning various items on the agenda.

The work of the session highlighted the U.S. Administration's archaic approach to problems of security. An approach based on military-technological presumptuousness and disregard for the lawful interests of other countries. There is a greater understanding that the present policy of the United States and NATO does not offer a reasonable model for ensuring international security.

Of course, it is still too early to say that the old mentality is surrendering its position without a fight. And the speeches from many delegations reflected a profound understanding of the danger of baleful consequences for mankind with which attempts to resolve security matters by military means are fraught, understanding of the need for the earliest complete elimination of nuclear arms and preventing the appearance of arms in outer space. Even many allies

of the United States did not support the American thesis on the "peacemaking" role of nuclear arms and the benefits of deploying SDI.

Most participants in the conference spoke highly of the Soviet plan to create a nuclear-free world by the end of this century. Many states, non-aligned ones in particular, have become more active in matters relating to nuclear disarmament. Argentina, Pakistan and China have submitted their own documents on the issue, and their tenor is the same as that of the Soviet proposal.

Discussions on nuclear disarmament at plenary and informal meetings have become livelier. For the first time in many years it has been possible to adopt a decision to conduct a detailed discussion of all aspects of this problem at special meetings of the conference. But the negative stand taken by the United States and its allies has so far precluded the achievement of anything else.

The question of banning nuclear tests now sounds totally different at the conference. Here, as was stated by many delegations, lies the watershed between the old and the new thinking. This, indeed, was the key issue at the last session.

Like the USSR, most countries view the ban on tests as a genuine path to restraining the nuclear arms race, and for this reason vigorously insist on the speediest conclusion of a treaty to this effect. When in August the Soviet moratorium was extended for the fourth time it is deeply impressed even those who are usually short of kind words about us. When Washington's arguments in defense of testing became completely untenable, the United States was forced to resort to an extreme measure. Using the [word indistinct] of consensus at the conference, the United States, on its own, blocked the commencement of talks, despite the flexibility displayed by almost all the other states represented, in respect of the mandate of its special auxiliary body on the prohibition of nuclear tests.

The burgeoning of the new approach to questions of ensuring security, as well as to the talks, also manifested itself in the large number of concrete proposals put forward by various countries on the main questions under discussion at the conference. The session of our forum showed that many of these proposals merit discussion. This is true not only of the proposals made by the USSR, its allies or non-aligned countries, but also of proposals made by Western states as, for instance, the French proposal on preventing an arms race to outer space and the Australian proposal on the protection of satellites and ground stations.

The broad discussion also brought to the surface latent differences in the positions of Western countries. Many speeches by their representatives were in contrast with American ones. To specify: the mandate of the special auxiliary body of the conference on the question of prohibiting nuclear tests, proposed by Australia in February 1986, was blocked by the American delegation. The U.S. position was seriously criticized by the Dutch delegation. In a departure from past practice, the United States even had to invoke "Atlantic solidarity."

But even this could not prevent public statements by Western countries in favor of political means of ensuring national and international security and of preserving treaties, in particular the ABM Treaty, and other agreements in the field of disarmament.

The mood in favor of achieving practical accords manifested itself most tangibly at the conference during the talks on banning chemical weapons. I should like to dwell on this in greater detail.

Is a Convention Within Reach?

The strategic aim of chemical disarmament is outlined in the January 15 statement as the total elimination of this type of weapon of mass annihilation and even the industrial base for its manufacture. While acknowledging all the difficulties of attaining this objective, the USSR believes it quite realistic to achieve this goal before the end of the century, and also defines those directions of the talks along which progress is already possible at the present stage.

The fundamental theses of the January 15 statement were spelled out in concrete detail in the Soviet proposals at the conference. In submitting them, the Soviet Union intended first of all to achieve a resolute advance towards agreement on one of the key sections of the convention concerning the industrial base for the manufacture of chemical weapons. Intensive and businesslike talks resulted in the attainment and formal approval of principled accords in respect of the future convention's provisions concerning the time framework for the liquidation of installations for the production of chemical weapons, the declaration of their liquidation, the main obligations of states to stop the production of chemical weapons, measures to ensure the decommissioning and liquidation of these installations, as well as strict verification measures, including systematic on-site international inspections. This signifies major progress not only in the work of the conference in 1986 but also a major landmark in the whole process of preparing the convention.

There has also been advance in reaching agreement on important provisions concerning both a whole number of the main commitments of states to liquidate chemical weapons and the relevant technical and verification procedures.

Noticeable results were also achieved as regards the future convention's section on permitted activities. It concerns the inadmissibility of the use of the chemical industry for developing and producing chemical weapons, regardless of whether this concerns state or private enterprises, or trans-national corporations.

The Soviet proposals open the way for the signing of the convention as early as 1987. But this requires a display of political will, as well as interest by the other participants in the talks.

The Soviet Union Proposes...

For many years the opponents of disarmament have been trying to explain the absence of progress at arms limitation talks by the impossibility of reaching agreement on questions of verification because of the "rigid" Soviet position. The new Soviet proposals on these issues have wrecked the system of such "arguments." They have shown that the Soviet Union attaches prime importance to the working out of effective measures to verify compliance with the projected agreements.

The obstructionism of the opponents of disarmament has become still more obvious in these conditions and they are now feverishly searching for other pretexts to justify their refusal to reach positive results at the talks in luding those at the conference.

It is impossible to achieve disarmament acting alone. The problem of arms limitation and disarmament is common to us all. And this also implies common concern and common responsibility. When working out its proposals, the Soviet Union studies and takes into account the viewpoints and initiatives of other governments, of public and political movements and makes a special point of ensuring equal security for all at every stage of the implementation of these proposals.

"The Soviet Union regards its participation in the disarmament conference with a great sense of responsibility dictated by its conviction that disarmament is the trunk road leading to the assertion of a new, just international order, to the creation of a safe world," Mikhail Gorbachev stressed in his message to the conference in February 1986.

The positive changes in the work of the conference in the outgoing year should be consolidated and developed. The making of time should at long last be replaced by vigorous and productive action.

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CSO: 5200/1124

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR COMMENTARY ON CSCE TALKS

General Tatarnikov Interview

AU261232 Vienna DIE PRESSE in German 26 Nov 86 p 2

[Interview given by Major General Victor Tatarnikov, military expert of the Soviet CSCE delegation, to DIE PRESSE reporter Burkhard Bischof in Vienna--date not given]

[Text] DIE PRESSE: You called the dismantling of the SS-4, SS-5, and SS-20 missile systems on the Kola Peninsula a "direct consequence" of the positive conclusion of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence-building and Security and Disarmament in Europe [CCSD]. Can we expect further unilateral Soviet measures in this respect?

Tatarnikov: First of all, I would like to point out that these measures do not only apply to the Kola Peninsula but also to the Leningrad and Baltic military districts; that is a very large area all together. These intermediate-range missiles are being dismantled and destroyed. This is a clear step in the direction of unilateral disarmament. Second, we are willing to give a guarantee to all countries of a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe that might be created, that we will not use any nuclear arms against them.

Now to your question: At present, we are not planning any further unilateral steps because the measures already taken are substantial enough. Now we are waiting for the reactions of the other states, in particular of those countries that possess nuclear arms themselves.

I know that some European papers consider our measures negligible. Nevertheless, we would welcome it very much if other nuclear powers were to join our "negligible" example, especially the United States, and also Great Britain. Because British nuclear carriers repeatedly move near the territories of Scandinavian states and, therefore, they are a special danger.

DIE PRESSE: The Soviet side has already proposed to fuse the Vienna Force Reduction Talks perhaps with stage II of the CCSD negotiations. What is your opinion with respect to the continuation of the Vienna Force Reduction Talks?

Tatarnikov: In any case, the problem of reducing forces and armaments in Europe --from the Atlantic to the Urals--must be solved within the framework of a different negotiating system than the Vienna talks. These negotiations, which have already taken 13 years, have not yielded any visible progress; therefore, the world public is not satisfied with this conference.

The Warsaw Pact wants an extension of the area for reductions beyond Central Europe, and, therefore, we also need a new forum for negotiations. And stage II of the negotiations on confidence-building and disarmament in Europe could be such a new forum. The first stage of the CCSD talks in Stockholm proved to be dynamic and successful; why should that not be the case in this second stage, when disarmament measures will be negotiated?

Here at the Vienna CSCE meeting we have to fix the mandate for Stockholm II. The Soviet delegation is already holding intensive talks on the extension of the CCSD mandate to disarmament measures all over Europe with the representatives of other states--of the Warsaw Pact, NATO, and the neutral and nonaligned countries. The reaction of many of our interlocutors has been clearly positive.

DIE PRESSE: What do you think about the often repeated argument that force reduction talks within the framework of the CSCE would make the entire matter even more complicated because it would be much more difficult for 35 negotiating partners to achieve any results than for the smaller circle of the Vienna Force Reduction round?

Tatarnikov: I do not think that the participation of all 35 CSCE states would make negotiations more complicated. As a participant in the Stockholm negotiations, I was able to note that neutral and individual NATO countries have certainly made a contribution to the successful conclusions of the conference. And only if all countries and groups of states make their own contribution will we be able to really solve the comprehensive problem of force and armament reductions from the Atlantic to the Urals.

Of course, we can follow different paths to solve this question. But it is precisely for this reason that Stockholm II seems to be the most appropriate forum to me, because the CCSD has already had success. It is certain that not all problems of confidence-building and security that were discussed during the first stage of this conference in Stockholm have been solved. For instance, the question of previously announcing large maneuvers of air and naval forces is still open, and the same goes for the question of limiting large-scale maneuvers. These things, too, have to be discussed during the second CCSD stage.

Kovalev Press Conference

LD101549 Moscow TASS in English 1538 GMT 10 Dec 86

[Excerpts] Vienna, 10 Dec (TASS)--"On instructions from the Soviet leadership, the delegation of the USSR at the Vienna meeting has submitted an official document on the convocation of a widely representative conference in Moscow

on the development of cooperation in the humanitarian field between the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) participating countries", said Anatoliy Kovalev, first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR.

Speaking at a press conference here today, he recalled that such proposal had been put forward by Eduard Shevardnadze, member of the Political Bureau of the CPSU Central Committee, minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, in his speech in Vienna on 5 November.

"Following the Reykjavik meeting, there is no road back to old ways, to old thinking now that the issue of the very survival of mankind is so acute. This is why we have invited all the participants in the Vienna meeting to both think in a new way and to act with a view to achieving maximum practical results".

In answer to the question what steps are being made by the Warsaw Treaty member countries to establish contacts with NATO with regard to starting a dialogue on a reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe, Anatoliy Kovalev said:

"The Soviet Union has made efforts to establish contacts between the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and NATO.

"Marshal of the Soviet Union Viktor Kulikov, commander-in-chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty member countries, suggested a meeting with General Bernard Rogers, supreme allied commander of NATO's Armed Forces in Europe.

"The working group of the Warsaw Treaty member countries on issues related to a reduction of armed forces and conventional arms in Europe has addressed NATO's special group on conventional arms control with a suggestion to establish direct contact."

"Herbert Krolkowski, general secretary of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty member countries, has sent a letter to NATO secretary-general Lord Carrington with the expression of hope that the proposals on arranging a meeting between Viktor Kulikov and Bernard Rogers and on establishing contacts between the working groups that were set up within the framework of the two alliances would be considered in NATO".

"We hope," Anatoliy Kovalev emphasized, "that the above-mentioned initiatives of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation will meet with a constructive attitude at the forthcoming session of the NATO Council. Thereby favourable conditions would be created for practical headway in the cause of easing tension and strengthening security in Europe."

Kovalev Addresses Plenary Session

LD101830 Moscow TASS in English 1814 GMT 10 Dec 86

[Excerpts] Vienna, 10 Dec (TASS)--The current reorganization in the Soviet Union has also involved foreign policy, Anatoliy Kovalev, USSR first deputy foreign minister, told a plenary session of the Vienna meeting of the states-participants in the Helsinki Conference on European Security and Cooperation. The USSR has displayed a fresh approach to many international problems, which

have accumulated--whether it be the elimination of nuclear, chemical or other types of mass destruction weapons, or putting an end to the nuclear weapons tests, a cut in the armed forces and conventional arms, settlement of conflicts.

Further on Kovalev Address

LD101839 Moscow TASS in English 1821 GMT 10 Dec 86

[Excerpts] Vienna, 10 Dec (TASS)--"Confrontational remarks and the use of stereotypes of the cold-war days are particularly out of place in the realm of cooperation in the humanitarian field", Anatoliy Kovalev, first deputy minister of foreign affairs of the USSR, has said here at a plenary session of the Vienna meeting of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) participating countries.

"But in the world, there are also phenomena of opposite nature, representing the disruptive element. Those are the renunciation of the SALT-2 treaty, the undermining of the ABM Treaty, the space militarisation plans, and the departure from the accords reached at the Reykjavik meeting."

"Under these conditions," he emphasised, "the Vienna meeting acquires still greater importance. It could make a considerable contribution not only to the strengthening of security and development of cooperation in Europe but also to the normalization of all international relations."

Touching upon the proposal made on December 8 by the delegation of the Polish People's Republic on supplementing the mandate of the Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, Anatoliy Kovalev stated that the proposal was an important constructive step in this direction. "The Soviet Union fully supports it. The initiative of our Polish friends is called upon to promote in practice a transition from the confidence-building measures adopted in Stockholm to an integrated system of confidence and opens the way for talks in the region stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals."

General Tatarnikov Speech

LD171525 Moscow TASS in English 1511 GMT 17 Dec 86

[Text] Vienna December 17 TASS -- Speaking at the Vienna meeting of representatives of the states, parties to the conference on security and cooperation in Europe, member of the Soviet delegation Major General Viktor Tatarnikov has appraised the state of affairs in security in the European continent.

Viktor Tatarnikov stressed that the NATO countries' military activity, their military doctrines, deployment of new types of armaments had heightened the situation in the European continent to a dangerous limit.

The American strategy, said the Soviet representative, views Europe as a "firefighting zone", which is bound to protect the territory of the United States from the flames of war. There is every indication that the United States abides by the concepts of General Pershing, who declared that the frontline of America's defences ran in European lands. Facts show that violating the spirit and letter of the Helsinki Act the United States imperils the security of the countries of the European continent.

The military measures being taken by the United States, supplemented with decisions on the use of weapons, are also heightening the situation. Not only questions of modernisation of the nuclear potential, but also simplification of the procedure of taking decision on the use of nuclear weapons were discussed at the recent session of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group.

Such steps are particularly dangerous since the flexible response strategy being imposed by Washington for NATO, envisages escalation of conflict up to the first use of nuclear weapons.

In these conditions greater becomes the responsibility of all states, above all nuclear, for the development of events in the European continent. The present-day situation makes it imperative that questions of disarmament be in the centre of attention at the Vienna meeting.

The current thesis in the west in the recent time has become the assertion on "superiority" of the Warsaw Treaty member states in conventional armaments. Citing factual data on the correlation of forces in that sphere, the Soviet representative stressed that the Western propaganda machine deliberately distorts the real picture. The NATO countries are obviously unwilling to honestly and openly start negotiations on the basis of the Budapest address of the Warsaw Treaty member states suggesting that troops and conventional armaments be reduced, he stressed.

Further on Tatarnikov Speech

LD181228 Moscow TASS in English 1122 GMT 18 Dec 86

[Text] Vienna December 18 TASS -- TASS correspondent Igor Revyakin reports:

"To supplement the mandate of the Stockholm Conference for moving on to the discussion of disarmament issues must become the central direction of further efforts of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) participating countries. The proposal made at the Vienna meeting by the Polish delegation opens up such an opportunity", Major General Viktor Tatarnikov, member of the Soviet delegation, said in a speech at a full-delegation session here on Wednesday.

"In their Budapest address, the Warsaw Treaty member countries put forward specific proposals envisaging a substantial cut in the armed forces and conventional arms. Large-scale verification measures, right up to on-site inspections, are also a major element of the proposals which do not lay down any pre-conditions".

"At the same time, NATO countries suggest substituting the subject of the talks and speaking of an ostensibly existing disbalance of forces, and not of arms reductions. The purpose of such step is clear: The talks can be dragged out for years to deal with anything but disarmament. Meanwhile, most CSCE participating states are disposed to discuss precisely disarmament issues.

"Time has come simultaneously to consider specific steps to further develop confidence-and security-building measures which concern notifications about independent air and naval exercises, restriction of the scope of military exercises, and the application of notifications to all CSCE participating countries", the Soviet representative emphasized.

"Take if only the independent activities of the Air Force and the Navy. These are highly mobile armed services which are provided with nuclear weapons, maintain the highest combat readiness, and are capable of delivering sudden strikes at any moment.

"The U.S. acts of aggression against Grenada, Libya, Lebanon, and Nicaragua with the involvement of U.S. air and naval forces are still fresh in the memory of all countries.

"If statements about openness and transparency are not empty words and if the CSCE participating countries really strive for predictability of the military situation in Europe, it is time to apply notifications to these types of military activities as well.

"The question of spreading confidence-building measures to the territories of all CSCE participating countries also requires immediate solution. This directly arises from the provisions of the final document of the CSCE follow up meeting in Madrid, the document which specifies the equality of rights, balanced nature and taking into account the security interests of all CSCE participating countries equally.

"Contrary to these provisions, a considerable part of U.S. military potential oriented towards transfer to Europe is concealed from notification.

"The state of affairs in which the United States, for example, has an edge in the field of the existing rights and obviously lags behind as regards its commitments in this respect should be changed", the Soviet representative pointed out.

KURIER Interview With Kashlev

AU181557 Vienna KURIER in German 18 Dec 86 p 5

[Interview given by Yuriy Kashlev, head of the USSR delegation to the CSCE conference, to KURIER reporter Heinz Nussbaumer in Vienna after the CSCE meeting had recessed for Christmas on 12 December]

[Excerpts] KURIER: What was the first stage of the CSCE like?

Kashlev: It proceeded as expected. Our proposal to let the opening take place at the foreign minister level has proved a real stimulus.

KURIER: What is the atmosphere in Vienna like?

Kashlev: There were positive and negative experiences--the positive experiences were caused by the international climate, the negative ones by the behavior of the U.S. delegation.

KURIER: How does the USSR want to present itself in Vienna?

Kashlev: As a country in the midst of a dynamic process of change. With new flexibility and new possibilities.

KURIER: But how does the American delegation act?

Kashlev: They show aggressive behavior and reflect the dangerous line of their government which at present is aimed at breaking existing armament agreements--SALT, ABM. I explain this behavior as follows: At present America is losing

in many areas in the world's eyes--therefore it is looking for a forum where it can subject the socialist countries to scathing criticism.

KURIER: What does that mean? A surrogate success to counter the Iran affair, for instance?

Kashlev: Yes, exactly. The more they are at sea, the more they attack us here.

KURIER: What is the current atmosphere like in international politics?

Kashlev: It is much better than in Madrid.

KURIER: And why?

Kashlev: The USSR is showing great flexibility and has put forth many new proposals; the Reykjavik meeting has roused new hopes; the West Europeans no longer want a confrontation with the East; the neutral and nonaligned countries receive an increasingly bigger role. And events such as Chernobyl or the space-shuttle disaster have strengthened the feeling of belonging to one community before fate.

KURIER: What does Moscow hope will be achieved at the Vienna CSCE meeting?

Kashlev: In the military area, practical disarmament results concerning conventional forces--all 35 CSCE states must participate in this to achieve disarmament from the Atlantic to the Urals. In the economic area, more trade relations--we have created new mechanisms. We take cooperation in the environmental sector very seriously; we have also learned much from the Chernobyl accident--even though there were enormous exaggerations in the West. And concerning human rights, we are doing very much now. In Vienna we want to seriously find out what is disturbing cooperation between our states in this connection--unfortunately in this area there is much propaganda and psychological warfare.

KURIER: How can living together in the "European House" be improved?

Kashlev: As long as there are weapons and blocs, there must also be locks on the doors. The less we are threatened, the easier the doors can be opened. But the West should finally start to clean the windows facing toward the East.

Kashlev Speaks

LD191648 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1545 GMT 19 Dec 86

[*"Statement by the Head of the Soviet Delegation at the Vienna Meeting"*--TASS headline]

[Text] Vienna, 19 Dec TASS -- The concluding session of the first stage of the Vienna meeting of representatives of the states participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe took place here today.

In his statement, the head of the USSR delegation, Ambassador Yu.B. Kashlev, noted that in the period after the Madrid meeting, as the discussion has shown, two tendencies in

the approach of the participating countries to the problems of security in Europe and in the world as a whole were clearly revealed. The Soviet Union and the socialist countries embodied one tendency. Its landmarks were the program put forward in the statement on 15 January of this year on eliminating nuclear and other forms of mass annihilation weapons by the end of the present century; the bold and cardinal proposals by the USSR in Reykjavik; the unilateral cessation of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union (silence has held sway on our test sites for 500 days already); the large-scale proposals by the Warsaw Pact states on reducing armed forces and conventional weapons from the Atlantic to the Urals; and a number of others.

Acting in the spirit of Helsinki, the Soviet Union states its willingness to discuss the issue of nonnuclear status of the Baltic Sea area, dismantled medium-range missile launching facilities on the Kola Peninsula, and a large part of them on the territory of the relevant military districts [okrug].

In the United Nations, socialist countries put forward proposals on the creation of an all-encompassing system of international security. All this is aimed at one objective -- to ensure fundamental change in international affairs, and to achieve radical improvement of the situation in Europe and in the world as a whole.

The second approach found its expression in the U.S. adoption of the "Star Wars" program and drawing other countries into it, breaking off the accords that were outlined in Reykjavik, and fully eliminating its consequences by continuing tests of nuclear weapons, in breaking the SALT II treaty, which curbs the arms race, and in undermining the foundations of the ABM Treaty.

The U.S. policy in the Mediterranean region is seriously undermining the all-European security, too.

The draft of the document on additions to the mandate of the Stockholm conference put forward by the PPR delegation will make possible a transition to practical talks within the framework of the CSCE on cutting armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe. It takes into account the profound interest which the West European countries are showing in reducing military confrontation in Europe. The NATO side has not yet undertaken serious steps in this direction.

Kashlev Statement on Security, Disarmament

LD191648 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1545 GMT 19 Dec 86

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annihilation weapons by the end of the present century; the bold and cardinal proposals by the USSR in Reykjavik; the unilateral cessation of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union (silence has held sway on our test sites for 500 days already); the large-scale proposals by the Warsaw Pact states on reducing armed forces and conventional weapons from the Atlantic to the Urals; and a number of others. Acting in the spirit of Helsinki, the Soviet Union stated its willingness to discuss the issue of the non-nuclear status of the Baltic Sea area, dismantled medium-range missile launching facilities on the Kola Peninsula, and a large part of them on the territory of the relevant military districts (okrug).

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Kashlev News Conference

LD231723 Moscow TASS in English 1653 GMT 23 Dec 86

[Excerpts] Moscow, 23 Dec (TASS)--The exchange of views held at the all-European meeting in Vienna has demonstrated opposite approaches to the discussion of the course of implementation of the provisions of the Helsinki and Madrid accords, a press conference held here today was told by Yuriy Kashlev, head of the USSR Foreign Ministry's Administration for Humanitarian and Cultural Relations, who heads the Soviet delegation.

Some delegates, he said, were sincerely trying to hold discussions on an equal footing and briefed the others on what is being done in their countries to implement the Helsinki and Madrid accords, expressed constructive proposals and made critical remarks when necessary. The others struck the posture of prosecutors and were speaking only about the affairs of other peoples, passing over in silence their own affairs, were trying to warp the whole process of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation.

Some delegations concentrated on malicious attacks against other countries, trying in every way possible to slander their policy and practices.

As the discussion of the military-political issues has shown, the dividing line in the approaches of the participating countries to the problems of security in Europe and realization of their commitments under the Final Act runs between those, who, acting in the spirit of new thinking, wish for settling international problems and strengthening universal security and those, who acting from force of inertia, are clinging tenaciously to confrontation, trying to frustrate the positive changes in the world. Figuratively speaking, this dividing line runs not between political blocs, but between political thinking.

One of these tendencies was personified by the Soviet Union and the socialist countries. Among its milestones were: the programme for the elimination until [as received] the end of this century of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, which was advanced by Mikhail Gorbachev in his statement of January 15 this year; the USSR's bold and cardinal proposals at Reykjavik; the unilateral termination of nuclear tests by the Soviet Union, and others.

Another approach found its expression in the adoption by the USA of the "Star Wars" programme and the drawing of other countries into it, in the frustration of the agreements, which began to take shape at Reykjavik, and the course for the total scrapping of its outcome, in the continuing nuclear weapons tests, in the abandonment of the SALT-2 Treaty containing the weapons race, in the attempt to torpedo the fundamentals of the ABM Treaty, i.e. in undermining practically all the key instruments of maintaining strategic stability in the world.

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CSO: 5200/1124

EUROPEAN CONFERENCES

USSR GENERAL TATARNIKOV ASSESSES VIENNA CSCE TALKS

PM091527 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Jan 87 First Edition p 3

[Article by Major General V. Tatarnikov, member of the USSR delegation to the Vienna CSCE talks: "Two Directions, Two Approaches"]

[Text] The second stage of the Vienna CSCE meeting begins in the Austrian capital on 27 January. This meeting is a continuation of the all-European process which began in Helsinki in 1975. The principles and provisions coordinated in the Finnish capital have been firmly incorporated in the structure of European life as a charter of peaceful contact between peoples. The development of this process clearly reflects the leading trend in Europe today -- the trend toward peaceful coexistence between states with different social systems and toward the prospects of a nuclear-free world which were opened up in Reykjavik.

One of the Vienna meeting's tasks is to review the fulfillment of the Helsinki Final Act. Discussion during the first stage, which came to a close on 19 December 1986, showed that two trends have clearly developed in the approach to the problem of European security.

One trend is personified by the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact countries. The substance of this trend is reflected in the program to eliminate nuclear and other types of mass destruction weapons put forward by M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, in his 15 January 1986 statement and in our bold and cardinal proposals in Reykjavik.

In accordance with the Helsinki accords, on 1 August 1980 the Soviet Union unilaterally withdrew from the GDR 20,000 Soviet military servicemen, 1,000 tanks, and other military equipment. In August 1985 it ceased all nuclear weapon tests -- once again on a unilateral basis -- and has observed this moratorium for almost 18 months. In confirmation of its support for the idea of giving northern Europe and the Baltic Sea region nonnuclear status, the USSR has dismantled its medium-range missile launching facilities on the Kolskiy Peninsula and the greater part of its medium-range missile launching facilities in the territory of the Leningrad and Baltic military districts and has also redeployed several divisions of operational-tactical missiles from these districts.

The Delhi Declaration, which stresses that the balance of fear must be replaced by comprehensive international security, is a very important document proclaiming the principles of a world free of nuclear weapons and violence, a world without mass destruction weapons and war. The profound ideas of this declaration have also aroused great interest among states involved in the all-European process, because these ideas have a direct bearing on the problems under discussion in Vienna. Unfortunately, the world has also witnessed ideas and actions of a diametrically opposed nature.
[paragraph continues]

When the appeal came from Delhi for a nuclear-free world, a report came from Washington that the United States would be rejecting once and for all the limitations imposed on the buildup of strategic nuclear weapons by the Soviet-American SALT II treaty, thereby actually breaking this treaty -- one of the foundations for preserving strategic stability in the world.

How have the United States and other NATO countries fulfilled the provisions concerning the foundations of European security? Their approach -- the greater the number of weapons, the greater the security -- is a prime cause of serious concern. This kind of approach is at variance with the spirit and the letter of the Helsinki Final Act. The continuing deployment of American cruise missiles in the FRG, Britain, Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands -- how does this militarist action correspond to the provisions of the Final Act, to its spirit? The cases of American ships in the Black Sea deliberately violating the borders of sovereign states taking part in the meeting -- do they correspond to the spirit of Helsinki?

It is clear that these actions have absolutely nothing in common with the task of strengthening confidence and security in Europe. On the contrary, they are aimed at poisoning the atmosphere of trust and cultivating hostility between states.

Taking these dangerous actions into account, the Soviet delegation is trying to achieve a constructive, balanced discussion of all problems of security and cooperation in Europe at the Vienna meeting. The USSR's position is based on consideration of the opinions held by the states taking part in the meeting that new, specific, and effective actions aimed at strengthening confidence and security are essential on the basis of the progress achieved earlier in Stockholm.

Assessing the Stockholm forum, many participants in the Vienna meeting have noted its positive results and also its positive effect on the situation in Europe. Stockholm's main lesson is that, through joint effort, the participant states were able to overcome their differences and difficulties, make mutual concessions, and reach accord on a number of key, complex issues relating to strengthening confidence and security. In accordance with these agreements, on 15 December 1986 the states exchanged annual plans for their military activity throughout 1987. This step has great practical significance. The Soviet Union also submitted its own plan of military activity and said that it will strictly adhere to the letter and spirit of the document worked out in Stockholm.

The progress made in Stockholm makes it possible for the European countries to get down to discussing security and disarmament measures in real earnest. At their Political Consultative Committee conference in Budapest the Warsaw Pact states put forward a balanced program for European disarmament which could be discussed at the second stage of the Stockholm Conference.

The draft document submitted by the Polish delegation in Vienna on supplementing the Stockholm Conference mandate indicates ways of resolving this task. It proposes, in particular, a parallel discussion of confidence-building measures and disarmament issues. This is the optimum way to reduce armed forces and arms and strengthen confidence and security at the same time. Many states have highly appraised this approach.

Unfortunately, as yet the United States and other NATO countries have failed to take serious steps in this direction. They are not even in evidence in the declaration approved by the NATO Council session on 11 December 1986. So what does this document contain? First, instead of talks on a real reduction in armed forces and conventional arms in Europe, it proposes a discussion on the alleged "imbalance" in the sides' military potentials. This talk of an "imbalance" is quite without foundation and, consequently, the proposed approach could develop into a long and fruitless discussion on figures which could drag on for many years. Second, the questions of disarmament in Europe are separated from the mandate for the Stockholm Conference approved in Madrid. On what grounds has this been done? The Madrid mandate was approved by 35 countries and they have not changed it. Third, in the NATO document the whole problem of reducing armed forces and conventional arms is taken beyond the all-European process, while nothing is said about the role that would be played in the proposed talks by such an authoritative group of countries as the neutral and nonaligned states. Moreover, the NATO document is totally lacking in specific answers to the questions of where, when, and how talks on reducing armed forces and conventional arms are to be held.

Many delegates at the Vienna meeting expressed disappointment in their speeches that the United States and some other NATO countries are once again trying to evade answering the Warsaw Pact states' quite specific, constructive proposals.

Hence, any progress in resolving the problems of reducing armed forces and conventional arms in Europe now depends on the willingness of the NATO countries to take a serious approach to the problem. One would like to hope that they will finally show this willingness at the resumption of the Vienna meeting this month.

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CSO: 5200/1232

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS ON REAGAN'S TESTING MESSAGE TO SENATE

TASS From Washington

LD132320 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1915 GMT 13 Jan 87

[Text] Washington, 13 Jan (TASS) -- TASS Correspondent Nikolay Turkatenko reports:

President Reagan has sent a message to the U.S. Senate stating that the administration favors ratification of the 1974 Soviet-U.S. treaty on limiting underground tests of nuclear weapons, and the 1976 treaty on underground nuclear blasts for peaceful purposes. However, the President's message points out that the treaties can be ratified only on the condition that compliance with them will be subject to verification.

As is known, the pretext of the "impossibility of ensuring the requisite monitoring and verification" is the administration's favorite way of placing obstacles in the way of new accords and of U.S. observance of the Soviet-U.S. accords already achieved. An example of this is the U.S. refusal to abide by SALT II.

As UPI stresses, the President's message is timed for the start of the hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the question of nuclear tests. The President is, as it were, delivering a "preemptive strike," mindful of the growing criticism in Congress of the administration's reluctance to promote attainment of accord on a full nuclear test ban. It is typical that, simultaneously with the publication of the President's message to the Senate, an unnamed representative of the administration told AP that the U.S. intends to continue its test program, and will conduct about six nuclear explosions in the next 3 months.

TASS From Moscow

LD141712 Moscow TASS in English 1636 GMT 14 Jan 87

[Text] Moscow January 14 TASS -- TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev comments:

U.S. President Ronald Reagan has sent a message to the Senate in which he expresses the readiness of the U.S. Administration to give its consent to the ratification of the 1974 Soviet-U.S. treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests and the 1976 treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

Noteworthy is the fact that this decision by the U.S. Administration, made 10 to 12 years late, is accompanied with Washington's refusal to start without delay

negotiations on a total and universal ban on nuclear weapon tests, and ending nuclear testing itself is classified once again among the category of U.S. "long-term objectives."

In his message to the Senate Reagan contends as before that ending nuclear testing by the United States will be possible only when the need to depend on nuclear weapons in ensuring deterrence is obviated.

The conclusion prompts itself that this move by the Reagan administration, which was made in conditions when the Soviet moratorium on any nuclear explosions is in effect, is a new manoeuvre by Washington with an eye to dampening the world public protests against the U.S. obstructionist stand on the issue of a total ban on nuclear testing.

The U.S. press indicates that the administration's decision on the transfer of the two treaties for ratification is part of the deal planned between the White House and Congress.

According to the newspaper THE WASHINGTON POST, the administration agrees to make these treaties a priority item on the agenda in exchange for the promise by the joint House-Senate conference committee to block the adoption by Congress of an amendment banning the United States from conducting nuclear tests.

A demand is set in the President's message as an indispensable condition to the ratification of the treaties that the Soviet Union accept U.S. terms for their verification. It is not excluded that the White House, once it wins Congress' consent to conducting nuclear tests, will scuttle the idea of ratification under the old threadbare pretext that verification techniques are "inadequate".

One should not forget that Washington has lately rejected equally lightly Soviet proposals providing for on-site inspection and initiatives by non-aligned states on verification measures with the use of international inspections.

The Soviet Union has a no less stake in establishing a reliable control over compliance with agreements than the United States. Soviet leaders stated on more than one occasion that verification of compliance with agreements is not a problem with the USSR, that the Soviet side is prepared to take sweeping verification measures, among them on-site inspections in case of need.

However, the most elaborate and reliable verification measures, likewise measures for disarmament, should be mutual and here the Soviet Union does not get a corresponding response from the U.S side, which has recently paid lip service to the most strict verification procedures. In any case, the tactics employed by Washington to thwart a reply visit to the United States by Soviet scientists to take part in monitoring U.S. explosions in the area of the tests does not give ground for optimism.

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CSO: 5200/1235

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR REPORTS ON 3D ROUND NUCLEAR TESTING TALKS

Led by Petrosyants

LD131716 Moscow TASS in English 1708 GMT 13 Nov 86

[Text] Geneva November 13 TASS--The third round of talks between the Soviet Union and the United States on the discontinuation of nuclear tests started here today. The Soviet delegation is led by Andranik Petrosyants, chairman of the USSR State Committee for the Use of Atomic Energy.

'No Tangible Results'

LD251524 Moscow World Service in English 1500 GMT 25 Nov 86

[Text] At a news conference here in Moscow a spokesman for the Soviet Foreign Ministry has said that another round of talks in Geneva on banning nuclear tests has brought no tangible results. He said the Soviet delegation had suggested a concrete plan for a general and comprehensive ban on nuclear explosions. The American delegation however would not discuss this. It was willing to discuss only nuclear weapons test reductions.

Lack of 'Positive' Results

LD290916 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0830 GMT 29 Nov 86

[Text] The latest round of Soviet-U.S. negotiations on ending nuclear tests has ended in Geneva. Our correspondent in Geneva, Vladimir Dmitriyev, asked Comrade Petrosyants, head of the Soviet delegation to the negotiations and chairman of the USSR State Committee on the Use of Atomic Energy, to comment on the results of the round which has ended:

[Begin recording] [Petrosyants] The third round is over, and we may indeed sum up the results. But, from our viewpoint, the results are not positive. The point is that the Soviet delegation insisted that this round should take place under the banner of preparations for a treaty on ending and banning nuclear tests.

We understand, of course, that at short notice it is not possible to prepare a treaty because there is a whole series of issues: issues of monitoring, of levels of force of nuclear blasts, the number of nuclear blasts, duration of monitoring, and of introducing monitoring in accordance with the 1974-76 treaties.

But unfortunately, the U.S. delegation shied away from a solution to questions linked with the ending of nuclear weapons tests. It posed only one issue, that of reconsidering the protocols of the 1974 and 1976 treaties. That is not a resolution of the question. It signifies a resolution of a secondary, or even, from our standpoint, a tertiary question. It will do nothing to bring us closer to terminating and banning tests of nuclear weapons.

What is the reason for this U.S. position? The reason is a very simple one: the fact is that the United States is continuing nuclear testing, continuing to experiment, continuing to modernize and improve its nuclear weapons, and therefore they are pushing the question of ending tests of nuclear weapons and banning tests of nuclear weapons into a remote corner. [end recording]

Foreign Ministry Briefs Press

LD251617 Moscow TASS in English 1545 GMT 25 Nov 86

[Excerpts] Moscow November 25 TASS--First Deputy Head of the Information Department of the USSR Foreign Ministry Boris Pyadyshev spoke today at a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists at the press centre of the USSR Foreign Ministry.

In connection with a regular round of the talks of the USSR and U.S. delegations on banning nuclear tests that is concluding today in Geneva, Boris Pyadyshev said that the Soviet delegation had suggested to embark without delay on full-scale talks which should lead to a complete ban on nuclear explosions. Regrettably, it must be noted that the U.S. delegation had no constructive programme. The USA would like to conduct talks only on the limitation of nuclear tests, not on their ending. As to the Soviet Union, it viewed and views complete ending and banning of nuclear testing as an important political step toward nuclear disarmament and will be exerting every effort for this purpose.

Petrosyants Views Third Round

LD010103 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 30 Nov 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast; Vladimir Dmitriev video report on conclusion of 3d round of Soviet-U.S. talks in Geneva on nuclear tests]

[Text] [Announcer] In Geneva, the 3d round of Soviet-U.S. talks on halting nuclear tests has ended.

[Begin video recording] [Dmitriev] We have witnessed here warm appreciation and approval by the representatives of international organizations in Geneva and Berne as well as by the public of neutral Switzerland for the USSR's decision on a bilateral moratorium on nuclear tests. When this decision was extended by us, more than a few kind words were expressed about our country.

Now at the end of this round and following a press conference conducted by the Soviet delegation, the local press is writing with disappointment about the results of the talks. The USSR representatives, it was stressed at the press conference, proceeded

from the positive results of Reykjavik and sought to develop all the positive things achieved at the summit meeting, and on this basis, to reach specific accords that would lead to the complete banning of nuclear tests.

[A.M. Petrosyants, head of the Soviet delegation] The Soviet delegation insisted that this round should take place under the banner of preparations for a treaty on halting nuclear tests. We understand that, of course, it is not possible at short notice to prepare a treaty, as there is a whole series of attendant issues which have to be discussed and examined.

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CSO: 5200/1235

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR ON U.S. NUCLEAR TESTING STANCE, PLANS

Further U.S. Nuclear Test 'Provocative'

LD230024 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1800 GMT 22 Dec 86

[From the "Vremya" newscast; video talk by political observer Valentin Zorin]

[Text] Hello, comrades! At present there is a particularly deep division between those in America who are in favor of the Republican administration immediately joining the Soviet moratorium, while it is not yet too late, and those who insist in every possible way that nuclear tests at the Nevada test ground continue. While the first point of view is expressed by a considerable majority of the American public, including influential circles in the Congress, there are also -- although in a minority, but obviously having a decisive influence in the present administration -- which insist that nuclear tests continue. These are, above all, U.S. military-industrial corporations which hold the main levers of power in Reagan's Washington. Such a situation will, as far as can be judged at present, lead to Washington definitely missing the invaluable opportunity offered by the Soviet moratorium.

It is not coincidental that in reply to the Soviet Government warning that it cannot threaten the security of its country and that it will be forced to announce the end of the moratorium after the next new U.S. test, provocative rumors leaked from high Washington offices that the new test will be carried out next month. So have all our efforts -- and let us say it directly, sacrifices -- been in vain? Can such a question arise! Far from it. I will not speak about that which has been said many times -- the enormous moral effect of our moratorium -- which in essence has buried the hostile myth of a Soviet military threat, but I will recall something else, the influence of the constructive peace-loving policy of Moscow on the political climate in the world, including that in the United States.

The present -- the biggest in the last 10 years -- internal political scandal in Washington, known as "Irangate," has assumed its scale and depth not lastly because it also exposed the uncontrolled -- not only operating behind the back of the electorate but also the Congress and a greater part of the government -- group of representatives from circles closest to the President. This group of people appointed arbitrarily by the President, (?calling) itself the National Security Council, has been steering the U.S. political course in recent years not only contrary to the interests of the majority of the American people, but also a considerable part of business circles,

exclusively in the name of profits of the most aggressive part of the monopolies — military-industrial complex. These monopolies have been setting the tune of the Washington's policy in recent years. The scandal, which has exposed gross violence in the activities of various business circles and U.S. Government bodies, is fraught with far-reaching consequences. Public circles and influential business groups now demand the liquidation of the dictatorship of the Californian military-industrial mafia. The rejection of the moratorium on nuclear weapons tests will put before the present Washington leadership new difficult political tasks which will not be as easily brushed aside as it perhaps seems to some today.

Tests 'Wrecking' Disarmament Effort

LD082128 Moscow TASS in English 2110 GMT 8 Jan 87

["Nuclear Explosions -- Catalyst of Arms Race" -- TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow January 8 TASS -- Military news analyst Vladimir Bogachev writes:

A press conference on Wednesday was told by the White House spokesman Dan Howard that for as long as nuclear arms are a part of the strategic defense of the United States and the West, nuclear tests are necessary. He added that the best moratorium would be the destruction of nuclear arms.

So the Reagan administration contends that the ending of test explosions will become possible only when nothing that needs testing is left. The essence of this logical abracadabra is that for Washington the ending of nuclear tests and even the commencement of talks on banning them is an extremely unwelcome prospect.

Or is it that the present Reagan administration really intends to take a quick short cut to eliminating all nuclear arms and bypass such intermediate stages as a moratorium or a ban on nuclear explosions? For in Reykjavik the President of the United States himself stated his readiness to sign an agreement with the Soviet Union on the liquidation by 1996 of all nuclear devices, including bombs, battlefield weapons, cruise missiles and intermediate range systems.

But as soon as the President returned to Washington from Iceland the White House "specified" that during the Soviet-American summit Reagan had often made slips of the tongue and when mentioning all nuclear devices actually had in mind only ballistic missiles.

Somewhat later the director of the American arms control and disarmament agency directly stated that Washington was no longer making the emphasis on eliminating all ballistic missiles in the course of ten years as well and that this measure was merely a "long-term" aim of the United States.

Everything became clear, when Washington decides publicly to pigeonhole a proposal on some concrete measure to lessen the danger of nuclear war it lists it among the "long-term aims" of the United States. To be more precise, all concrete measures to reduce or eliminate arms proposed by other countries are declared by the Reagan administration "long-term aims" of the United States and sabotaged in practice.

The present American leadership wants a continuation of nuclear tests only because they are an important component part of the process of creating new and improving old means

of mass annihilation. The United States Administration needs nuclear explosions to fulfill its plan of further stepping up the arms race on earth and spreading it to outer space.

The present United States Administration links the problem of ending nuclear tests with the problem of eliminating nuclear arms in the hope of wrecking at the same time also the prospects of reducing the nuclear arsenals and those of attaining agreement of a general and complete prohibition of nuclear explosions.

U.S. Test Planned 5 February

LD120851 Moscow TASS in English 0840 GMT 12 Jan 87

[Text] New York January 12 TASS--The United States is planning to stage its first nuclear test this year on February 5, THE NEW YORK TIMES reported today quoting administration officials. According to experts familiar with the American nuclear test programme, the Department of Energy intended to conduct six nuclear blasts in the coming three months.

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CSO: 5200/1235

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

MOSCOW: U.S. 'OBSTACLES' TO SEISMOLOGISTS' WORK HIT

PM191639 Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English No 50, 14 Dec 86 p 7

[Interview With Igor Nersesov, corresponding member of the Armenian SSR Academy of Sciences, by correspondent Aleksandr Grigoryev: "Barred From Nevada. About the Soviet-American Experiment in Nuclear Non-Testing Verification"]

[Text] "At last, we have chosen the sites on which to set up our seismic apparatuses around the American nuclear testing range in Nevada. They will be located roughly 150 km from the testing area -- to the south, west and north-east of the range," said Igor Nersesov, Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences of the Armenian SSR, head of the delegation of Soviet scientists who have recently returned from the United States. Neresov was speaking with "MN" correspondent Aleksandr Grigoryev.

More than four months have passed since the commencement of the Soviet part of the joint experiment by Soviet and U.S. seismologists in control over the non-conduct of nuclear testing and before this first and as yet modest step was made to implement the American part of the programme. The sites for mounting the apparatuses were chosen unseen, because we Soviet scientists were not allowed to go to Nevada. The U.S. Administration's attitude toward our joint project seriously compounded the organizational aspect of the part conducted on American soil.

First, its course was seriously delayed. Our trip was planned for September. At that time, three stations with American equipment and serviced by scientists from the USA were already working in the USSR. But only in November did we receive permission to go to America. Moreover, to put it mildly, they gave us very weird terms: either we go as private guests of the U.S. Natural Resources Defense Council or as official guests of the American Government, but then in the latter case we would have had to be present during testing of nuclear weapons.

Second, the question of our visiting Nevada was made contingent on this. We could enter the testing range only in the event we took part in nuclear testing.

We opted for the former variant and went at the invitation of the Natural resources Defense Council. Our road to Nevada, naturally, was closed. Instead of a visit to Nevada, our American colleagues had to offer us samples of mountain rock, charts and slides of eight contemplated sites in the environs of the Nevada testing range. After comparing all the information we received, we chose three sites.

During the first days of their work on Soviet land, in the area of Karkaralinsk, American scientists James Brune, Charles Archambeau and others traversed many kilometres in the mountains in search of the most convenient site for setting up the instruments. They took stock of the minutest details, even the location of trees around the sites proposed for conducting the seismic observations. It is not accidental that, at a press conference in the USA, Jonathan Berger, the leading specialists of the experiment from the American side in mounting Seismic equipment, described the Soviets' readiness to accept the sites "blindly" as a well-nigh heroic act.

In describing the situation to journalists, the American scientist put it something like this: "It's the same as buying a car you've never seen."

But for us it was more important to tear down the barriers in the way of advancing the experiment. Much in our decision to choose the sites "blindly" was apparently played by the fact that we had already jointly with the American colleagues selected sites for apparatuses in Kazakhstan and, therefore, could trust their professionalism. Direct contact has a special role to play in such an important undertaking. Among the achievements, already listed on the credit side of the joint experiment, I would primarily name the "human factor" -- the ability demonstrated by the scientists of the USSR and the USA to cooperate productively and successfully in the practical realization of a project serving the strengthening of peace.

A system of monitoring has been established. It could be used. But...

Both Soviet and American scientists taking part in our project consider it a very important scientific venture aimed to ensure verification of the non-conduct of nuclear blasts. What we have already created is a mock-up of the verification system which could practically be used in the shape in which it currently exists. Suffice it to say that, with the help of their instruments in Kazakhstan, the American scientists even register explosions carried out in industrial quarries. And these blasts use only ordinary explosives, and in small quantities. Because nuclear explosions, even of the lowest yield, could go undetected. It would be impossible to conceal them. [sentences as published]

Our consent to accept the sites "blindly" made it possible to melt the ice in the realization of the American part of the project. And yet the differences between the state of affairs in the work on it in the USSR and in the USA are still striking.

For example, preparations are under way to mount ground-level apparatuses for seismic observation of the territory of the Nevada testing range. But Soviet specialists will not take part in servicing them because the US government has denied us the right to do this.

There are other problems as well complicating our work in the USA. Americans say that more sophisticated well-drilling apparatuses will be ready in January. But so far it is not known whether we shall be able to use them on American territory, because the land in the area of the Nevada testing range is state property and no permission to drill wells has yet been received. It may not be received at all.

It is true that the US Natural Resources Defense Council is preparing reserve variants, looking for private landowners who could be asked to rent plots for drilling wells.

Not everything is OK either concerning permission to use American well-drilling equipment in the USSR. The US scientists have obtained a licence from their government to bring it to the area of the Soviet testing range. But the question has not yet been decided about programme support for the equipment, without which it is practically worthless.

All these problems have arisen not through the fault of the Natural Resources Defense Council. On the contrary, the American organizers of the experiment have to apply additional efforts to overcome ever new obstacles put up by the US authorities. Understanding this, the Soviet side has displayed the maximum flexibility. The departure of Soviet scientists Sergey Dorogan and Yevgeniy Sutulov to San Diego, California, where telemetric information should be supplied from the seismometers in Nevada, has been postponed for a month, till mid-January.

The agreement has been signed for a year, and we, the Soviet side, will strictly abide by our commitments.

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CSO: 5200/1125

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS: PEACE GROUPS' LETTER TO REAGAN ON TESTING

LD230923 Moscow TASS in English 0920 GMT 23 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow December 23 TASS -- The participants in a plenary meeting of the Soviet Peace Committee and the board of the Soviet Peace Fund, which took place in Moscow today, appealed to the U.S. President "to display goodwill and political responsibility." Speaking on behalf of millions of Soviet peace campaigners, they demanded in a letter to Ronald Reagan an end to nuclear testing. A delegation chosen by the plenary meeting, led by writer Anatoliy Ananiyev, a deputy chairman of the Peace Committee, called at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow and handed the letter to an Embassy official.

Just a few days separate us from December 31, when the Soviet unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions runs out, the letter says. You know perfectly well that this moratorium, announced by the USSR on August 6, 1985, has been extended four times. The Soviet leadership did so fulfilling the will of the Soviet people and meeting the numerous requests from the world's peaceloving public, including the Americans.

All this time we, like millions of people all over the world, have been hoping that your administration will give a positive response to this important Soviet initiative and renounce nuclear testing. However, these hopes have not yet come true.

The participants in the plenary meeting recall that the Soviet Government suggested in its statement of December 18 immediate full-scale talks on a total nuclear test ban and expressed its readiness to continue to respect its moratorium till the first U.S. nuclear explosion next year.

The Soviet peace campaigners urge the U.S. President: Use the chance which still is open and do at long last what the peoples of all the countries and continents, including the Americans, are demanding so strongly and unanimously -- stop nuclear weapons test.

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CSO: 5200/1235

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

USSR'S GERASIMOV BRIEFS MEDIA ON MORATORIUM

LD301207 Moscow TASS in English 1154 GMT 30 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow December 30 TASS -- "Today is the 512th day of the Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests. Tomorrow will be the 513th day. The count can be continued for generations to come, if the U.S. follows the example of the Soviet Union", Gennadiy Gerasimov, head of the Information Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has stated.

Speaking at a briefing for Soviet and foreign journalists today, he said that the outgoing year had been proclaimed to be the International Year of Peace by the decision of the U.N. General Assembly. "We proceed from the assumption that peace is the most valuable thing, the benefit of humanity. These are our priorities, and we sought to do our utmost for 1986 to become the beginning of a decade of peace, so that humanity [would] enter the 21st century in conditions of peace, trust and cooperation, as the resolution of the U.N. General Assembly put it".

"Unfortunately, our initiatives have not been supported by the West so far. It is moving in the opposite direction -- in the direction of a further whipping up of the arms race, both in space and on the earth".

"However, the struggle for peace is going on, and we have not become dejected", Gerasimov said.

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CSO: 5200/1125

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

PRAVDA: GENERAL CHERVOV VIEWS NUCLEAR TEST RESUMPTION

AU051356 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 4 Jan 87 p 4

[USSR Colonel General Nikolay Chervov "comment" on USSR decision to resume nuclear tests following the first U.S. nuclear test in 1987: "Now It Is Only Up to the U.S. Government to Decide; Measures Enforced In the Interest Of Security" — initial paragraph is newspaper's introduction]

[Text] Vladimir Morozov, NOVOSTI military commentator, asked Colonel General Nikolay Chervov, chief of a directorate of the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces, to comment on the enforced measures of the Soviet Government, which has adopted the decision that the USSR will resume nuclear testing after the first U.S. nuclear explosion in 1987.

Four times the USSR has extended its unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions. From the political as well as the military viewpoint these have been bold steps, creating all prerequisites for the earliest possible contractual ban on tests. The entire world community has also interpreted them in this way. Unfortunately, the United States has refused to join in the moratorium.

Moreover, while this has lasted it has carried out 24 tests. The USSR, which continued its moratorium, then declared that under these circumstances it cannot remain unilaterally restrained forever. The Soviet leadership carefully analyzed the situation which has arisen, and absolutely correctly arrived at the conclusion that, since the United States continues nuclear tests with the objective of developing new types of weapons, the Soviet Union can no longer risk its and its allies' highest security interests. The USSR's decision to discontinue the unilateral moratorium, although forced, is fully justified.

At the same time, the Soviet Government's declaration stresses that the USSR will resume nuclear tests only after the first American test explosion in 1987. It is prepared to return to the moratorium any day, should the United States decide to halt its nuclear tests.

The U.S. Administration claims that a total ban on nuclear tests will be possible only when the possibility of verification is substantially improved, when trust becomes strengthened, and when results are achieved in the reduction of conventional equipment. The issue of verification is no problem, however. The USSR has expressed its assent to any verification measures, including international verification measures, as well as to on-site inspections. The USSR has made this a reality. American seismic stations are located in the vicinity of Semipalatinsk. The USSR is also willing to study any other verification measures, but does not want verification just because of nuclear tests, as the U.S. Administration proposes, but in order for these tests not to be carried out. Herein lies the fundamental difference between the two sides. In reality the current U.S. Administration wishes neither reduction, nor verification, nor trust.

The White House would like to present the Soviet moratorium as a propaganda maneuver. But a moratorium on all nuclear explosions is not just a proposal, but above all a fact which shows the USSR's seriousness and high degree of responsibility in the struggle to strengthen peace. Banning nuclear tests is the most realistic, the simplest, and the most effective act in the interest of halting the feverish arms buildup and, to a considerable degree, also averting the feverish arms buildup in space. What sort of propaganda is that?!

The Soviet moratorium is a unique action, dictated by the new thinking, by the new approach to the solution of the main task of the present -- ridding mankind of the threat of nuclear war. Naturally, the moratorium is fraught with certain risks for the USSR. In the course of the 18 months its moratorium has been in effect, the USSR has fallen behind the United States a bit. There exists a real danger that the United States could get far ahead in the development of its nuclear warheads. Therefore, one of the main objectives of the Soviet nuclear tests, if they are resumed after the first U.S. nuclear explosion in 1987, will be the perfection of the nuclear potential. The Soviet Union cannot permit its security to be imperiled, especially since the United States unilaterally tramples agreements underfoot and openly strives to achieve military superiority.

The main objective of the USSR -- halting nuclear tests and putting an end to the feverish arms buildup -- remains unchanged, and the declaration of the Soviet Government formulates this accurately.

If in its policy Washington proceeds from realism and if this policy is not determined by chasing the chimera of military superiority, a positive solution to the problem is not excluded. The U.S. Administration still has time to think over and consider everything.

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CSO: 5200/1125

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

PRAVDA HITS CONTINUING FRENCH NUCLEAR TESTING PROGRAM

PM291447 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 26 Dec 86 First Edition p 4

[Own correspondent V. Bolshakov dispatch as part of feature entitled "The Main Topic. Moratorium: Day 508": "From the Sahara to Mururoa. Nuclear Tests and France's Stance"]

[Excerpts] Paris, Dec--The first French nuclear tests were conducted in the Sahara in 1960, and continued there until 1966. They were then transferred to Mururoa Atoll in the Pacific.

Nuclear tests are still continuing at Mururoa. Why? French leaders have repeatedly declared that France would not terminate its nuclear tests until the other nuclear powers take serious disarmament measures. Ever since, according to Georges Fischer, member of the French peace movement leadership, "this policy has been constantly confirmed in one form or another. The irrationality of this policy was demonstrated in the 'Greenpeace' case (meaning the 1985 explosion organized by French military intelligence staffers in New Zealand on a ship belonging to 'Greenpeace,' an international organization of environmentalists, which was due to sail to Mururoa to protest against the French nuclear tests--V.B.). We showed the whole world that we consider our nuclear tests sacred and would not allow them to be jeopardized even by a handful of ecologists appealing to common sense."

Specialists in the nuclear weapons sphere note a rather significant feature of the tests at Mururoa: They involve nuclear charges which are, so to speak, "miniatures"--4 kilotons on 27 April, 3 kilotons on 7 May, and 2 kilotons on 28 May. Three options may be involved. The first is that these are tests of tactical nuclear weapons, including neutron weapons, being created [sozdavayemoye] in France. The second is that these are tests of warheads either for nuclear-armed ABM missiles or for antisubmarine defense missiles armed with nuclear warheads. And the third is that these are tests of technology for nuclear-pumped laser weapons. Any one of these three options involves "third-generation" nuclear missile weapons which have nothing in common with the concepts of "containment" and "deterrent."

These expert assessments are not groundless. The "Arms 5-Year Plan" (1987-1991) provides for the improvement of nuclear weapons by the French Ministry of Defense.

In late 1986 France conducted tests of 20- and 30-kiloton nuclear charges at Mururoa. The ensuing protest by peace champions, environmentalists, and young people in France, let alone the protests by New Zealand, Australia, and the island states in the Pacific, was so widespread that L. Jospin, first secretary of the French Socialist Party, openly asked: "Does France really need underground nuclear tests?" L. Jospin said in particular that, at a time when the USSR and the United States, the two leading nuclear powers, are seeking ways to reduce their nuclear arsenals in the wake of Reykjavik, France's policy of modernizing and building up its nuclear missile weapons is already difficult to justify. This opinion by the leader of the largest opposition party reflects not only a shift in favor of the moratorium among French public opinion but also growing dissatisfaction with the military policy pursued by the government.

G. Marchais, secretary general of the French Communist Party, noted in a recent speech that the continuation of French nuclear tests at Mururoa is totally divorced from the strategy of deterrence and pursues the objective of improving the existing nuclear arsenal.

The newspaper L'HUMANITE wrote recently in an article on the French nuclear tests that their termination would, first, help curtail work on the creation [sozdaniye] of new destabilizing weapons and, second, encourage other nuclear powers to follow the USSR's example and join the nuclear moratorium rather than getting involved in yet another spiral of the improvement of nuclear missile weapons.

The arguments used by the advocates of continuing the tests also fail to stand up to criticism from the viewpoint of verifying [proverka] observance of the moratorium. The journal SCIENCE ET VIE recently published an article by military observer Sven Ortoli, who admitted that modern technology completely rules out the possibility of concealing tests of even "subkiloton" nuclear devices (in other words, with a yield of less than 1 kiloton). Meanwhile, the bourgeois press is constantly using as justification of the nuclear tests the thesis of "difficulties in verifying [kontrol]" their termination.

But these "arguments" against a nuclear test ban, which were finally demolished by the Soviet leadership's explanations on the question of the USSR's attitude toward the verification [kontrol] problem, are being treated with growing skepticism both in France and in other West European countries.

The shortage of new thinking, of which M.S. Gorbachev spoke in his 22 October statement on Soviet television, is, alas, still to be found among French bourgeois political circles. The country's progressive forces and public opinion in other West European countries demand that all who are now elaborating new plans for the arms race, extending to the end of this century, should take advantage of a situation which is favorable for the cause of disarmament. The crucial nature of this moment in time has been felt particularly acutely by the European peace-loving public in the last few days in light of the Soviet Government's 18 December statement which contained the warning that the Soviet Union would be forced to resume nuclear tests following the very first U.S. nuclear tests in the coming year, 1987.

"Let's join the Soviet moratorium before it is too late!" "Halt nuclear tests!" --these are the messages on posters conceived by members of the French peace champions movement and fighters for nuclear disarmament. Posters reading "We demand an end to nuclear tests!" appeared on the walls of houses in the course of demonstrations held throughout the country. Only time will tell whether the leaders of the Western nuclear powers will heed and act on this appeal to common sense, aware that any further buildup of nuclear potentials will not enhance anyone's security but only diminish it.

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CSO: 5200/1125

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

TASS: KIM IL-SONG ON KOREAN NUCLEAR-FREE ZONE

LD302048 Moscow TASS in English 1823 GMT 30 Dec 86

[Text] Moscow December 30 TASS -- TASS political news analyst Mikhail Yakovlev writes:

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has made one more step towards national reconciliation and unification of Korea. General secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea, President of the DPRK Kim Il-song has proposed that summit military-political negotiations be held between the north and the south of the country with a view of building up confidence between the sides and relaxing tension, discussing questions of mutual cooperation and exchanges, reducing armed forces, ending the arms race and big military exercises. The success of such negotiations, said the Korean leader, would enable summit North-South negotiations to discuss the basis issues relating to reunification of the country.

The DPRK's new peaceable act is not casual. The situation shaping in the Korean peninsula and around it is the cause of rightful concern of both the Korean people and the peoples of other Asian countries. [paragraph continues]

Over the long years of occupation the U.S. military turned the south of Korea into an explosive nuclear bridgehead, with hundreds of nuclear warheads and numerous delivery vehicles -- from artillery guns to newest planes -- deployed there. Moreover, the United States has recently taken the decision to deploy its "Lance" tactical missiles in South Korea.

It is noteworthy that the United States is taking steps to build up its military might in the Korean peninsula every time when one witnesses even the slightest outlines of positive changes in the dialogue between the north and the south of Korea.

For many years the DPRK Government has been working for the solution of the Korean question through peaceful means, in the national interests of the Korean people, in the interests of peace and security in the Asian-Pacific region. Suffice it to mention the DPRK's proposal that all American troops and nuclear weapons be withdrawn from South Korea, that a peace treaty should come in place of the Armistice Agreement, that a democratic confederal republic of Korea be formed. Materialization of the DPRK's proposal on establishing a nuclear-free zone in the Korean peninsula would also be a serious contribution. But the DRPK's constructive proposals invariably encounter stubborn opposition of the United States which is nurturing criminal aggressive plans towards Asian countries, above all socialist states.

Materialization of the DPRK's new initiative would undoubtedly help remove dangerous tension in the Korean Peninsula, open the way to solution of the national problem of the Korean people as a whole. Withdrawal of all American occupation troops from the south of Korea is an indispensable condition for that, the DPRK Government stressed on many occasions.

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NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

GORBACHEV, HIROSHIMA MAYOR MESSAGES ON NUCLEAR THREAT

Gorbachev Message

LD160506 Moscow TASS in English 0341 GMT 16 Jan 87

[Text] Moscow January 16 TASS -- Follows the full text of the message sent by Mikhail Gorbachev to Takeshi Araki, the mayor of the city of Hiroshima:

Esteemed Mr. Araki,

I have read with great attention your message stressing the pressing need for progress in the effort to put an end to nuclear tests and achieve nuclear disarmament. Concern for the destinies of the world expressed in it is close and understandable to Soviet people. I believe that it is consonant also with the wishes of all honest people on earth demanding that a repetition of the Hiroshima tragedy on a global scale be prevented.

The Soviet Union believes that as long as nuclear weapons remain on earth there exists the threat of nuclear war and destruction of humankind in it. Therefore we are not for just talking that disarmament is desirable, but for accomplishing that desire of the peoples. The aim of our disarmament programme is well known. It is to eliminate by the beginning of the 21st century all nuclear and other mass destruction weapons. As Reykjavik showed, we are prepared for sensible mutually acceptable compromises. I can assure you that the USSR will cover its half of the way towards disarmament honestly, without wishing to ensure for itself any superiority or advantages. I think, you will agree, that we have the right to expect the same approach from the other side too.

Your letter contains a call for further extending the unilateral Soviet moratorium on nuclear tests. This is quite an understandable wish to us, reflecting the hopes and aspirations of the inhabitants of Hiroshima, of all Japanese, to whose lot it fell to be the first victims of deadly atomic weapons. In common with you we would wish that the moratorium would be permanently in effect, that all the nuclear powers would join in it. Herein was and remains one of the aims of our initiative. We remain committed to the idea of a general moratorium now too. Even in the event of a forced resumption of nuclear explosions, the USSR is prepared to re-introduce the moratorium, if the same decision is taken by the U.S. side.

We are firmly convinced that putting an end to nuclear explosions is the simplest way towards curtailing the arms race. It totally depends on the USA whether that way is cleared and unblocked. It is high time for everybody to draw the firm conclusion that the from positions of nuclear strength policy, the policy of nuclear blackmail is

completely outdated. In this age security can be only universal. Today all countries and peoples should learn the great science of peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial cooperation. The Soviet Union is seeking for itself the same security, which it is ready to recognize the the United States, for other countries. including for Japan.

Japan, a state, which, in our view, has a special right to be among the front ranks of fighters for a nuclear-free world, could say its weighty word for putting an end to nuclear tests, for transition to real disarmament. As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, the fight for a total ban and elimination of nuclear weapons is the very essence of our policy, and we are ready for constructive international cooperation in the name of this lofty goal. We are confident that the interests of the Soviet and Japanese peoples as well as of other peoples on earth in the effort to remove the nuclear threat cannot but coincide.

Yours sincerely
M. Gorbachev
January 14, 1987

Mayor Replies to Message

LD160910 Moscow TASS in English 0841 GMT 16 Jan 87

[Text] Hiroshima January 16 TASS -- Mikhail Gorbachev's reply to Hiroshima Mayor Takeshi Araki, who last December sent a letter to the general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, was conveyed to the addressee here today.

Araki in his letter, with identical messages sent also to the leaders of the United States, Britain and France, spoke highly of the Soviet Union's introduction of a unilateral moratorium on all nuclear explosions 18 months ago and urged the other nuclear powers to follow suit in the name of halting the arms race.

After receiving the Soviet leader's return message, the Hiroshima mayor said:

"We are sincerely grateful to Mikhail Gorbachev for his unwavering commitment to the cause of nuclear disarmament and stronger general security.

"We in Hiroshima realize especially acutely what a nuclear catastrophe can lead to. This is why the city's people have welcomed wholeheartedly the Soviet-proposed program for scrapping all nuclear weapons by century's end.

"The Soviet moratorium on nuclear explosions has become a real contribution to its implementation."

"Regrettably," Araki added, "we have not received replies from the leaders of the other nuclear powers." He expressed deep concern about the U.S. Administration's intent to press on with its nuclear testing and about its plans to stage another nuclear blast next month.

After the ceremony at which he handed Mikhail Gorbachev's reply message to Araki the Soviet ambassador to Japan, N.N. Solovev, placed a floral garland at the foot of the monument to the victims of the American atomic bombing of Hiroshima. It contains rolls with the names of the 143,590 people who were killed in August 1945 and died later from the effects of the atomic explosion.

Speaking in a TASS interview, Sakae Ito, co-chairperson of the Japanese Council of Organizations of Atomic Bombing victims, said:

"The Soviet Union keeps making stubborn efforts towards disarmament in spite of the U.S. refusal to follow its lead.

"The Reagan administration is reluctant to give any thought to the fate of mankind, to how to save this planet from destruction.

"The United States has continued its nuclear testing and kept ignoring Soviet proposals.

"The USSR has observed its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing for 18 months now, but we understand that there is a limit to any patience.

"Washington must realize, at long last, that the whole planet is waiting to see the implementation of the Soviet program for destroying all nuclear weapons by the end of the century."

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CSO: 5200/1235

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

PRAVDA HITS AUSTRALIAN OPPOSITION VIEWS ON SOUTH PACIFIC NFZ

PM241459 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 22 Dec 86 First Edition p 5

[O. Skalkin "Rejoinder": "Peacock Takes Umbrage"]

[Text] If one is to judge by the statements of Andrew Peacock, who is in charge of foreign affairs in the shadow cabinet of the Australian Liberal Party, the foreign policy platform of the main force in the country's parliamentary opposition today, as in the old days, is held up by two rotten supports. Blind emulation of the United States, which was responsible for involving the country in the U.S. adventure in Indochina with grievous consequences for Australia and the Liberals themselves. The other element which has become ingrained is its anti-Soviet rhetoric which employs the most unworthy methods and is nearly always filled with unpardonable falsification.

The latest target of Peacock's statements is Soviet policy in the Pacific Ocean and the USSR's cooperation with countries in this part of the world. The aim of these insinuations is perfectly transparent. This cooperation is not to the liking of Peacock and others like him.

Several months ago, at parliamentary debates on the draft law on a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific, the Liberals and their foreign policy representative refused point-blank, for example, to support the Rarotonga Treaty, with which the peoples of the Pacific link their hopes of a peaceful future. At Washington's prompting, they "exposed" the Soviet threat in the Pacific and are now doing their utmost to inflate this ill-intentioned myth. The Americans do not like the fact that small Pacific countries now have the opportunity to develop economic ties with the Soviet Union on a fair basis and more effectively defend their national interests. So Peacock and other conservatives are making a lot of noise about "Moscow's intrigues."

The spokesman for the opposition glibly claimed in parliament, for example, that with the aid of fishing agreements the Soviet Union is trying "to buy itself the opportunity to penetrate the South Pacific." "The Soviet Union's ultimate aim is to destabilize peace in our region," he said casually a few minutes later. Proof? There is none, of course. And the shadow minister is confusing the issue.

In particular, he has crudely distorted both the spirit and the meaning of M.S. Gorbachev's Vladivostok speech, which sets out Soviet policy in the Asia-Pacific region. The policy speech by the Soviet leader, which has met with a good response, including in the capitals of South Pacific countries, discussed jointly building new, just relations in Asia and the Pacific Ocean and outlined ways of achieving this aim.

Peacock has no idea of how timely and important honest, just economic relations, including in the fishing sphere, are to the region's young developing states which have been robbed for centuries and are still being exploited today by imperialist benefactors. In many cases, fishing is an extremely important — if not the only — source of foreign currency for countries dependent on importing essentials, and their hopes of strengthening their independence are connected with it.

But Mr. Peacock drones on and on, regardless of everything.

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CSO: 5200/1125

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ON DETECTION WITH JAPAN

BK241031 Melbourne Overseas Service in English 0830 GMT 24 Dec 86

[Text] The minister for foreign affairs, Mr Hayden, has announced that Australia is cooperating with Japan in a scientific venture which will contribute to detecting underground nuclear explosions. The venture involves the exchange of seismic waveform data which will contribute to the building and operation of a global seismic network. Seismic monitoring is one of the most important means of detecting underground nuclear explosions.

The Australian Government believes that a global seismic network could play a vital role in verifying compliance with a future comprehensive test ban treaty -- Australia's highest priority arms control objective. An experiment conducted between the Australian Seismological Center in Canberra and the Japanese Weather Association in Tokyo will complement work by the Geneva-based conference on disarmament group of scientific experts. A major international seismic experiment is proposed for 1988.

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CSO: 5200/4302

NUCLEAR TESTING AND FREE ZONE PROPOSALS

BRIEFS

END OF NUCLEAR TESTS URGED--Moscow, 26 Dec (TASS)--The Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation has called upon various social and political forces, organizations and individuals in Western Europe, the U.S. and Canada to step up their efforts for an end to nuclear testing. The committee drew the attention of their partners to the fact that in the present situation the peace forces of Europe and the world as a whole could shortly take broad and efficient measures to block another nuclear explosion planned by the U.S. If that goal was accomplished, the resumption of Soviet nuclear testing would be out of the question, the document says. [Text] [Moscow TASS in English 1918 GMT 26 Dec 86 LD] /9738

CSO: 5200/1125

RELATED ISSUES

USSR'S BOVIN AUTHORS BOOK ON U.S. NUCLEAR STRATEGY

Moscow OБSHCHESTVENNYYE NAUKI V SSSR: SERIYA 1--PROBLEMY NAUCHNOGO KOMMUNIZMA (REFERATIVNYY ZHURNAL) in Russian No 5, Sep-Oct 86 pp 48-51

[Review by A.L. Samoylov of book "Pogovorim po sushchestvu...o mire i voynе, pazryadke i konfrontatsii, razoruzhenii i gonke vooruzheniy i o drugikh problemakh mirovoy politiki" [Let Us Talk About the Essence of Peace and War, Detente and Confrontation, Disarmament and the Arms Race and About Other Problems of World Policy] by A. Ye. Bovin, Mezhdunarodnyye Otnosheniya, Moscow, 1985, 104 pages]

[Text] The book of the well-known observer and specialist in international affairs represents a developed exposition of the author's answers to the most frequent questions of readers, listeners and television audiences. The main focus of the book is on the problems of war and peace.

Contrary to all Western propaganda, no one in the Soviet Union is thinking of changing the social order in the United States. From the point of view of the international legal order, capitalism has just as much a right to exist as does socialism. We very definitely support this legal order. Despite the overall irreconcilability of the interests of capitalism and socialism, there is at least one common interest that outweighs everything else. This common interest is survival under conditions where a war with nuclear missiles would be a catastrophe for both the USSR and the United States. For the USSR, the maintenance of equilibrium in the international arena is not a temporary or transient goal but a strategy aimed at replacing the "balance of fear" with a balance of interests (p 95).

The Soviet Union believes that it is necessary to adapt foreign policy to the realities of a changing world. The United States is trying to accommodate the surrounding world to the needs of its own policies. The Soviet Union is proceeding from the existence of a strategic military parity and is proposing the gradual mutual reduction of its level. The United States, in declaring that it lags behind militarily, has in fact taken the course of destroying parity and of achieving superiority. As a first step, the Soviet Union is proposing a freeze on arms at the current levels. The United States wants to talk about disarmament and simultaneously carry on the modernization and proliferation of arms.

Having renounced in 1972, on a mutual basis, the deployment of ABM defense systems, the USSR and the United States "voluntarily agreed to become hostages--each country in relation to the other" (p 7). This stressed in a dramatic way the transition of strategic thinking to a qualitatively new level. Neither defense nor aggression nor any combination of them can guarantee security any longer. The only guarantee of security is mutual security. The recognition of this fact in the East as well as in the West permits the conclusion that in principle the probability of preventing a third world war remains higher than the probability of the start of such a war, despite the obvious increase in the threat of a nuclear-missile catastrophe since the end of the 1970's (p 7).

At the nuclear missile level, the classical link between weapons and their utilization is upset. Nuclear missiles cannot be a reasonable means of waging war. One can have them but there is no sense in using them in any way other than as a means of restraint. War is a decision that resolves nothing. The result is the so-called "strategic stalemate": there are figures on the board but no place to move them (p 9). From this follows the absurdity and illogic of the arms race, for in the nuclear age, weapons accumulation does not increase security but diminishes it.

In principle, the question of superiority does not boil down to quantitative parameters (who has more or less of something), although it is related to them. At the nuclear level, superiority means the capability through a first strike (counterforce, counter-C3 strike) of reducing the potential for a retaliatory strike to the point where this retaliatory strike would no longer be a "knockout or lethal" strike (p 37).

The danger increases when nuclear weapons are deployed near potential targets. If the flight time is only a few minutes, then there is a corresponding reduction in the time for decisions and thus there is a greater risk of error. Now, after the beginning of the implementation of NATO's "double resolution," this is precisely the situation that exists in Europe.

The author pays a great deal of attention to the most urgent problem in world politics, the militarization of space. The Soviet position in this matter is clear: not to transfer the arms race to space, inasmuch as the task of "absolutely dependably" defending oneself against missiles has no solution at all. In the opinion of many experts, it is fundamentally impossible to establish an ABM defense with 100-percent reliability. Even a 5-percent "hole" in the ABM defense system is enough to wipe out all hopes of security, for security has to be insured with the help of that same guaranteed destruction (p 17).

The extension of the arms race to space, the concomitant unavoidable renunciation of the existing agreement prohibiting ABM defense, and the simultaneous and--for obvious reasons--asymmetrical and unequal proliferation of defensive and offensive potentials will increase instability and uncertainty in the realm of strategic planning. New uncertainties will be added to the many already in existence, which will make it more difficult to maintain the strategic equilibrium. And as the risk factors increase, so will the probability of a nuclear-missile confrontation (pp 18-19).

In the United States, various scenarios are being worked out for a limited controlled nuclear war--the exchange of strikes not against cities but only against military targets and command and communications centers. Soviet military doctrine rejects the possibility of such a "nuclear duel" as purely illusory. It assumes that it will not be possible to stop the escalation of nuclear strikes (p 14). At the same time, the author writes in conclusion that the forces against war and for the preservation of peace will grow more rapidly than the forces capable of plunging humanity into a nuclear-missile catastrophe. On the side of peace, besides the socialist countries, are dozens of nonaligned states, where they understand better and better that their development problems cannot be solved without a return to detente and without disarmament.

The side of peace includes not only the mass antiwar and antinuclear movement but also influential circles in the governments, parliaments and business of Western powers who understand the hopelessness and danger of the course of increasing preparations for war.

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